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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Nuclear Debates and Political Competition in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: 
Denuclearization or Nuclear Latency in the aftermath of Fukushima 
By 
Alex Chang Lee 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor Etel Solingen, Chair 
 
The objective of this research has been primarily analytical, aiming at a better 
understanding of why Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are experiencing different outcomes in 
their nuclear decisions in the post-Fukushima era and how these deviating outcomes will 
influence these states‟ non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years. To date, much of the 
scholarship on nonproliferation in Northeast Asia has paid inadequate attention to the effect of 
political segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy arena on nuclear decision-
making processes and nuclear policies.
1
As Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan democratized and 
liberalized, the political segmentation within the nuclear policy arena diversified into multiple 
domestic coalitions with different agendas. Thus, political competition within the nuclear policy 
arena became more complicated as multiple domestic coalitions interacted and competed for 
political influence. This research seeks to answer the following questions: What determines the 
                                                          
1
 Nuclear policy arena is a term used to explain a policy arena where nuclear agendas are debated by domestic 
coalitions. 
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nuclear orientation of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the aftermath of Fukushima?
 2
 And 
why are these three states experiencing different outcomes in the post-Fukushima era? Finally, 
what is the likelihood that these states will reverse their non-nuclear weapons policies in the 
coming years?  
This research argues that in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the segmentation 
and rearrangement of political competition within the nuclear policy arenas of these states are the 
main factors in determining these states‟ nuclear orientations. Nuclear orientation is 
operationalized via the political behavior of domestic nuclear coalitions which include coalitions 
that are pro-nuclear energy, pro-nuclear weapons, anti-nuclear energy, and anti-nuclear weapons. 
Thus, this research contends that in the post-Fukushima era, the final nuclear decision-making of 
these states is determined by the interplay of these four domestic coalitions within the nuclear 
policy arena and the ways in which the international and domestic conditions of economy, safety, 
security, and social norms are filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions. The controlled 
comparison of these three states in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident provides important 
benefits for improving our systematic understanding of the relationship between the interplay of 
coalitions and the nuclear orientation of states. 
In the post-Fukushima era, changing international and domestic conditions filtered 
through the lenses of domestic coalitions affected their nuclear weapons debates differently and 
resulted in various decision outcomes. These states have been very adamant about their non-
nuclear weapons policies while heavily condemning North Korea. As North Korea continued to 
                                                          
2
 Nuclear orientation is a term used to explain the relative position or direction of a state in terms of its overall 
nuclear inclination which is operationalized via domestic nuclear coalitions which includes coalitions that are pro-
nuclear energy, pro-nuclear weapons, anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons. Furthermore, nuclear 
orientation portrays the overall nuclear positioning of a state on the nuclear spectrum. A state‟s position on the 
nuclear spectrum explains which direction it is leaning toward on either a one- or two-dimensional spectrum.  
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conduct their nuclear tests, a domino effect or “reactive proliferation,” as many experts predicted, 
did not occur in Northeast Asia. However, there are still some possibilities that reactive 
proliferation could occur in Northeast Asia and spill over to other regions if any one of these 
states decides to go nuclear in the future.  
Taiwan is moving toward complete denuclearization by removing its civilian nuclear 
programs. South Korea is gradually moving toward complete denuclearization via a gradual 
phase out of its nuclear power and finding different paths to complete its nuclear fuel cycle. 
However, Japan‟s nuclear orientation is circling back to the original position that it had prior to 
the Fukushima incident. According to the findings of the case study chapters, this dissertation 
cautiously envisions that, for different domestic political reasons, Japan and South Korea are 
more prone to go nuclear than Taiwan if the U.S. nuclear umbrella fails to work properly in the 
coming years. 
 Japan has an ambition to become the power house of Asia once more. Thus, nuclear 
weapons might not be an end goal but a necessary step on its way to becoming a great power. 
This study contends that Japan is more prone to go nuclear due to its political motivations and 
the consistency shown by its leadership on the matter of nuclear hedging throughout the years. 
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, the Japanese leadership continuously used external threats, 
such as China and North Korea, to rouse nationalistic sentiment within the general population 
and to justify its remilitarization process. In particular, the surge of nationalism in Japan should 
be carefully monitored because this will not influence its short-term, but will influence its long-
term national strategy. 
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 In contrast, this study contends that South Korea is prone to go nuclear due to high 
public support for nuclear weapons. Even though public support for nuclear weapons is showing 
a pattern of downward trend since 1999, the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons is still popular 
among many South Koreans. The recent polls from 2017 to 2018 vary from 43% to 67%. Thus, 
even though there are no immediate concerns for these states to abandon their non-nuclear 
weapons policies, the international community needs to keep close eyes on the public support for 
the nuclear weapons in South Korea and the surge of nationalism and the remilitarization process 
that is currently in progress in Japan.  
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
In a world where leaders are competing over whose nuclear button is bigger and more 
powerful, states should be concerned about their survival. Alliance abandonment anxieties have 
been peaking in Japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK or South Korea), and the Republic 
of China (hereafter ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Furthermore, the trade war between two 
regional powers has positioned Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (JST) in a very awkward 
position as these states‟ economies are largely intertwined with both those of the United States 
and China. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, a wide range of political and social 
changes in JST have ensued as nuclear safety and security issues became even more salient. 
These wide-ranging changes in the economic, security, safety, and social aspects of these states 
are directly and indirectly influencing the non-nuclear weapons policies of JST. 
What determines the nuclear trajectory of a state? More specifically, what determines the 
nuclear trajectory of JST in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident? Since the nuclear age, 
prominent nuclear scholars and policy experts have argued that the nuclear decisions of these 
Northeast Asian states were constrained by either security or economic conditions. According to 
the comparative nonproliferation literature for East Asia (Campbell, Einhorn & Reiss, 2004; 
Hughes, 2007; Alagappa, 2007; Solingen, 2007; Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 
2016; Mochizuki & Ollapally, 2016), JST, as allies of the United States, have been walking a 
similar path regarding their nuclear decisions since the “second nuclear age.”3 These states 
decided to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and, instead, develop robust civilian nuclear 
energy programs. As JST lack natural energy resources, these states all have worked relentlessly 
                                                          
3
 Even though the original “second nuclear age” was characterized by Paul Bracken (2003) as involving a 
proliferation dynamic after China‟s 1964 test, I have adopted Solingen‟s characterization of the “second nuclear age,” 
namely that it is the period after the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. 
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toward maximizing nuclear energy for the purposes of their economies and energy security. In 
recent years, climate change concerns and rising demands for energy security have compelled 
these states to rely more on nuclear energy. In the early 2000s, as demand for nuclear energy 
increased globally, Japan and South Korea took the lead in reviving the nuclear power industry 
and ushered in a nuclear renaissance. The advancement and spread of civilian nuclear programs 
have increased the chance of proliferation of nuclear technology, which may open pathways 
towards nuclear weapons. Yet, this nuclear renaissance was soon put to an end by the Fukushima 
incident in 2011.  
On March 11, 2011, Japan was shaken by the Great East Japan Earthquake of magnitude 
9.0. It was followed by a 15-meter tsunami which engulfed the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. 
As the entire site was flooded, the Fukushima Daiichi power plant was shut down and its backup 
generators were damaged by seawater. This caused the deactivation of reactor cooling and water 
circulation functions. The inability to cool down the rising heat within the nuclear reactor caused 
the fuel rods to overheat, which led to the meltdown of three nuclear reactors. The meltdown 
eventually led to the release of radiation, resulting in contaminated air and water around the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant. In April 2012, the severity level of the nuclear emergency was 
elevated from category five to category seven, which was the highest level on the scale created 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Category seven placed the Fukushima 
incident in the same category as the Chernobyl incident in 1986, making it one of the worst 
nuclear accidents in the history of nuclear power.  
Due to concerns over possible radiation exposure, the Japanese government evacuated 
nearly half a million people within the 20km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Eight 
years later, more than 50,000 people still remained displaced from their homes as they await the 
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return to their hometowns, but most of the evacuees decided to settle down away from the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant. This is because there is still over 1 million tons of radioactive 
water that require cleanup at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant (“Japan marks 8th anniversary 
of 3/11 disaster in Tohoku region,” 2019). The Japanese government announced in 2016 that the 
cleanup cost for the Fukushima incident has already reached $200 billion and will continue to 
climb as there is no specific deadline when this cleanup will end (Yamaguchi, 2016). The 
calculation from the Japan Center for Economic Research, a private think tank from Tokyo, 
showed that cleanup cost for the Fukushima incident could soar to at least $315 billion and up to 
$728 billion (Komori, 2019). The nuclear incident at Fukushima triggered intense outbursts 
against nuclear activities in Japan and neighboring states‟ domestic politics. The public started to 
show a strong allergic reaction toward nuclear energy and other nuclear related issues. As a 
consequence of the Fukushima incident, various nuclear issues, especially nuclear safety became 
salient in both the public and political spheres of JST. The Fukushima incident is considered a 
turning point for policy consensus and political competition on the subject of nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons in these states. The Fukushima incident and the recent geopolitical environment 
of Northeast Asia are pushing these states to reevaluate their nuclear trajectories. 
One of the major explanations of these states‟ nuclear trajectories since the abandonment 
of their nuclear programs is based on security motivations and defensive realism, an argument 
that asserts that these states were able to restrain their aspirations for nuclear weapons due to the 
strong commitment of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (Alagappa, 2007).
4
 Mark Fitzpatrick 
(2015) argues that the continuation of the non-nuclear weapons policies of JST depend foremost 
                                                          
4
 According to Waltz (1979, 126) and defensive realists, “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to 
maintain their positions in the system.”  
 
 
4 
 
on the credibility of U.S. deterrence.
5
 Fitzpatrick claims that due to security uncertainties, these 
three states will remain latent nuclear powers for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, according 
to T.V. Paul (2009), nuclear latency may allow these states to pursue a virtual deterrence strategy 
or hedging strategy.
6
 Ariel Levite (2002) defines nuclear hedging as “a national strategy of 
maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition 
of nuclear weapons,…[in]short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years” (p. 69).  
 A competing explanation is that JST are more likely to abandon their pursuit of nuclear 
weapons as a result of domestic political factors (Solingen, 1994, 2007, 2012; Sagan, 1996; 
Hymans, 2011). Indeed, most scholars accept that denuclearization in East Asia was caused by a 
ruling coalition seeking to maintain its political survival through integration into the global 
economy and by satisfying domestic constituencies (Solingen, 1994, 2007, 2012). Solingen‟s 
work on political survival and domestic political coalitions (outward-oriented vs. inward-
oriented) explains the systematic relationship between nuclear policy and domestic models of 
political survival. In other words, a ruling coalition that advocates economic growth through 
internationalization has incentives to avoid nuclearization, while inward oriented coalitions do 
the opposite. Solingen (2007) argues that “leaders and ruling coalitions interpret security issues 
through the prism of their own efforts to accumulate and retain power at home” (p. 52). In short, 
East Asian leaders or ruling coalitions perceive economic growth and global access as advancing 
state security and insuring their political survival. Overall, the internationalization model allows 
these states to maintain their non-nuclear weapons policies. Unfortunately, the 
internationalization of these states led to the rapid advancement of civilian nuclear technology, 
                                                          
5
 See  Cha (2003) and Hughes (2007)  
6
 See Levite(2002), Sagan (2010),  Bowen & Moran( 2014),  and Fitzpatrick (2016) 
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which unintentionally shifted the nuclear trajectories of these states from denuclearization 
toward nuclear latency. 
Unlike the defensive realists or Solingen‟s internationalization model, Jacque Hymans‟ 
(2011) model does not purport to explain why these states gave up their nuclear ambition. 
Hymans‟ (2011) nuclear policy rigidity explanation introduces the impact of increasing the 
number of veto players within the policy decision-making processes. In short, it explains why the 
current nuclear trajectories of these states will not shift even in crises. In recent years, his model 
has gained some traction in the academic and policy communities in Northeast Asia. 
 Earlier scholarship provides different explanations as to why JST decided to abandon 
their nuclear ambitions and to maintain their non-nuclear weapons policies. Yet, these studies are 
in agreement that these three states will maintain their pre-Fukushima nuclear positions of 
intentional or unintentional fence-sitting (i.e., latent nuclear capabilities) for the foreseeable 
future. Fence-sitting here refers to the condition of states that have the technical expertise and 
robust civilian nuclear programs that would allow them to quickly construct nuclear weapons if 
they so desired.
7
 For Muthiah Alagappa (2007) and other realists, it is unlikely that China and 
North Korea will denuclearize or that geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia will significantly 
de-escalate in the coming years. From the standpoint of T.V. Paul (2009), and Fitzpatrick (2015), 
states are reluctant to give up their latent nuclear capabilities due to security uncertainties. For 
Solingen (2007), economic performance has taken precedence over all other political and social 
factors in terms of the political survival of the ruling coalition in East Asia. Finally, from the 
standpoint of Hymans (2011), it is hard for these states to shift their nuclear positions due to 
                                                          
7
 Fence-sitting here differs from the “fence-sitters,” a term coined by Etel Solingen in 1994. According to Solingen 
fence-sitter is a state that is reluctant to commit fully to a global or regional nonproliferation regime. 
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policy rigidity and veto players who tend to fight for their perceived interests even in crisis 
situations.  
Seven years after the Fukushima incident, Japan and the Abe administration circled back 
to nuclear power and decided to slowly reactivate their nuclear reactors. In contrast, the 
progressive Moon administration in South Korea decided to gradually decommission their 
nuclear reactors while seeking alternative energy sources. However, the Moon administration has 
also shown its intention to maintain the overseas construction of nuclear reactors as one of South 
Korea‟s major export commodities for the future. Most shockingly, the Tsai administration of 
Taiwan decided to decommission all of their nuclear reactors by 2025. Why are these states 
experiencing different outcomes in their nuclear decisions? Where are they headed in regards to 
the nuclear energy and weapons debate? How will these outcomes affect these states‟ latent 
nuclear capabilities and future decisions regarding nuclear weapons? An apparent gap exists 
between the expectations of earlier scholarship and the current nuclear orientation of these states. 
Significant changes in international and domestic conditions from the early 1990s to the 
present may force JST to rethink their nuclear trajectories. Over the past two decades, the rise of 
the global economy
8
, the economic and military rise of China alongside the decline of U.S. 
hegemony in Northeast Asia, and the rise of nuclear North Korea have all been gradual. Those 
large-scale changes are progressively altering the international conditions that ended the nuclear 
weapons programs in JST during the second nuclear age. Domestically, these states ended their 
longtime one-party dominated political systems and enjoyed successful modernization with high 
economic growth. South Korea and Taiwan both successfully made transitions from 
authoritarianism to liberal democracy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan is still the 
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 Global economy simply refers to the world economies as one economic system. 
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dominant party in the Japanese Diet (Parliament), but it lost the one-party dominance it had 
maintained from the 1950s to the 1980s. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
2016 Outlook, China and Japan had the second and third largest economies in the world, 
followed by South Korea in 11th place and Taiwan in 22nd place. With the exponential growth 
of their civilian nuclear energy programs, these states have all experienced periods of high 
economic development, respectively known as the Japanese Miracle, the Miracle on the Han 
River in South Korea, and the Taiwanese Miracle.   
Moreover, the politics of the nuclear policy decision-making process in JST have become 
more complicated in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. The nuclear policy arenas and the 
decision-making processes of these states are currently in disarray. Unlike the pre-Fukushima 
era
9
 when the nuclear policy arena and decision-making process were under the full control of 
the pro-nuclear energy coalition (PNEC)
10
, the final decision-makers of these states today are 
facing stiff opposition from the anti-nuclear energy coalition (ANEC)
11
 and anti-nuclear 
weapons coalition (ANWC).
12
 Coincidentally, heighten geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia 
and fear of decommissioning civilian nuclear programs brought the pro-nuclear weapons 
coalition (PNWC)
13
 out of the PNEC‟s shadow. Today, the PNWC in Japan and South Korea 
have become too vocal to be dismissed merely as reflecting the attitude of a small fraction of 
politicians and certain government bureaucracies toward nuclear weapons dependence. With 
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 The range of the pre-Fukushima era differs for each country, as it is based on the date each state abandoned its 
nuclear weapons program. This is the period when these states solely focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
10
 The PNEC is the proponent of the nuclear energy. It is generally comprised of utility companies, nuclear vendors, 
politicians and political parties, the bureaucracy, the financial sector including the Keiretsu in Japan (a 
conglomerations of businesses) and Chaebol in South Korea (a large family owned business conglomerates), 
academia and think tanks, and the media. 
11
 The ANEC is the opponent of nuclear energy and is generally comprised of NGOs, think tanks, politicians and 
political parties, the media, and academia. 
12
 The ANWC is the opponent of nuclear weapons and is generally comprised of NGOs, think tanks, politicians and 
political parties, the media, and academia. 
13
 The PNWC is the proponent of the nuclear weapons and is generally comprised of NGOs, think tanks, politicians 
and political parties, the media, and academia.   
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multiple coalitions fighting for their political agendas within the nuclear policy arena, if these 
states were ever to reverse their nuclear weapons trajectories, now seems the most likely time. 
Since the inception of nuclear weapons, there have been 31 states with latent nuclear 
capacity to build nuclear weapons, but only 10 states went on to build nuclear arsenals 
(Fuhrmann & Tkach, 2015). JST all decided to give up their aspirations for nuclear weapons in 
exchange for economic growth and security guarantees from the United States. Since the dawn 
of the nuclear age, countries like JST, which lack natural energy resources, imported nearly all of 
their energy supplies from overseas. Therefore, for the purpose of energy security and economic 
growth, these states advanced their civilian nuclear energy programs and aggressively promoted 
nuclear power. As a consequence, all three states seek stable nuclear fuel supplies while 
maximizing nuclear energy. Utilizing nuclear energy as the cornerstone of their economies, JST 
quickly climbed the ladder of global economic status. For that reason, the nuclear policy arenas 
and decision-making processes of these states were dictated by nuclear energy agendas and the 
PNECs for at least 40 to 70 years. To ensure stable nuclear fuel supplies, most of the nuclear 
weapons debates related to nuclear latency capability were downplayed by the PNECs, while 
they advocated nuclear energy debates on the complete nuclear fuel cycle.   
All three states have abandoned their nuclear weapons programs; Japan did so right after 
the end of World War II, and South Korea and Taiwan did so in the late 1970s and 1988 
respectively. Although domestically, these states have non-nuclear weapons policies in place, 
Japan‟s, South Korea‟s, and Taiwan‟s status as non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) remain of 
continuing interest to policy analysts and scholars of international relations. East Asian security 
experts remain uncertain even with all the efforts made by these states, that the states will uphold 
their non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years. This is an ironic circumstance for JST, 
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which discontinued their nuclear weapons programs and maintained a solid record of adhering to 
their policies of peaceful use of nuclear energy. While these states have conveyed their intentions 
to uphold their non-proliferation obligations stated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), their neighbors are still suspicious about dual-usage technologies 
(Hughes, 2007; Bowen & Moran, 2014, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2016).  
Too many international and domestic conditions have changed since these states 
abandoned their nuclear weapons programs. Can we still depend on past nuclear nonproliferation 
studies which imply, that JST will not reverse their non-nuclear weapons policies in the near 
future? Could past nonproliferation studies still be relevant or sufficient for explaining the 
nuclear intentions of these states today? Solingen (2007) predicted that “different dynamics 
could be at work, triggering conditions under which internationalizing [or other domestic] 
models may no longer provide sufficient conditions for continued denuclearization” (p. 286). 
The PNECs of these states have been able to maintain their dominance in the nuclear policy 
arenas by regulating the nuclear decision-making process and access to information. Despite the 
PNECs‟ efforts, transparency14 issues surrounding the nuclear decision-making process and 
access to information were the powder keg that eventually would have exploded in these states, 
as domestic conditions such as democratization and liberalization ripened. However, it was the 
Fukushima incident which opened the floodgates to closed information that was once regulated 
by the PNECs. It also introduced more transparency to all nuclear discussions in JST.   
As a consequence of the Fukushima incident, various nuclear issues became salient in 
both the public and political spheres. In its aftermath, the media and the public quickly opened 
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 Transparency is defined as accessibility to public information regarding the actions of those in nuclear decision-
making processes and the consequences of these actions.   
 
 
 
10 
 
up discussions about nuclear safety and nuclear transparency issues. Public discussions, soon 
thereafter, about nuclear issues expanded to other non-safety related issues, such as 
nonproliferation and nuclear technologies including uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing. Massive interest from the media and the public regarding nuclear issues, in light of 
the Fukushima incident, provided large amounts of new data that was previously unavailable to 
the public.  
Furthermore, the nuclear incident at Fukushima triggered strong outbursts against nuclear 
activities in these states‟ domestic arenas. The public started to show a strong allergic reaction 
toward nuclear energy and other nuclear related issues. JST also experienced two significant 
changes in their domestic political dynamics with respect to their nuclear policy decision-making 
processes. First, nuclear safety and security issues became salient in both the public and political 
spheres. The myth that nuclear power was absolutely safe had been broken. The link between 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons became apparent in nuclear debates. As decommissioning 
of nuclear reactors became the official nuclear agenda of these states, the PNWCs of these states 
could no longer ignore the link between civilian nuclear programs and nuclear weapons.  
Second, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC all gained momentum in penetrating the 
nuclear policy arena and decision-making processes. Consequentially, for the first time, the 
PNECs are facing strong opposition in controlling nuclear policy decision-making processes. 
While the nuclear policy decision-making process of the pre-Fukushima era was almost unipolar, 
with the PNEC as the dominant stakeholder, the post-Fukushima era processes are multipolar, 
with multiple domestic coalitions influencing the final decision-making process. It is imperative 
to acknowledge that since the 1990s the international and domestic conditions, which directly or 
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indirectly could influence the nuclear decision-making processes, in Northeast Asia have 
significantly shifted from those of the second nuclear age. 
What determines the nuclear orientation
15
 of a state? More specifically, what determines 
the nuclear orientation of JST in the aftermath of Fukushima? Which ways do these states lean in 
their nuclear weapons and nuclear energy debates? How do nuclear energy debates influence 
nuclear weapons discussions? Why are these three states experiencing different outcomes in the 
post-Fukushima era? Finally, what is the likelihood that these states will reverse their non-
nuclear weapons policies in the coming years?  
To answer these central questions, this research first examines the changes in both 
international and domestic conditions surrounding JST in pre- and post-Fukushima. Second, the 
pre- and the post-Fukushima debates, regarding nuclear energy, weapons, safety, and social 
norms, are explored to understand how and why these debates changed over time. Third, the pre- 
and the post-Fukushima domestic political dynamics of these states, more specifically, the 
nuclear policy arenas of these states are examined to better understand the ongoing nuclear 
debates and changing domestic political competition. Fourth, various nuclear issues and 
geopolitical circumstances are filtered through the lenses of the four domestic coalitions (the 
PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) that shape the nuclear orientation of each state. 
Finally, in order to build trend data on these states‟ nuclear orientations, the relationship between 
domestic coalitions within the debates and their influence over the nuclear orientations of each 
state are examined. This study is in agreement with the earlier works of Stephen Meyer (1984) 
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 Nuclear orientation is a term used to explain the relative position or direction of a state in terms of its overall 
nuclear inclination. Furthermore, nuclear orientation portrays the overall nuclear positioning of a state on the nuclear 
spectrum. A state‟s position on the nuclear spectrum explains which direction it is leaning toward on either a one- or 
two-dimensional spectrum. 
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and Etel Solingen (2007) who claimed that all conditions, both international and domestic, are 
eventually filtered through domestic politics during the decision-making process.  
Beyond nuclear policy relevance, the contrasting nuclear trajectories of JST offer an 
important puzzle worthy of comparative analysis. Although this analysis cannot predict the exact 
outcomes of these states‟ future decisions regarding nuclear weapons, by building valuable trend 
data on these states‟ nuclear orientations post-Fukushima, it aims to lay the groundwork for 
increasing the accuracy of future predictions regarding the nuclear decisions of these states.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section defines the scope and terminologies 
that are used throughout. The second section examines nuclear debates prior to the Fukushima 
incident to facilitate the understanding of the systematic relationship between nuclear debates 
and the pre-Fukushima spectrums of nuclear energy and weapons. The third section briefly 
covers the argument on the political segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy 
arena and introduces the four domestic coalitions (the PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the 
ANWC). The fourth section then goes over the research design, method, and data collection. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a road map for the remainder of the dissertation. 
Scope and Terminology 
It is essential to make a distinction between the puzzle addressed in this study and other 
puzzles in the field of nonproliferation studies. Most of the previous literature in this field 
focuses on the question of why some states have abandoned nuclear weapons, while some persist 
in their ambition to build them. This framing of the problem limited researchers to examine only 
states that once held nuclear weapons programs. Even though the Fukushima incident influenced 
the nuclear orientations of multiple states worldwide, the scope of this research is limited to the 
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comparative studies of pre- and post-Fukushima Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This research 
examines how post-Fukushima debates regarding nuclear energy, weapons, safety, and norms 
influence the overall nuclear orientation of these states.  
The time period of this research is divided into the pre- and post-Fukushima eras in order 
to compare the differences in the domestic political dynamics of the nuclear policy arenas both 
before and after the nuclear incident. The range of the pre-Fukushima era differs for each country, 
as it is based on the date each state abandoned its nuclear weapons program. This is the period 
when these states solely focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The post-Fukushima era 
refers to the period after the Fukushima incident in March 2011.  
This section will briefly define the nuclear terminologies that are used throughout the 
chapters. Nuclearization is the movement toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Denuclearization is 
the movement toward removing all potential pathways to nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon 
policy is based on the NPT, which requires that states do not receive, manufacture nuclear 
weapons, or receive assistance in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Nuclear latency refers 
to a state with possession of any or all of the capabilities (technologies, especially enrichment 
and reprocessing, facilities, and expertise including tacit knowledge) necessary to develop 
nuclear weapons without actually building or acquiring nuclear weapons. However, this does not 
indicate that all states with nuclear latency have the intention to develop nuclear weapons. Some 
states fall under nuclear latency as they push themselves to advance their civilian nuclear 
technology for the purpose of energy security and economy. And for others, nuclear latency 
provides them with an option to tinker around the nuclear hedging option.   
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Nuclear orientation is a term used to explain the relative position or direction of a state in 
terms of its overall nuclear inclination. Furthermore, nuclear orientation portrays the overall 
nuclear positioning of a state on the nuclear spectrum. A state‟s position on the nuclear spectrum 
explains which direction it is leaning toward on either a one- or two-dimensional spectrum. The 
nuclear energy spectrum is a one dimensional spectrum with opposing poles of zero nuclear 
energy at one end and maximum nuclear energy at the other end. The nuclear weapons spectrum 
is a one dimensional spectrum with nonproliferation of nuclear weapons options on one side and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons options on the other. The zone of nuclear latency refers to a 
region on the nuclear weapons spectrum occupied by states with latent nuclear capabilities.
16
 The 
nuclear policy arena is a term used to explain an arena where nuclear agendas are debated by 
domestic coalitions. In regards to nuclear policy, the final decision-makers refer to the highest 
decision-makers, for example, the president or prime minister, of each state.   
The Systematic Relationship between Nuclear Debates and Nuclear Spectrums  
Since the second nuclear age, JST have been walking similar paths in terms of their 
nuclear trajectories. These states have all given up their pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange 
for economic growth through integration with the global economy and security guarantees from 
the United States. JST have been model citizens of the global nonproliferation movement, all 
accepting relevant nonproliferation guidelines while actively promoting nonproliferation abroad. 
Furthermore, these states decided to develop robust civilian nuclear energy programs.  
In the early stage of civilian nuclear program development, these states sought stable 
nuclear fuel supplies from the United States and other outside fuel suppliers through integration 
                                                          
16
 Assessments of how many states possess latent nuclear capabilities vary because previous literatures all had 
different guidelines in measuring nuclear latency. See Meyer (1984), Stoll (1996), Barnaby (2004), Hymans (2006), 
Sagan (2010), Fuhrmann & Tkach (2014).  
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with the global economy. Subsequently, nuclear energy became one of the main drivers for each 
of their economic miracles. Hence, the nuclear energy policies of these states were hardly 
influenced by the nuclear incidents at Three Mile Island in 1979, which ended the construction of 
new civilian nuclear reactors in the U.S., and Chernobyl in 1986, which limited the civilian 
nuclear programs in European states.  
Despite these nuclear incidents, JST each abided by the myth that nuclear power was 
absolutely safe. In Japan, this is known as the “Myth of Absolute Safety” (zentai anzen shinwa). 
In these states, nuclear energy became the ultimate energy source because it was thought to be 
cheap, clean, and safe; therefore, it was never seriously confronted in nuclear energy debates or 
agendas. As a result, the nuclear policy arenas and decision-making processes of these states 
were easily dictated by nuclear energy agendas. Therefore, these states were able to focus on 
maximizing nuclear energy for the sake of their energy security and economy. The nuclear 
energy spectrum for JST prior to Fukushima is shown in Figure 1.1. For the purpose of 
maximizing nuclear energy, the PNECs ultimate concern has been, and still is, acquiring stable 
nuclear fuel supplies.  
The nuclear energy spectrum represents the advancement of nuclear energy capability of 
a state. A state with either twenty or more nuclear reactors or with ENR technologies or facilities 
falls on the right side of the mid-point of the nuclear energy spectrum.
17
 This is because ENR 
technologies or facilities allow a state to complete its nuclear fuel cycle. Furthermore, according 
to South Korean nuclear experts, given South Korea‟s more than 20 operational reactors, it is 
cost-effective and economically viable for the state to acquire both uranium enrichment and 
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 Twenty or more nuclear reactors provide a state with an economic incentive and an NPT-conforming justification 
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plutonium reprocessing facilities.
18
 This has been an ongoing argument for Japan as well, which 
currently possesses both enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
19
 As shown in Figure 1.1, Japan 
is at the most far right of the nuclear energy spectrum as it has already acquired the complete 
nuclear fuel cycle and has the most nuclear reactors out of these three states.  
Figure 1.1: Nuclear Energy Spectrum Prior to Fukushima 
 
These states‟ civilian nuclear energy programs and civilian nuclear technologies have 
grown alongside their growing economies, quickly surpassing the top nuclear suppliers of the 
world. In the process of maximizing nuclear energy, these states have shown their intentions to 
acquire the complete fuel cycle, including the sensitive fuel cycle technologies of uranium 
enrichment
20
 and nuclear reprocessing.
21
 In these states, nuclear experts, mostly from the nuclear 
industries argued that the complete fuel cycle is a necessity for maintaining stable nuclear fuel 
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 Author‟s interview with nuclear experts at the KINAC, Seoul, South Korea in July 2016. 
19
 Jimmy Carter argued that a reprocessing facility was not economical during the Carter-Fukuda summit in March 
1977; however, the United States eventually gave in to the Japanese request to build reprocessing facility 
(Oberdorfer 2003, 461). 
20
 Uranium enrichment is the process of enhancing the concentration of the U-235 isotope. For the purpose of the 
civilian nuclear reactors, U-235 isotope is enriched to 3% - 5% from natural state of 0.7%. For the purpose of 
weapon-grade uranium, U-235 isotope is enriched to 90% or more. However, technically uranium enriched to 20% 
(over 20% is consider highly enriched uranium) can be used to build the nuclear weapons. 
21
 Nuclear reprocessing is a chemical process to separate and recover fissionable plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.  
Extracted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel can be used to fuel nuclear reactors, but also to make nuclear weapons. 
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supplies and for the growth of their nuclear industries in the world market.
22
 The PNECs of these 
states have strongly expressed that uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing have a valid 
civilian purpose. Nevertheless, a problem with these two nuclear technologies is that they 
provide two pathways for acquiring nuclear weapons. For the PNWCs, the cost-effective and 
economically viable argument was a way to obtain enrichment and reprocessing technologies 
and facilities while playing safely within the boundaries of the NPT and international 
expectations. This allows the PNWCs to obtain dual-usage technologies while concealing their 
true intentions. 
Although no government would acknowledge that its civilian nuclear program was kept 
for the purpose of nuclear weapons, it could not deny that these sensitive civilian nuclear 
technologies could be easily refitted into military technology. The connection between nuclear 
energy and nuclear weapons is absolute, intimate, and essential. According to Hannes Alfven, 
the Nobel Prize winning physicist, “atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins” 
(Kenward, 1976). In other words, there is no clear distinction between civilian and military 
nuclear technology. The PNECs of these states do not deny possible unintended consequences, 
but nevertheless, the PNECs have been promoting the importance of enrichment and 
reprocessing (hereafter ENR) technologies for the purpose of energy security and the growth of 
their nuclear industries.  
Hence, intended or unintended, the efforts of these states‟ PNEC to maximize the civilian 
nuclear energy programs shifted the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons from absolute zero 
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 Japan and South Korea are one of the top nuclear suppliers in the world market alongside with France and Russia.  
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to somewhere in the middle of the nuclear weapons spectrum [See Figure 1.2].
23
 This nuclear 
weapons spectrum does not represent the intention to develop nuclear weapons; however, the 
spectrum represents the advancement of the nuclear weapons capability of a state. A state with 
ENR technologies or facilities or that has already received consent from the United States to 
pursue ENR technologies falls on the right side of the mid-point of the nuclear weapons 
spectrum. Alongside with the ENR issues, the escalations of geopolitical tensions in Northeast 
Asia continuously bring out the nuclear weapons discussion in these states. In the pre-Fukushima 
era, each state‟s position on the nuclear weapons spectrums was determined by the economy, 
security, and social norms conditions. As shown in Figure 1.2, the zone of nuclear latency 
indicates that the states which fall in this region have some degree of latent nuclear capability. In 
the zone of nuclear latency, as shown in Figure 1.2, Japan is positioned on the right side of the 
mid-point because it has already acquired enrichment and reprocessing facilities which may open 
two pathways towards nuclear weapons. Unlike Japan, based on the 123 agreement with the 
United States, South Korea and Taiwan required U.S. approval to pursue ENR technologies or 
facilities. 
Figure 1.2: Nuclear Weapons Spectrum Prior to Fukushima 
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 Furthermore, the dotted line pointing to maximizing nuclear energy was drawn in Figure 1.2 to represent how 
much nuclear energy policy influence the nuclear weapons spectrum. Additionally, similar to Figure 1.1, this dotted 
line also separates states with and without enrichment and reprocessing technologies and facilities. 
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These states, including Japan with an anti-nuclear weapons movement, enjoyed this 
unintended or intended position on the nuclear weapons spectrum for an extended period of time. 
This was due to almost non-existent nuclear nonproliferation debates in both the public and 
political spheres of South Korea and Taiwan prior to the Fukushima incident. In the case of 
Japan, the nuclear energy discussion was strictly kept separate from the nuclear weapons 
discussion. For the Japanese, the ENR discussion was strictly part of the nuclear energy debates. 
For example, prior to the Fukushima incident, even Hibakusha (or atomic bomb survivors) in 
Japan detached their anti-nuclear weapons movement from the nuclear energy discussions. 
From the perspective of nuclear behavior studies, this intended or unintended position on 
the nuclear weapons spectrum is known as fence-sitting or nuclear hedging.
24
 In an interview 
with conservative magazine Sapio in 2011, Shigeru Ishiba, a former defense minister of Japan, 
said that “it's important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to 
produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time.” Then he added that “it is a tacit nuclear 
deterrent” (Dawson, 2011). This statement exemplifies the break with the long standing elite, 
political leadership, reluctance to publicly discuss the connection between nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons. This is significant because it allowed nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 
debates, post-Fukushima, to be openly discussed alongside each other for the first time in these 
states. These types of breaks, eventually, allowed for the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 
spectrums to intersect into a two-dimensional nuclear spectrum [See Figure 1.3].  
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Figure 1.3: 2011 Pre-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum    
                     
A two-dimensional nuclear spectrum allows us to better understand the relationship 
between nuclear energy and nuclear weapon spectrums of these states [See Figure 1.3]. This two-
dimensional nuclear spectrum also makes it easier to portray the nuclear orientations of these 
states. It is clear that as states move towards the zero nuclear energy option on the Y-axis, they 
are moving towards the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons option on the X-axis. This is 
because the decommissioning of civilian nuclear power plants leads to a reduction in the use of 
low enriched nuclear fuel and the output of spent nuclear fuel. Thus, decommissioning nuclear 
power plants decreases the possibility of these states to build uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing facilities, which could be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, as states 
move towards the maximizing nuclear energy option on the Y-axis, they are also moving 
towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons option on the X-axis. Yet, there are 
nonproliferation international and domestic conditions [See Table 1.1 and Table 1.2] that limit 
these three states from leaning too much towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons option. In 
other words, unless these conditions are removed, the limitation on how far these states can 
move towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons will prevent these states from moving too far 
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away from the middle of the nuclear weapons spectrum. Yet, Figure 1.4 illustrates the diverging 
nuclear orientations of these states in the aftermath of Fukushima. The dashed arrows in Figure 
1.4 portray the projected movement for JST for the coming years. Further explanations on these 
states‟ projected movement within this spectrum are provided in the next section and case study 
chapters.  
Figure 1.4: 2018 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum Expectation 
                       
Political Segmentation and Competition 
A.  The four domestic coalitions (the PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) 
The Fukushima incident is considered a turning point for JST‟s policy consensus on the 
subject of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. As JST democratized and liberalized, the 
political segmentation within the nuclear policy arena diversified into multiple domestic 
coalitions with different agendas. Consequently, political competition becomes more 
complicated as multiple domestic coalitions interact and compete for political influence within 
the nuclear policy arena. In the post-Fukushima era, several nuclear policy changes occurred 
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alongside the policy preference shift by domestic coalitions and the social norms of these three 
states. Political segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy arenas, as well as, the 
domestic coalitions‟ orientations toward both international and domestic conditions have 
implications for the post-Fukushima nuclear orientations of these states. In other words, the 
interplay of the four domestic coalitions (the PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) 
within the nuclear policy arena and the ways in which international and domestic conditions are 
filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions are essential in determining the nuclear 
orientations of these three states post-Fukushima. 
Figure 1.5: Nuclear Policy Preference of Domestic Coalitions prior to the Fukushima Incident 
     
Pre-Fukushima JST wan shared similar nuclear policy preferences between their 
domestic coalitions. Even though social norm differed in these states, these three states shared 
similar views that nuclear energy should be maximized for the purpose of energy sovereignty 
and economy as shown in Figure 1.5. Furthermore, these states heavily relied on the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella while obtaining nuclear latency in the case of the failure of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
However, up to date, these states have never gone beyond utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes.  
The PNECs in JST prior to the Fukushima disaster did not experience fierce competition, 
as they were the dominant stakeholders in the nuclear policy arenas and the nuclear decision-
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making processes [See Figure 1.6]. The ANEC did exist in all three states, but they lacked 
political power or motivation to penetrate the nuclear policy arena and the decision-making 
process. Thus, similar domestic and international conditions resulted in similar nuclear 
trajectories for these states. However, unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Japan was a victim of the 
atomic bomb. Therefore, even though the ANWC could not match the influence level of the 
PNEC, the ANWC, with strong support from the public and the Japanese communist party, was 
able to influence nuclear weapons debates within the nuclear policy arena in Japan, resulting in 
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles [See Figure 1.6]. 
Figure 1.6: Nuclear Decision-Making Process prior to Fukushima 
               
 
Post-Fukushima, however, these states are experiencing multi-polarity or segmentation in 
their domestic political dynamics with four different coalitions fighting for their interests in the 
nuclear policy arena. Moreover, there are also competing interests over national fuel cycle 
capabilities within the PNECs of these states. Therefore, even with similar conditions, the 
nuclear orientations of these states differ based on the interplay between domestic coalitions and 
each coalition‟s perception of international and domestic conditions. Hence, when a decision 
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regarding nuclear agendas takes place, decision-makers, today, must deal with more than one 
relevant domestic coalition. 
A hypothetical domestic model of political segmentation and competition is built around 
Etel Solingen‟s (1994, 1998, 2007) political survival (internationalizing) model in East Asia and 
Itty Abraham‟s (1998, 2006, 2009) concept of “nuclear ambivalence.” Abraham (1998, 2006, 
2009) argues that decision makers suffer from “nuclear ambivalence,” meaning that they may not 
have well-developed agendas or intentions in the nuclear field. In other words, decision-makers‟ 
intentions are not deeply rooted. Thus, their decision-making with regard to nuclear energy, or 
even nuclear weapons, could be easily swayed by a wide range of political and social factors that 
can influence their political survival. In the aftermath of the catastrophic Fukushima incident, the 
majority of politicians (including former and current presidents and prime ministers) in JST, 
regardless of their party platform and their past preference for nuclear energy, condemned 
nuclear energy. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p. 279) argue that an exogenous shock to the 
system causes political survival for the ruling coalition to become uncertain due to the rise of 
political competition. Since the decision makers of JST suffer from nuclear ambivalence, rapidly 
shifting international and domestic conditions provide an opportunity for domestic coalitions 
other than the PNEC to penetrate the nuclear policy arena and the decision-making process.  
Solingen (1994, 2007, 2012) argues that denuclearization in East Asia was caused by a 
ruling coalition seeking to maintain its political survival through integration into the global 
economy and by satisfying domestic constituencies. Thus, the political survival of East Asian 
leaders is based on their countries‟ economic performance and integration into the global 
economy. This study is in agreement with Solingen that these states will continue to uphold their 
internationalizing posture because economic performance still remains a high priority for 
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decision-makers‟ political survival. However, given the Fukushima incident and increasing 
geopolitical tensions in recent years, safety and security have begun to gain more prominence in 
nuclear policy arenas. In short, while economic performance is still a major factor, it is not the 
only factor considered by decision-makers in these states. These new political agendas have 
allowed new political coalitions with different nuclear agendas to emerge and gain power in the 
nuclear policy arena. 
As a result of multiple coalitions fighting for their agendas within the nuclear policy 
arena, Taiwan has decided to decommission its six nuclear reactors by 2025. In 2017, Taiwan‟s 
decision-makers stipulated a policy of a “nuclear free homeland by 2025” in Article 95 of the 
Electricity Act (Lin, 2018). South Korea is in an awkward position, as it would like to gradually 
phase out domestic nuclear energy and replace it with alternative energy sources, while also 
expanding its nuclear industry in international markets. In September 2012, the ruling 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) initiated the process of decommissioning nuclear reactors by 
2039. However, this initiative was quickly terminated as the conservative LDP under Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe reclaimed the Japanese Diet in early 2013. Seven years after Fukushima, 
Japan is gradually circling back to nuclear power. In contrast, South Korea and Taiwan have 
moved away from fence-sitting and are once more moving toward denuclearization.  
In the post-Fukushima era, the internationalizing model argued by Etel Solingen explains 
why these states maintain their non-nuclear weapons policies. However, it fails to explain why 
Japan decided to remain within the zone of nuclear latency while South Korea and Taiwan 
decided to move toward denuclearization. As a result, the internationalizing model is necessary 
but not sufficient to explain what is going on within the nuclear policy arena of these states in the 
post-Fukushima era. To better understand why these three states are experiencing different 
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nuclear policy outcomes, it is necessary to dive deeper into the political segmentation and 
competition that occurred in these states in this era. As state political segmentation and 
competition becomes more complicated within the nuclear policy arena, there are more domestic 
barriers to circumvent for a coalition that seeks nuclear weapons.  
Moreover, high political competition leads to higher transparency, making any 
clandestine nuclear weapons program almost impossible without total agreement between all 
coalitions. A state‟s nuclear orientation tends to move toward denuclearization, when it has high 
levels of political competition within the nuclear policy arena and is moving toward 
internationalization. South Korea and Taiwan‟s nuclear orientations are moving towards 
denuclearization, albeit to varying degrees, under these exact circumstances. However, Japan 
might be an exception to the argument sketched above.     
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Japan maintains its nuclear orientation towards nuclear 
latency even with high levels of political segmentation and competition while seeking 
internationalization. This might be due to the existing nuclear apparatus of the country, as the 
conservative LDP has had a strong connection with the PNEC since the beginning of the nuclear 
age. For that reason, even with the majority of the Japanese opposing nuclear energy, the 
Japanese government is still pushing for its restart. On the other hand, Japan‟s exceptional 
position is not permanent, as other domestic coalitions may gain more power within the nuclear 
policy arena.  
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine the evolution of political 
segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy arena shown above using the case 
studies of JST. The objective of this study has been primarily analytical in examining the nuclear 
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policy changes alongside the policy preference shift by domestic coalitions and social norms of 
these three states. The next section briefly introduces the four domestic coalitions (the PNEC, the 
PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) that are competing for political influence within the nuclear 
policy arenas of these states.   
B. Pro-nuclear energy coalitions (PNEC) 
The PNEC is the proponent of nuclear energy. It is comprised of utility companies, 
nuclear vendors, politicians and political parties, the bureaucracy, the financial sector including 
the Keiretsu in Japan (a conglomeration of businesses) and Chaebol in South Korea (a large 
family owned business conglomerates), and the segment of NGOs, academia, think tanks, and 
media. The PNEC is often called the “nuclear village”25 in Japan and the “nuclear mafia” in 
South Korea. It had exclusive power in the nuclear policy decision-making processes in these 
states prior to the Fukushima incident. The PNEC‟s main objective has been, and still is, to 
maximize nuclear energy output for the purposes of economic and energy security. Therefore, 
the PNECs prefer economic integration with the global economy which allowed these states to 
maintain steady nuclear fuel supplies. As these states‟ nuclear energy programs and nuclear 
technologies surpassed the top nuclear suppliers - such as the U.S., France, and Russia- these 
states strived for “peaceful nuclear sovereignty,”26 which refers to obtaining a complete fuel 
cycle with ENR facilities allowing for an uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply. 
 The complete fuel cycle with ENR facilities allowed these states‟ nuclear industries to be 
more competitive in the world market and compare to other nuclear suppliers. However, due to 
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, also known as the “123 
                                                          
25
 For discussion on “nuclear viliage,” see Kingston (2012) 
26
 For more discussion on peaceful nuclear sovereignty, see Sheen (2011) 
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Agreement,” only Japan attained “peaceful nuclear sovereignty.” The PNECs distanced 
themselves from the PNWC because they understand the unintended consequences of ENR 
technology. The PNEC differentiated themselves from the PNWCs by promoting the 
nonproliferation movement and strengthening the safeguards for nuclear technologies. The 
PNECs tend to balance domestic and international concerns because only a stable domestic and 
international environment allows for maintenance of steady nuclear fuel supply for these states.  
C. Pro-nuclear weapons coalitions (PNWC) 
Post-Fukushima, the PNWC is the proponent of nuclear weapons and is comprised of 
politicians and political parties, and the segment of NGOs, think tanks, media, and academia.  
Unlike the PNEC, the PNWC advocates nuclear sovereignty. The PNWC‟s main objective has 
been, and still is, to maximize its national security. The PNWCs of these states have been 
skeptical about their alliance with the United States and its policy of extended nuclear deterrence. 
The PNWCs do not believe that, when pushed, Washington would trade New York for the sake 
of Seoul, Taipei, or Tokyo. Therefore, the PNWCs‟ national security objective has been to either 
acquire indigenous nuclear weapons or to reacquire U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. The PNWCs‟ 
skepticism of the U.S. alliance was reinforced when North Korea declared that its nuclear 
weapons program was complete and it could strike the entire United States. As North Korea 
becomes the second nuclear state in Northeast Asia, the PNWCs‟ conviction that a nuclear state 
can only be deterred by another nuclear state is intensifying.   
Since these states decided to abandon their aspiration for nuclear weapons, the PNWCs 
have been hiding behind the PNECs. Occasionally, conservative politicians in both Japan and 
South Korea have discussed the possibility of a nuclear option, but most of the time, nuclear 
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weapons discussions have kept a low profile in both the political and public spheres of these 
states. This study claims that the PNWC, throughout the second nuclear age, has been one of the 
groups within PNECs that have been supportive of ENR technology.  Given the constraints on 
nuclear weapons, the PNWC has sought a more realistic goal, latent nuclear capability, and has 
done so throughout the pre-Fukushima era. However, intensifying geopolitical tensions and 
movements to decommission civilian nuclear reactors was a wake-up call for the PNWCs.  The 
PNWCs tend to highlight international concerns over domestic ones, as international conditions 
dictate national security.  
D. Anti-nuclear energy coalitions (ANEC) 
Post-Fukushima, the ANEC is the opponent of nuclear energy and is comprised of 
politicians and political parties, and the segment of NGOs, think tanks, media, and academia. 
However, the anti-nuclear energy movement was almost nonexistent in South Korea and Taiwan 
prior to Fukushima. The anti-nuclear energy movement was led by NGOs and academia but had 
a hard time attaining the backing of politicians, the media, and the public. The ANEC‟s primary 
objective has been, and still is, to remove all nuclear related facilities. The ANECs emphasize the 
catastrophic risks of nuclear energy. The ANECs have been arguing that nuclear energy is not 
just bad for the environment but is also bad for the economy. The ANECs have been raising 
public awareness regarding the risks of nuclear energy. Yet, all these efforts by the ANECs have 
been overlooked due to the continuing economic success of these states and the PNECs‟ motto 
that nuclear energy is cheap, clean, and safe. 
 In the aftermath of Fukushima, the PNECs‟ motto was adopted and inverted by the 
ANECs, resulting in the motto nuclear energy is not cheap, clean, or safe. The Fukushima 
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incident and nuclear scandals triggered allergic reactions to nuclear energy in the society of JST. 
With increasing concerns over the safety and transparency of nuclear energy, the ANECs quickly 
gained momentum in the nuclear policy arenas and became one of the dominant powers in the 
nuclear policy decision-making process. Since nuclear safety and transparency are the utmost 
interests of the ANEC, the ANECs of these states tend to concentrate on domestic conditions.  
E. Anti-nuclear weapons coalitions (ANWC) 
Post-Fukushima, the ANWC is the opponent of nuclear weapons and is comprised of 
politicians and political parties, and the segment of NGOs, think tanks, media, and academia. 
The ANWC‟s main domestic objective has been, and still is, to remove all nuclear facilities and 
any material that could be used for building nuclear weapons. Internationally, the ANWC‟s goal 
is the disarmament of nuclear weapons. Pre-Fukushima, however, the ANWC only existed in 
Japan. The concept of nonproliferation was almost non-existent in South Korea and Taiwan prior 
to the Fukushima incident. Furthermore, nuclear weapons were positively portrayed in South 
Korea as symbols of independence. 
 In contrast, nuclear weapons were portrayed negatively in Japan because Japan was the 
only victim of the atomic bomb. Unlike the movement against nuclear energy, the anti-nuclear 
weapons movement gained traction with the backing of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). As 
anti-nuclear weapons sentiment reached its peak, conservative LDP Prime Minister Eisaku Sato 
was pressured to introduce the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1967. Although they were 
adopted by the Japanese Diet in 1971, they were never written into law. Throughout the Cold 
War, the allergic reactions toward nuclear weapons remained strong nationwide. Japanese 
leaders and policymakers have stood by the Three Non-nuclear Principles.  
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Post-Fukushima, however, the ANWCs of these three states, even ANWC in Japan, are 
considered as the weakest coalitions within the nuclear policy arena of each state. The ANWCs 
in South Korea and Taiwan joined themselves to the ANEC to provide their agendas with more 
influence within the decision-making processes. However, the ANWCs‟ agendas in South Korea 
and Taiwan were overshadowed by those of the ANECs. In contrast, the ANWC in Japan still 
maintains some influence in the nuclear policy arena and decision-making process and also 
enjoys strong public support. However, even in Japan, the anti-nuclear weapons movement lost 
its traction nationwide as the JCP weakened and has been limited to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
areas and the Hibakusha. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, where there is no clear distinction 
between the ANEC and the ANWC post-Fukushima, Japan‟s ANWC maintains its separation 
from the ANEC as many supporters of the anti-nuclear weapons movement still support nuclear 
energy. The utmost concern for the ANWCs is nonproliferation movements that promotes 
disarmament of nuclear weapons and complete denuclearization of a state. Therefore, the 
ANWCs tend to balance between domestic and international concerns.   
Research Design 
The main argument of these comparative analyses is that all conditions, both international 
and domestic, are eventually filtered through domestic politics during the decision-making 
process. Hence, controlled comparison of JST in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident is both 
timely and analytically indispensable. The controlled comparison provides important benefits for 
improving our systematic understanding of the relationship between the interplay of coalitions 
and the nuclear orientation of each of these states. Furthermore, to better understand the nuclear 
orientation of these states post-Fukushima, each case study observes four processes: 1) 
examining how international and domestic conditions are filtered through the four domestic 
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coalitions, 2) analyzing how these filtered conditions influence the perception of each coalition, 
3) building trend data that portrays the interplay between these coalitions in the nuclear policy 
arena, and 4) exploring how each coalition influences the nuclear decision-making process and 
nuclear orientations of these states.  
Prominent nuclear scholars and policy experts have argued that the nuclear orientation of 
these Northeast Asian states was determined by either the security or economic challenges each 
state faced.  Prior to the Fukushima incident, the nuclear orientations of these three states were 
strongly influenced by security concerns, economic concerns, and social norms [See Table 1.1]. 
As previously mentioned, during the pre-Fukushima era, the impacts of these conditions were 
determined by the PNECs, the sole stakeholder in nuclear policy decision-making processes of 
these states. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 illustrate both international and domestic conditions which 
influence nuclear orientation toward either nonproliferation or proliferation. 
Table 1.1: Pre-Fukushima Nonproliferation and Proliferation Conditions 
 Economy Security Social Norm 
Nonproliferation 
conditions 
1.Rise of Global Economy 
(Internationalizing) 
2.Economic rise of China 
3.U.S. Alliance 
1.U.S. Alliance 1. Nuclear Allergy  toward  Nuclear 
Weapons (the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
+ Victim mindset (Japan only)) 
Proliferation/ / 
↑ Nuclear Energy 
conditions 
1. Complete nuclear fuel 
cycle 
1. Nuclear North Korea (Japan 
and South Korea only) 
2. Military rise of China  
3. Remilitarization of Japan 
(South Korea only) 
4. Alliance abandonment 
1.“Myth of Absolute Safety” 
2. Positive Image of Nuclear Weapons 
(South Korea only) 
 
As portrayed in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, nuclear safety and nuclear information 
transparency were added as new nonproliferation conditions, while the “Myth of Absolute Safety” 
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was removed from the proliferation conditions in the aftermath of Fukushima. Thus, in the post-
Fukushima era, the nuclear orientations of these three states are strongly influenced by security 
concerns, economic concerns, safety concerns, and social norms [See Table 1.2]. The Fukushima 
disaster initiated a “second nuclear allergy era” in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia, especially in 
South Korea, and Taiwan. This created a new dimension in the overall nuclear debate in these 
states‟ discussion about nuclear safety and security. Post-Fukushima, nuclear safety and security 
became the most debated topics in both households and the media. As nuclear safety and security 
issues became salient, political power quickly coalesced around establishing new political 
coalitions with anti-nuclear agendas.  
Table 1.2: Post-Fukushima Nonproliferation and Proliferation Conditions 
 Economy Security Safety Social Norm 
Nonproliferation / 
↓ Nuclear Energy 
conditions 
1. Rise of Global 
Economy 
(Internationalizing) 
2. Economic rise of 
China 
3. U.S. Alliance 
1.U.S. Alliance 1. Nuclear Safety 
2. Nuclear 
Information 
Transparency 
1. Nuclear Allergy  toward  
Nuclear Weapons (the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles + Victim 
mindset (Japan only)) 
2. Nuclear Allergy toward 
Nuclear Energy 
Proliferation/ 
↑ Nuclear Energy 
conditions 
1. Complete nuclear fuel 
cycle 
1. Nuclear North Korea 
(Japan and South Korea 
only) 
2. Military rise of China  
3. Remilitarization of 
Japan (South Korea only) 
4. Alliance abandonment 
 1. Positive image of nuclear 
weapons (South Korea only) 
2. Rise of Nationalism (Japan 
Only) 
 
The dependent variable is the nuclear orientations of JST. The independent variable is 
political competition within these states‟ nuclear policy arenas. It is assumed that these states 
will maintain their internationalizing orientation for the foreseeable future; therefore, the 
internationalizing orientation is kept constant and set as a controlled variable. The intervening 
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variables are the economy, security, safety, and social norm conditions that are filtered through 
the lenses of four domestic coalitions (the PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC). More 
specifically, the economy variable category includes the rise of the global economy, the 
economic rise of China, and complete nuclear fuel cycle. The security variable category includes 
the military rise of China, the rise of nuclear North Korea, the U.S. alliance, the alliance 
abandonment concerns, and the remilitarization of Japan (this condition only applies to South 
Korea). The safety variable category includes nuclear safety and nuclear information 
transparency. However, in the case of the U.S. alliance, it falls into both economy and security 
categories. Finally, the social norm variable category includes nuclear allergy toward nuclear 
weapons (the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and Victim mindset (Japan only)), nuclear allergy 
toward nuclear energy, the rise of nationalism (Japan only)
27
, and the positive image of nuclear 
weapons (South Korea only).  
  Even though the influence of these variables on the nuclear orientations of these states is 
examined, the primary emphasis is on how these states‟ nuclear orientations are shaped by the 
interplay of various coalitions in the nuclear policy arenas and how this affects the nuclear 
weapons debate.  It is difficult to make clear-cut predictions about whether these states will 
maintain or reverse their non-nuclear policy in the upcoming years. In other words, there is no 
such thing as a definite “yes” or “no” in knowing states‟ intentions. Although the definite future 
of these states cannot be predicted, the valuable trend data on these states‟ nuclear orientations 
                                                          
27
 The rise of nationalism is only applicable for Japan in this research because, unlike South Korea‟s anti-Japanese 
sentiment, which is historically embedded within the Korean society and directed toward a specific country, the rise 
of Japanese nationalism is a national movement led by political leaderships to change the national identity in a way 
that can impact the nuclear policy decision-making. The impact of nationalism and nationalistic sentiment are 
further explained in Japan and South Korea case study chapters.  
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and domestic coalitions provide a solid foundation for increasing the accuracy of future 
predictions.  
A. Process-Tracing  
Utilizing process-tracing to analyze change over time, change and continuity in the 
nuclear discussions pre- and post-Fukushima with respect to nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and 
nuclear weapons are examined. The changes in international and domestic conditions around JST 
are closely explored to better understand the nuclear orientations of these states pre- and post-
Fukushima. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005), process-tracing is 
defined as a method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain 
and causal mechanism – between an independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent 
variable” (p. 206). Process-tracing methods are utilized to build trend data, which is built up 
through the order of events or processes that occurred in these states. This is helpful for 
understanding how domestic political dynamics of these states have changed, and how time and 
sequencing influence the nuclear orientations in the aftermath of Fukushima. For example, if the 
LDP was in power during the Fukushima incident, then the domestic political dynamics and 
nuclear orientation of Japan would have been more similar to South Korea and Taiwan.   
B. Data Collection  
The study draws on evidence from nuclear policies, nuclear legislation, political speeches, 
government press releases, and policy statements, as well as the elite rhetoric, public opinion 
surveys, media representation, and activities of anti-nuclear groups. Furthermore, data collection 
is relied on mass media coverage and informal and formal interviews conducted by the author 
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with salient political actors, such as prime ministers, politicians, bureaucrats, military leaders, 
and NGO‟s representatives.  
The films and Television documentaries are analyzed using open source analysis. For 
example, Japan‟s “Fukushima: A Nuclear Story” (2015) and South Korea‟s “Pandora” (2016) 
received accolades from ordinary citizens for accurately representing the public perception of 
nuclear power in Japan and South Korea. Open source analysis comes from the intelligence 
community and uses data collected from publicly-available sources. These sources include 
newspapers, television, and computer-based information primarily from web-based communities. 
Open source analysis is the fastest way to collect information in the digital era; however, there 
are issues with reliability. To increase the reliability of the information, the data is verified with 
insights from public figures in NGOs, academia, and political offices. 
Over fifty semi-structured formal and informal interviews with politicians, military 
leaders, bureaucrats, think-tanks, academics, and media outlets of these three states were 
conducted during the two years of fieldwork in Japan and South Korea. Expert interviews further 
provide data about the interplay between coalitions within these states and how they filtered both 
nuclear issues and geopolitical circumstances into domestic politics. This method served 
primarily as a means to confirm results obtained from archival and open source data.  
Roadmap  
Chapter 2 provides an extensive analysis of the development of nuclear debates and the changing 
international and domestic conditions surrounding Northeast Asia pre- and post-Fukushima. 
Then this chapter identifies the strengths and weakness of alternative theories explaining the 
nuclear orientations of JST. Furthermore, Chapter 2 underlines why these alternative theories are 
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relevant, but also why they do not have full explanatory power to systematically analyze the 
continuing denuclearization policy of these states in the aftermath of Fukushima. Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5, in the context of JST, respectively, explore how discussions surrounding the nuclear 
energy, nuclear weapons, nuclear safety, and nuclear norms have evolved pre- and post-
Fukushima and how these discussions have influenced the nuclear orientations of these states. 
These chapters analyze the changing domestic political dynamics and nuclear policy arenas 
within each state.  
Chapter 3 explores how the Japanese nuclear orientation is circling back to the original position 
that it had prior to the Fukushima incident. The skepticism about the safety of nuclear energy 
continues in Japan, but the sluggishness of its economy and intensifying geopolitical tensions in 
the region are taking precedence. Article 9 and Japan‟s three nonnuclear principles of not 
possessing, not producing, and not allowing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil are coming under 
attack as a result of the remilitarization movement. How firm is Japan‟s non-nuclear weapons 
commitment?  
Chapter 4 explores if the new normal, which phases out nuclear energy in South Korea, will 
maintain its position in the coming years. This new normal already seems insecure as South 
Korea must balance between its domestic energy policy and its nuclear export policy. Even with 
safety concerns for nuclear energy, South Korea is still experiencing strong public support for 
nuclear weapons due to the rise of nuclear North Korea and concern for alliance abandonment. 
How will different domestic coalitions deal with the complete nuclear fuel cycle discussions, 
which include ENR technology? Can South Korea achieve control over the complete nuclear fuel 
cycle without raising concerns about proliferation?  
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Chapter 5 explores how Taiwan‟s nuclear safety concerns overwhelmed its security concerns 
post-Fukushima. How did the rise of China influence the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 
discussion in Taiwan? Why did Taiwan decide to decommission all its nuclear reactors by 2025 
and how does this influence the nuclear orientation? How likely is it that Taiwan will reverse its 
nuclear policy?   
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the previous three case-study chapters and utilizes the 
comparative analysis to identify the general patterns that emerge. 
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Chapter 2 Altering Conditions and Competing Explanation                                                
The statuses of JST as non-nuclear weapons states remain of continuing interest to policy 
analysts, security experts, and scholars of international relations, especially in Northeast Asia. 
According to one of the dominant explanations for the nuclear behavior of a state, neorealism, 
the power transition between the U.S. and China, the presence of an increasingly belligerent 
region, a nuclear North Korea, and alliance abandonment concerns should all have led these 
states to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons programs. For some policy analysts and security 
experts, the question of these states‟ nuclearization is not whether these states will nuclearize but 
when.  
Yet, for most scholars, these states‟ movement toward maintaining non-nuclear weapons 
policies are very pragmatic decisions calculated to meet the conditions of both the international 
and domestic environments. By the same token, the emergence of nuclear-armed JST are highly 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. This research does not downplay the importance of security 
motivations on the nuclear behavior of these states, especially the alliance with the United States 
and its extended deterrence. This study acknowledges that international politics or the balance of 
power arrangement provides constraints and incentives, which could influence states‟ nuclear 
behavior. Nonetheless, each state deals with these constraints and incentives within its nuclear 
policy arena and its decision-making process. Consequently, it is necessary to re-evaluate the 
impact of security motivations and international conditions have on these states‟ nuclear 
orientations through the lenses of the domestic coalitions. Additionally, both international and 
domestic conditions surrounding these states‟ nuclear behavior have significantly changed in 
recent years. These conditions are perceived differently than those of the second nuclear age, as 
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each state‟s domestic political dynamics were restructured into four domestic coalitions (the 
PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) in the aftermath of Fukushima.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it systematically analyzes how the international 
and domestic conditions surrounding JST have changed from those of the second nuclear age, 
and how these conditions differ pre- and post-Fukushima. Second, it examines competing 
explanations among the various schools of thought for these states‟ nuclear behaviors and 
addresses the limitations of these alternative explanations post-Fukushima. This research 
contends that these alternative explanations are relevant to some extent, but do not have full 
explanatory power to effectively elucidate the continuing denuclearization and different 
outcomes of nuclear orientations post-Fukushima. Finally, this chapter discusses domestic 
models of political competition and nuclear debates.   
Shifting International and Domestic Conditions 
As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the international and domestic conditions that 
influenced the nuclear policy arenas and decision-making processes in Northeast Asia have 
significantly shifted from those of the second nuclear age. The simultaneous occurrence of the 
regional power transition and democratization in Northeast Asia has also changed both the 
international and the domestic political environments surrounding these states. Finally, the 
Fukushima incident changed the political competition within the nuclear policy arenas of JST. 
The research is timely and analytically indispensable in its evaluations of the security, economy, 
safety, and social norm conditions surrounding the nuclear orientations of these states both pre- 
and post-Fukushima.  
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A. Security conditions 
First, security conditions surrounding Northeast Asia have been altered significantly from 
those of the second nuclear age. The rise of China‟s military, the arrival of North Korea as a self-
recognized nuclear power, the Japanese movement to normalize (remilitarize), and alliance 
abandonment concerns have increased tensions within JST, between neighboring states, and in 
the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2018, 
China‟s military spending grew from 24 percent of the total defense budget for all Northeast 
Asian countries in 2000 to approximately 71 percent of this total defense budget in 2017 [see 
Figure 2.1].   
Figure 2.1: Military Expenditure by Country in Northeast Asia  
 
Source: SIPRI. Table created with data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2018) 
Even though the defense budgets of all East Asian countries have increased, the growth 
in China‟s defense spending has far outpaced that of its neighbors. According to the SIPRI report, 
South Korea‟s and Taiwan‟s 2017 defense budget were $39 billion and $10 billion respectively, 
but these numbers were far behind China‟s $228 billion and Japan‟s $45 billion. Based on the 
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South Korean 2012 defense white paper, South Korea has been concerned about the regional 
arms race between China and Japan, who have continuously increased its naval and air force 
capabilities.
28
 South Korea‟s defense budget also increased by 7.2% in 2017 and 8.2% in 2018. 
Additionally, the Defense Ministry of South Korea released a mid-long term defense plan for 
2019-2023, which increases the defense budget by 7.5% annually for the next five years (Kim, 
2019). The budget is temporarily increased to meet the criteria of wartime operational control 
(OPCON) transfer from the United States. South Korea has been working toward modernizing 
their military capability to meet the criteria that was established during the 46th Security 
Consultative Meetings (SCM) between the U.S.-ROK in 2014 (Oh, 2019).
29
  
Even though the increase of defense budget in South Korea is temporary, this provides 
good excuse to neighboring states to boost their military as well, igniting an arms race in the 
region as a result. Nonetheless, JST all acknowledged that catching up with Chinese military 
expenditure is implausible. Furthermore, these states are concerned that going after China would 
lead to an unending arms race in Northeast Asia.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Neighboring states of Japan are concerned that the revision of the Japanese constitution and the remilitarization 
process will significantly increase the defense budget of Japan.  
29
 For wartime OPCON to be successfully transferred to South Korea, the United States asked South Korea to 1) 
increase and modernize its military capability and 2) increase capability to respond and retaliate against North 
Korea‟s nuclear and missile threats. 
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Figure 2.2: U.S. troop levels in Japan and South Korea 1969-2016 
        
Sources: Heritage Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005 (1969, 1990, 2000 data), Pew Research Center (2016 
data) 
Even with the six nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, and rapidly rising Chinese 
military expenditure, U.S. troop levels in Japan and South Korea have been steadily downsized 
since the Guam doctrine in 1969 [see Figure 2.2]. The overall U.S. troop levels currently in 
Japan (approximately 38,000) and South Korea (approximately 24,000) have been reduced to 
one-third of U.S. troop levels in 1969. Thus, there are concerns, particularly within these states‟ 
security policy communities, that regional security instabilities will undermine the U.S. alliance 
commitment and its extended nuclear deterrence guarantees in Northeast Asia (Sanger, Choe, & 
Rich, 2017). Deepening the alliance abandonment concerns, President Donald Trump repeatedly 
indicated that America‟s alliances with Japan and South Korea were a “bad deal.” In 2016, as a 
Presidential candidate, Trump also frequently acknowledged that he might support allowing 
Japan and South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. In recent years, intensifying geopolitical 
tensions and serious alliance abandonment concerns in these states increased the voices of the 
PNWCs in these states. From the standpoint of the PNWCs, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or 
indigenous nuclear weapons seem to be a logical balancing option to maximize their national 
 
 
44 
 
security against the rapidly growing Chinese military expenditure and the downsizing U.S. troop 
levels in Northeast Asia. As the regional power structure shifts in Northeast Asia, these states are 
at a critical juncture for evaluating their non-nuclear weapons policies.  
B. Economic conditions 
Second, economic conditions surrounding JST have changed significantly from those of 
the second nuclear age. Over the years, these states have all experienced periods of high 
economic development, respectively known as the Japanese Miracle, the Miracle on the Han 
River in South Korea, and the Taiwanese Miracle. According to the IMF 2016 Outlook, Japan 
had the third largest economy in the world, followed by South Korea in 11th place and Taiwan in 
22nd place. Unlike the early years of the second nuclear age, when JST were highly dependent 
on the U.S. market and U.S. economic assistance, these three states are now some of the top 
economic performers in the global market. According to 2017 UN Comtrade data, China was the 
number one trade partner for both South Korea (total export volume $142.1 billion) and Taiwan 
(total export volume $89.1 billion). The total export volumes of South Korea and Taiwan to 
China far outpace their total export volumes to the U.S. ($68.9 billion for South Korea and $37 
billion for Taiwan). The United States is still Japan‟s number one trade partner (total export 
volume $135.1 billion). However, Japan‟s total export volume to China is quickly catching up 
with its total export volume to the U.S. ($132.8 billion). Since normalization with China, the 
regional trade volume of each state is nearing 40% of its total export volume. With the exception 
of North Korea, all economies in Northeast Asia are closely interdependent. 
 Today, these states‟ economies are not only strongly intertwined regionally but also with 
the global economy. In short, these states are now in positions to mutually affect other states‟ 
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economies negatively or positively at the regional and global levels. A security expert in South 
Korea argued that the international community might be reluctant to place sanctions against 
South Korea if it decides to build ENR facilities for peaceful purposes.
30
 In short, this security 
expert was pointing out that South Korea‟s economy is so intertwined with the global economy 
that putting sanctions on South Korea is like putting sanctions on the global economy itself. In a 
globalized world, a strong economy can serve as a powerful source of leverage in negotiations 
with adversaries and allies.  
C. Safety conditions 
Third, safety conditions surrounding nuclear issues in JST have been altered significantly 
from those of the second nuclear age. The myth that nuclear power is absolutely safe had been 
shattered within these states. The devastation and unending accounts of nuclear scandals in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima incident are making people worried about nuclear powers, especially 
people living nearby nuclear reactors. Unlike Japan, one nuclear meltdown similar to Fukushima 
would contaminate at least one-third of the South Korean territory and would contaminate the 
whole island of Taiwan.  
 As a result, in the aftermath of Fukushima, nuclear safety quickly arose as one of the 
important conditions influencing the decision-making process of the states. As nuclear safety and 
security issues became salient, political power rapidly coalesced around establishing new 
political coalitions with anti-nuclear agendas. For the first time, there was a clear division 
between the proponents and opponents of nuclear energy. In the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident, the ANECs swiftly controlled the nuclear policy arenas of these states by pointing out 
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that nuclear energy is not safe and proposing to decommission nuclear reactors. The PNECs 
quickly responded by promising stricter safety regulations and proposing ideas on how to 
improve the safety of nuclear reactors. This movement evolved into a debate between 
decommissioning and more stringent regulation within the nuclear policy arenas of the states. 
The control comparison of JST offer an opportunity to examine the effect the nuclear safety 
debate has on nuclear orientations. 
D. Social norm conditions 
Fourth, social norm conditions surrounding JST have been altered significantly from 
those of the second nuclear age. The first nuclear allergy refers to Japanese society being 
“allergic” to nuclear technology, particularly nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Lucky Dragon Number 5 (Daigo Fukuryu-Maru) incident. 
However, the Fukushima incident initiated a second nuclear allergy era in Japan and elsewhere 
in East Asia, especially in South Korea and Taiwan. The myth of absolute safety, which survived 
both Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island incident, was shattered in all three states. JST are 
experiencing a massive breakout of anti-nuclear energy movements in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima incident. This time around, the societies of these states are showing strong allergic 
reactions toward nuclear energy. However, unlike nuclear energy, nuclear weapons are still 
portrayed positively in both South Korea and Taiwan. The social norm conditions do not directly 
influence the nuclear debates. Yet, social norms play an important role in domestic politics and 
nuclear debates, since the result of the debate can be strongly influenced by how these domestic 
coalitions exploit public opinion built upon these social norms.  
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Competing Explanations for the Nuclear Behavior in East Asia 
The literature concerning nonproliferation studies of JST can be organized into 
international-level explanations, which emphasize the balance of power and security dilemma, 
and domestic-level explanations, which focus on the political interests of each state. An 
ideational explanation emphasizing norms and culture falls under both international and 
domestic explanations. Many scholars acknowledge that each level of analysis explains some 
aspect of a state‟s nuclear behavior.  This section explores the competing explanations of the 
nuclear behavior in JST, and their respective shortcomings in explaining the nuclear orientation 
of these states in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident.  
A. International level explanations 
 For much of the second nuclear age, realism and its variants (especially structural realism, 
commonly referred to as neorealism) dominated the discourse on international security and 
nuclear weapons. From a neorealist perspective, in an anarchical international system, it was 
natural for a state to seek a nuclear weapons program, or at least to secure its survival through a 
credible security guarantee from a nuclear ally. The nuclear decisions were considered to be a 
byproduct of international politics, more specifically a byproduct of the balance of power and 
security dilemmas (Waltz, 1981). Hence, domestic-level explanations emphasizing political 
interests, and ideational explanations emphasizing norms and culture, are irrelevant to nuclear 
decisions and outcomes. Structural realism is divided into offensive realism and defensive 
realism. Offensive realists seek to aggressively maximize power to achieve security.  
For the offensive realist, nuclear weapons have become the key to maximizing states‟ 
power. Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer (1990) and Benjamin Frankel (1993) argue 
that a shift to a multipolar world would cause nuclear proliferation in countries such as JST. 
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James Moltz (2006) argued that a nuclear North Korea could trigger the nuclear arms race in 
Northeast Asia, and the number of nuclear weapons states could potentially reach six by 2016. 
Ashley Tellis (2013) also portrays a bleak future for Northeast Asia. For Tellis, power transitions 
in Northeast Asia, especially with the rise of China and the decline of U.S. hegemony, will 
inevitably cause instability in regional deterrence.
31
 From the standpoint of Tellis, Northeast Asia 
is inevitably heading toward nuclear multi-polarity. Paul Bracken (2012) shares a similar 
perspective with Tellis that the non-usage of nuclear weapons, despite intense geopolitical 
competition, is now at risk. 
 Furthermore, at the beginning of this century, Northeast Asia, due to rising geopolitical 
tensions around the widespread capabilities of nuclear power, was seen as a “nuclear tinderbox 
that could go off at any instant” (Fitzpatrick, 2016).  In a similar line of thinking, the Korean 
President, Park Geun-hye, stated in her 2014 interview with the Wall Street Journal that if North 
Korea conducts its fourth nuclear test, “it would be difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino 
from occurring in this area” (Baker & Gale, 2014). Since 2014, North Korea conducted three 
more underground nuclear tests and declared itself as a nuclear power; yet, nuclear dominoes 
have not, so far, occurred in Northeast Asia.  
Contrary to North Korea‟s development of nuclear weapons, JST are maintaining good 
standing with their non-proliferation obligations. The predominant explanation in the policy 
communities of Northeast Asia is based on security motivations and defensive realism, which 
argues that these states were able to restrain their aspirations for nuclear weapons due to the 
strong commitment of the U.S. alliance and extended nuclear deterrence (Alagappa, 2007). 
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According to Waltz (1979, p. 126) and defensive realists, “the first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.” Therefore, defensive realists seek 
to obtain security by adopting moderate and reserved policies. From the standpoint of defensive 
realists, the U.S. alliance commitment and the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence were the key 
determinants of JST giving up their ambitions for nuclear weapons. Borrowing the words of 
Victor Cha (2003), as “long as U.S. commitment remains firm, the likelihood of Japan seeking 
alternative internal or external balancing options is low”(p. 9-10). In other words, a weakened 
U.S. alliance could lead to alternative balancing options, such as a state seeking its indigenous 
nuclear weapons. 
There are multiple precedents in which abandonment concerns led to the initiation of 
nuclear programs in South Korea and Taiwan. President Nixon‟s announcement of the Guam 
doctrine in 1969 and U.S. bypassing of its allies during the normalization talk with China 
shocked these states. South Korea gave up its nuclear weapons program only after receiving 
security assurance from the United States, whereas Taiwan maintained its nuclear program 
clandestinely until the United States discovered it in 1988. Even though Japan did not seek 
nuclear weapons, it started to show a new independent attitude in international politics, quite 
apart from the U.S. position. Christopher Layne (1993, p. 38-39) argues “Japan is beginning to 
seek strategic autonomy” and possibly developing nuclear capabilities.   
In Northeast Asia, as geopolitical conditions intensify, there are concerns that regional 
security instabilities will undermine the U.S. commitment to its alliances and its extended 
nuclear deterrence guarantees (Sanger, Choe, & Rich, 2017). Remarks by President Trump have 
deepened recent alliance abandonment concerns in these states. In 2016, Presidential candidate 
Trump repeatedly attacked the alliance with Japan and South Korea as a “bad deal,” while 
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suggesting that he may allow Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the 
election, President Trump has pushed U.S. allies in Northeast Asia to do more defense burden 
sharing and has increased doubts about U.S. commitments to the security of these states. 
President Trump also unilaterally escalated his rhetoric toward North Korea over the 
development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, which intensified already 
heightened geopolitical tensions. President Trump‟s policies provided a renewed fear of 
abandonment for these states, which may induce Japan and South Korea to consider indigenous 
nuclear weapons as a more reliable option to ensure their security.  
JST are rational actors; therefore, they are skeptical of security guarantees provided 
through U.S. alliances and U.S. extended deterrence. Consequently, these states are reluctant to 
place all their eggs in one basket. Even though politicians and military experts from Japan and 
South Korea continuously deny that their countries have contingency plans in the case of the 
failure of U.S. extended deterrence, these states have constantly reinforced their own military 
capabilities, enlarged their diplomatic power, and strengthened their own economic capabilities 
to escape the dilemma of abandonment and empower themselves within the alliance.
 32
 Although 
no government would acknowledge that its civilian nuclear program was kept for the purpose of 
nuclear weapons, the latent nuclear capabilities allow JST to have an option to produce nuclear 
weapons in the unlikely event that they are to abandon the option of U.S. extended deterrence. 
 In 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron justified the United Kingdom‟s decision 
to modernize and retain its Trident nuclear deterrent submarines by stating that “just relying on 
the United States to act on our behalf allows potential adversaries to gamble that one day the U.S. 
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might not put itself at risk in order to deter an attack on the U.K” (Cameron, 2013). Even the 
United Kingdom, known as the closest ally state of the U.S., is seeking an insurance policy. 
Furthermore, fearing possible U.S. withdrawal from Europe, the U.S. allies in NATO, especially 
Germany and France, are discussing a possible European Union nuclear weapons program 
known as “Eurodeterrent” (Fisher, 2017). Thus, despite states‟ explicit declaration that their 
civilian nuclear programs are solely for peaceful usage, it is natural to infer that alliance 
abandonment concerns are making JST somewhat or strongly interested in advancing their 
civilian programs for the purpose of latent nuclear capability.  
Because JST have constantly suffered from U.S. abandonment concerns over the years, 
nuclear latency can be considered an insurance policy for them. From the standpoint of security 
experts of these states and possibly defensive realists, nuclear latency is one additional option, 
which can help ease their alliance abandonment concerns. According to Fitzpatrick (2016), all 
three states can be called latent nuclear powers because they could produce indigenous nuclear 
weapons within several months to a few years. Therefore, the nuclear latency of these states is 
taken as the new normal in their security paradigms. From the standpoint of defensive realists, 
JST have maintained their positions in regional and international systems by not aggressively 
chasing nuclear weapons, but instead promoting the regional and global stability through the U.S. 
alliance and through acquiring latent nuclear capability.  
Therefore, unless there is a problem with the United States‟ nuclear extended deterrence, 
the most logical answer for these states is to maintain their nuclear orientations as latent nuclear 
powers.  However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the nuclear orientations of South Korea and 
Taiwan, which were moving towards the maximizing nuclear energy option and unintended 
nuclear latency, reversed their direction, moving towards the zero-nuclear energy option and 
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nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In other words, these states‟ nuclear orientations started to 
move away from nuclear latency (middle of the nuclear weapons spectrum) and move toward 
denuclearization. These movements toward denuclearization reveal the gap between the 
expectation of structural realism and the nuclear orientation of these states. 
Despite intensifying geopolitical conditions, JST are maintaining their non-nuclear 
weapons policies. Yet, in the aftermath of Fukushima, these states are diverging in their nuclear 
orientations, which is an unexpected result from the stance of defensive realism. From the 
standpoint of the balance of power and security dilemma, it is hard to understand why South 
Korea and Taiwan decided to move toward denuclearization when China is rapidly expanding its 
military expenditure, and North Korea is escalating regional tensions with its nuclear weapons 
activities. This dissertation acknowledges that there are constraints and incentives provided by 
security motivations, especially the alliance with the United States and its extended deterrence, 
which influences the nuclear behavior of these states. As noted in chapter one, “leaders and 
ruling coalitions interpret security issues through the prism of their own efforts to accumulate 
and retain power at home” (Solingen, 2007, p. 52). However, as noted before, all conditions, 
both external and internal, are filtered through domestic politics (debates within the nuclear 
policy arena) during the decision-making process. This study now turns from the international 
level explanations to domestic level explanations, which focus on the political interests 
surrounding nuclear issues. 
B. Domestic level explanations 
In recent years, the prevailing wisdom in most academic circles is that these states are 
more likely to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons as a result of domestic political factors 
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(Solingen, 1994; Sagan, 1996; Hymans, 2006, 2011; Solingen, 2007, 2012). According to 
Solingen (2007), differences in nuclear behavior can be observed between states, which advocate 
the internationalizing model and those who encouraged an inward-oriented model of economic 
development. The former have “incentives to avoid the political, economic, reputational, and 
opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons because such costs impair a domestic agenda 
favoring internationalization”; however, the latter have “greater incentives to exploit nuclear 
weapons as tools in nationalist platforms of political competition and for staying in power” 
(Solingen, 2007, p. 5). Solingen (2007) demonstrated through the case studies in Nuclear Logics 
that nuclear behavior of a state is highly dependent on domestic political factors rather than 
merely being a byproduct of the balance of power and security dilemmas of a state. Indeed, a 
reasonably common explanation is that ruling coalition in JST seek to maintain their political 
survival through integration into the global economy or by satisfying domestic constituencies 
and this is what has caused denuclearization. 
Along these lines, Solingen argues that JST are reluctant to proceed with nuclear 
weapons programs or to obtain nuclear weapons due to their export-led industrialization and the 
internationalization of their economies. According to Solingen (2007), leaders that advanced 
their political survival through export-led industrialization undertook effective commitments to 
give up their nuclear programs. In other words, the political survival of the leadership in JST is 
strongly correlated with the well-being of the export economy. Even today, these states are 
firmly based on export-led industrialization that is heavily integrated into the global economy. 
Therefore, since the early years of the nuclear age, the leaders of these states have understood 
that the consequences of pursuing a nuclear program could directly impair their economies, 
which in turn could affect their political survival.  
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This dissertation is in agreement with Solingen‟s claim that these states will continue to 
maintain their internationalizing posture for the foreseeable future because economic 
performance remains a high priority for leaders or ruling coalitions‟ political survival. Yet, this 
dissertation would like to argue that there are two reasons why the internationalizing model, 
today, is necessary but likely not sufficient for these states to continue their denuclearization 
policy. This is not surprising at all, as Solingen (2007) anticipated that “different dynamics could 
be at work, triggering conditions under which internationalizing [or other domestic] models may 
no longer provide sufficient conditions for continued denuclearization” (p. 286).  
First, as Solingen foresaw, different political dynamics post-Fukushima triggered 
domestic conditions such as safety and transparency to gain status in the nuclear policy arena. 
Unlike economic conditions, safety and transparency do not have any association with the 
internationalization model. Given the recent geopolitical tensions in the region, security issues 
are also quickly gaining momentum within the nuclear policy arenas of these states. In short, 
while economic performance is still a major priority in their domestic agenda, it is not the only 
domestic agenda considered by decision-makers in these states post-Fukushima. In Japan, the 
economic agenda is still taking precedence over safety and security. However, the importance of 
the security agenda has been rising with the rise of nuclear North Korea and the military rise of 
China. In South Korea, the economic and safety agenda has taken priority over the security 
concerns in the nuclear policy arena. In contrast to Japan and South Korea, the safety agenda has 
taken priority over both the economic and security agendas in Taiwan‟s nuclear policy arena. 
These new political agendas have allowed new political coalitions with different nuclear agendas 
to emerge and gain power in the nuclear policy arenas of these states.  
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Second, one variable which Solingen‟s internationalizing model did not account for was 
the advancement of civilian nuclear technology and how it will impact the nuclear orientation of 
these states. In the world today, the internationalizing model allows these states to maintain their 
non-nuclear weapons policy. Yet, it could not stop the advancement of civilian nuclear 
technology, which unintentionally or intentionally shifted the nuclear trajectories of these states 
from denuclearization toward nuclear latency. Solingen (2007, p. 301) has defined 
denuclearization as the “renunciation” of nuclear weapons. According to Hymans (2010, p. 18), 
“the word renunciation suggests a very strong, indeed irreversible commitment to remaining 
non-nuclear.” Yet, this irreversible commitment was unintentionally broken by the advancement 
of civilian nuclear technology. 
As these three states experienced rapid economic growth through internationalization, 
their nuclear industries also quickly expanded and became the cornerstone of the economic 
miracles of these states. Ironically, as the civilian nuclear technologies of these states advanced, 
which were strongly supported by liberalizing ruling coalitions, the direction of their nuclear 
weapons spectrums started to shift toward nuclear latency [see Figure 2.3]. According to Hannes 
Alfven, the Nobel Prize winning physicist, “atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese 
twins” (Kenward, 1976). 
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Figure 2.3: Advancement of civilian nuclear technology and nuclear orientation (Ex. South 
Korea) 
 
This shift was an inevitable step for states with a liberal economy. If a state operates 
more than 20 nuclear reactors, it is more cost-effective to acquire the complete nuclear fuel cycle 
with both enrichment and reprocessing technologies than to rely on outside suppliers.  Intended 
or unintended, the efforts of these states to take full advantage of their civilian nuclear energy 
programs shift their nuclear orientations from moving toward absolute zero on the nuclear 
weapons spectrum to reversing their course toward the zone of nuclear latency. Therefore, 
internationalizing conditions are not necessary but likely sufficient for these states to move 
toward nuclear latency.   
Thus, as these states move towards maximizing their nuclear energy options, Solingen‟s 
internationalizing model is still a sufficient condition for maintaining the non-nuclear policy, but 
it no longer provides sufficient conditions to continue denuclearization. In contrast to Solingen‟s 
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political survival model of East Asian states, the political competition model demonstrates that 
these states‟ nuclear orientations tend to move toward nuclear latency when the states have low 
levels of political competition within the nuclear policy arena and are moving toward 
internationalization. If the current situation is put into an equation: Nuclear orientation towards 
nuclear latency= low levels of political competition + internationalizing orientation.  
Another domestic political model that reasoned against the neorealism argument was 
Scott Sagan‟s domestic politics model, where domestic and bureaucratic interests and 
bureaucratic competition shape nuclear decisions. Sagan portrays domestic coalitions within the 
scientific-military-industrial complex as the main driver of these states‟ nuclear policies. 
According to Sagan (1996), “bureaucratic actors are not seen as passive recipient[s] of top-down 
political decisions; instead, they create the conditions that favor [or disfavor] nuclear weapons 
acquisition by encouraging [or discouraging] extreme perceptions of foreign threats, promoting 
supportive [or non-supportive] politicians, and actively lobbying for increased [or decreased] 
defense spending” (p. 64). Even though Sagan himself does not utilize the model to explain the 
motivation behind these states‟ decisions to acquire or renounce nuclear weapons, Sagan‟s 
domestic politics model befittingly explains the post-nuclear weapons program environment of 
JST. As these three states progress toward building robust civilian nuclear energy programs, 
Sagan‟s domestic politics model, which is based on the domestic coalition within the scientific-
military-industrial complex, became the center of the nuclear policy arena. Over the years, these 
domestic coalitions solidified their position as the pro-nuclear energy coalitions (the PNEC) 
known as the nuclear village in Japan and “nuclear mafia” in South Korea and Taiwan, which 
wielded disproportionate influence over nuclear policy decisions. Scott Sagan‟s domestic politics 
model focused on the relationship of domestic actors on the nuclear policy decision arena; 
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however, it does not mean Sagan ignores the importance of leadership in the decision-making 
process.
33
  
Even though Solingen and Sagan both express the importance of these pro-nuclear energy 
coalitions, the difference between these two models is that, for Sagan, these pro-nuclear energy 
coalitions were the true decision-makers behind nuclear policy and for Solingen, these pro-
nuclear energy coalitions were the means for a leader to achieve political survival. However, 
over the years it became very hard to distinguish which model had greater influence in the 
nuclear policy decision-making processes of these states. This was because due to the 
overlapping visions of a robust civilian nuclear energy program between the leaders of these 
states and the PNEC. In other words, over the years the leaderships and pro-nuclear energy 
coalitions in these states truly became one large ruling coalition. However, one aspect Sagan and 
Solingen have not accounted for was the political segmentation and political competition within 
the nuclear policy arenas of these states. Yet, this study is in agreement with Sagan that domestic 
coalitions within the nuclear policy arena are the true-decision-makers behind these states‟ 
nuclear policies, but also in agreement with Solingen that domestic coalitions are means for final 
decision-makers to achieve their political survival. It is just that the equation became more 
complicated with multiple domestic coalitions fighting for their agendas in comparison to one (or 
two in the case of Japan) domestic coalitions prior to the Fukushima incident.     
The last domestic political model explaining these states‟ nuclear policy decision making 
comes from Jacque Hymans‟ work on the veto players.34Unlike the other domestic models 
explained above, Hymans‟ veto players do not explain why JST gave up their nuclear ambition, 
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but rather explains why these states maintained their nuclear orientations prior to Fukushima due 
to the policy rigidity that existed in these states. According to Hymans (2011), Japan‟s nuclear 
policy rigidity is due to the increasing number of veto players. Previous nuclear weapons 
literature focused on the ruling coalition, while Hymans‟ work on the veto players goes beyond 
these coalitions and introduces the other players involved in the nuclear policy decision-making 
process. Unlike other domestic models, Hymans‟ veto players do not distinguish between a top-
down or down-up process. This model explains the continuation of the nuclear policy arena and 
veto players involved in the Japanese nuclear policy decision-making process. Therefore, the 
time variable is important for Hymans‟ veto players. Hymans utilizes the historical narratives to 
explain how each veto player in the nuclear policy arena either positively or negatively 
reinforces the currently implemented nuclear policy. 
 Over the years, the nuclear policy arena and ruling coalition in Japan has been dominated 
by the PNEC. Thus, an increasing number of veto players in the nuclear policy arena supported 
the PNEC and strongly reinforced nuclear policies that maximized nuclear energy. Hence, 
Hymans concludes that an increasing number of veto players in Japan will cause nuclear policy 
rigidity, making it difficult for decision-makers to shift their nuclear policy one way or the other 
even in crisis situations. According to Hymans, this model can also be applied to South Korea 
and Taiwan, given their similar domestic outlook and domestic political arrangement in the 
nuclear policy arenas. This study can agree with Hymans that policy rigidity can make it difficult 
for decision-makers to shift their nuclear policy one way or the other. However, this study 
challenges Hymans‟ argument that policy rigidity will stop states from shifting their nuclear 
policies even in a crisis. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, even with all of those veto 
players who favored nuclear energy, Japan quickly changed its stance on nuclear energy and 
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South Korea and Taiwan decided to phase out nuclear energy, eventually leading to the 
decommissioning of nuclear reactors in coming years.  
A final alternative explanation is an ideational explanation, which focuses on social 
norms and culture. The studies of the effects of social norms and culture on the nuclear 
nonproliferation of Northeast Asia have been underdeveloped. As noted in the previous section, 
this study argues that social norm conditions do not directly influence domestic politics or 
nuclear debates. Yet, interaction between social norms and other conditions can cause a 
synergetic effect in explaining the nuclear behavior of a state. One of the few studies dealing 
with norms on East Asia comes from the work of Maria Rublee‟s Nonproliferation Norms: Why 
states choose Nuclear Restraints, which portrays social norms against nuclear weapons in Japan. 
Through the network of international regimes, states become integrated into the international 
community. Maria Rublee (2009) claims that the norm of non-proliferation, which was 
embedded in the NPT, is asserted into the society, making states less likely to develop a strong 
desire for nuclear weapons. However, Rublee (2009) does not claim that the international non-
proliferation norm by itself caused any state to abandon nuclear weapons ambitions. It is argued 
that in most cases of nonproliferation, interaction norms and other variables (international or 
domestic conditions) caused a synergetic effect to produce positive outcomes (Rublee, 2009, p. 
202). According to Rublee, social norms provide the groundwork for Japan‟s nuclear policy not 
to possess, develop, or permit the deployment of nuclear weapons. 
However, social norms can easily go the other way towards the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. As Sagan (1996) highlighted in his discussion of the norms model, social norms can be 
oriented toward both proliferation and non-proliferation. Kenneth Waltz (2003) argued for the 
importance of political determination in developing nuclear weapons: “in the past half century, 
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no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined 
to do so” (p. 38). Over the years, nuclear weapons have been publicly portrayed positively in 
South Korea and Taiwan. This shows how social norms can set political foundations, but they 
can hardly influence the decision-making process. 
C. Link between nuclear energy & nuclear weapons 
Since the Indian peaceful nuclear explosive test of 1974, concerns about the potential 
spread of nuclear weapons have increased worldwide. The Indian peaceful nuclear explosive test 
showed that civilian nuclear programs could be easily diverted into building nuclear weapons. 
According to the World Nuclear Association, there are 447 operable nuclear reactors with 57 
under construction. Furthermore, there are over 160 new reactors under negotiation to be built 
and over 300 more proposed worldwide. Climate change concerns and the rising demands for 
energy security are pushing nations to rely more on nuclear energy. While nuclear energy may 
resolve energy security and climate change concerns, Alagappa (2008) emphasizes that a 
“nuclear renaissance,” or the advancement and spread of civilian nuclear programs have 
increased the chance of proliferation of nuclear technology, which may open pathways towards 
nuclear weapons. According to the research conducted by Fuhrmann (2009) and Kroenig (2009), 
the civilian nuclear cooperation raises the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
because all fissile materials and nuclear technologies necessary for nuclear weapons production 
have legitimate civilian application.  
The civilian nuclear programs of JST have made significant advancements since 
abandoning their ambitions for nuclear weapons. Japan and South Korea went from building 
nuclear reactors under turnkey contracts to building their nuclear reactors with their technologies 
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and expertise. In recent years, Japan and South Korea outbid top nuclear suppliers such as France 
and Russia to construct nuclear power plants overseas. Thus, nuclear power plant has become 
one of the major export commodities for both Japan and South Korea. As these states‟ nuclear 
industries expand, obtaining stable nuclear fuel supplies and reducing nuclear waste are 
becoming a priority for the PNECs. For those reasons above, Japan already acquired and South 
Korea seeks to acquire both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. However, 
the advancement of civilian nuclear programs also has a dark side.  
Even with their good standing in the international community, each state makes a 
compelling case study on potential proliferation. This is because the pursuit or advancement of a 
civilian nuclear program is often characterized as a pathway to acquiring sensitive dual-use 
technology, which can easily be refitted and applied to the research and development of nuclear 
weapons (Alagappa, 2008; Fuhrmann,2009; Kroenig, 2009; Sagan,2010; Brown & Kaplow, 
2014). For example, in August 2004, the Roh administration of South Korea reported to IAEA 
that the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) had secretly conducted multiple 
enrichment and reprocessing experiments. Even though this was self-proclaimed to IAEA, South 
Korea has shown that it is capable of enrichment and reprocessing procedures. As mentioned 
previously, ENR facilities provide a pathway to building nuclear weapons. This dissertation will 
evaluate the ENR debates within these states to better understand the intentions of these states 
for acquiring ENR facilities. Do states really need enrichment (front end) and reprocessing (back 
end) for the expansion of their nuclear industries? If not, why are they really seeking ENR 
capabilities? 
Over the years, scholars have attempted to understand why states seek or renounce 
nuclear weapons. Broadly speaking, most of the literature about nuclear behavior is divided into 
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the demand-side analysis, which focuses on a state‟s motivation or desire to pursue its 
indigenous nuclear weapons, and supply-side analysis, which focuses on a state‟s technical 
capability to build its nuclear weapons. According to Scott Sagan (2010) and Jacque Hyman 
(2011), the traditional division between supply-side and demand-side literature has hindered the 
chance of understanding the relationship between supply (nuclear capability) and demand 
(incentives for and against developing nuclear weapons). Even though most nuclear behavior 
studies separate nuclear capability and motivation, they cannot deny that a state‟s nuclear 
orientation is the complex product of these relationships. In analyzing the domestic political 
dynamics of these states, it is imperative to seek to understand how nuclear supply and nuclear 
demand or motivation can mutually influence each other in shaping a state‟s nuclear orientation. 
Therefore, exploring the motivation or motivations that are hidden behind nuclear capability, 
including ENR technologies, will provide greater understandings of how these motivations can 
influence the nuclear orientation of these states.  
Political Segmentation and Competition: Nuclear Debates 
To date, much of the scholarship on nonproliferation in Northeast Asia has paid 
inadequate attention to the effect of political competition on nuclear decision-making processes 
and nuclear policies. This gap is understandable; unlike in the United States and other nuclear 
weapons states, studies in regards to political segmentation and competition within the nuclear 
policy arenas was almost non-existent in South Korea and Taiwan prior to the Fukushima 
incident. Until the 1990s nuclear weapons and energy were only debated privately or in relation 
to national economic policies in South Korea and Taiwan. Although the PNEC and the ANWC 
existed in Japan and worked relentlessly to promote their agendas within the nuclear policy arena, 
they still did not compete for political influence. From the standpoint of the ANWC, nuclear 
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weapons and nuclear power were separate agendas. This is because most of the supporters of the 
ANWC also supported nuclear energy prior to the Fukushima incident. The agendas of the 
PNEC and ANWC in Japan really never crossed each other within the nuclear policy arena 
during the pre-Fukushima era. Therefore, earlier studies of JST dealt only with decision-makers 
dominated by one domestic coalition, the PNEC. Furthermore, „nuclear weapon‟ was banned as a 
taboo word from scientific and academic communities and the nuclear industries of these states 
since the ratification of the NPT. 
Even though the Fukushima incident significantly changed domestic political dynamics, 
causing political segmentation and competition within the nuclear policy arenas of JST, political 
segmentation and competition would have occurred in these states sooner or later, regardless of 
the Fukushima incident. Since these states decided to abandon their aspirations for nuclear 
weapons, the PNWCs have been hiding behind the PNECs. Given the constraints on nuclear 
weapons, the PNWCs have sought a more realistic goal, latent nuclear capability, and did so 
throughout the pre-Fukushima era. However, as geopolitical tension escalated in the region, the 
PNWCs wanted to move beyond nuclear latency and were becoming more vocal about acquiring 
indigenous nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. As the PNWCs became more vocal 
about nuclear weapons, the PNECs, even though they share similar views on ENR technology, 
clearly wanted to separate themselves from the PNWCs by promoting the nonproliferation 
movement both domestically and internationally.  
While the PNECs and PNWCs were distancing themselves from each other, the ANECs 
were seeking niche markets to penetrate the nuclear policy arenas. However, the ANECs had a 
hard time attaining the backing of politicians, the media, and the public. Even though ANWC 
lost most of its influence within the nuclear policy arena of Japan with the decline of the Japan 
 
 
65 
 
Communist Party (JCP), the hibakusha, with the help of social media networks, have been 
actively campaigning for removal and disarmament of nuclear weapons through their testimonies.  
This dissertation acknowledges that political competition within these states would have 
occurred eventually without the Fukushima incident but contends that the domestic dynamics of 
these states‟ nuclear policy arenas would have looked very different. Thus, it is timely and 
systematically indispensable in its evaluation of political segmentation and competition within 
the nuclear policy arenas of these states.  
South Korea and Taiwan were under authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War, and 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) overwhelmingly dominated Japan for nearly five decades. 
Authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan and the LDP throughout the Cold War 
strongly favored the policy of maximizing nuclear energy because these states‟ were constrained 
by security and economic challenges. Furthermore, nuclear energy was the major driving force 
behind these states‟ economic prosperity since the first civilian reactor began commercial 
operation. Thus, nuclear energy has been an unquestioned reality of these states‟ domestic 
politics. It is because of these reasons throughout the pre-Fukushima era that the economy was 
considered a top policy priority as decision-makers of these states sought security through 
integration with the global economy. However, post-Fukushima, public anxiety and fear of a 
possible nuclear incident are reinforcing nuclear safety as one of the top priorities within the 
nuclear policy arenas of these states. Political segmentation and competition in these states‟ 
nuclear policy arenas allow us to test which conditions are essential for decision-makers and 
examine how these domestic coalitions pressure the decision-makers to enact policies that 
advance the substantive agendas or ideological perspectives of narrower constituencies. 
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The post-Fukushima environment with multiple political coalitions makes the nuclear 
policy arena the perfect testbed to examine how international and domestic conditions such as 
security, economy, safety, and social norms interact and compete for political influence, and how 
these conditions are filtered through domestic politics during decision-making processes. The 
nuclear policy arenas provide spaces where these filtered conditions can interact and compete for 
political power which can influence the final decision.  Furthermore, nuclear debates and the 
interaction of coalitions allow this study to measure how much influential power each condition 
or coalition has within the nuclear policy arena. However, it will be complicated to quantify 
which condition(s) and coalition(s) have the most influential power within the nuclear policy 
arena of each state. Nonetheless, examining the events and nuclear debates chronologically and 
matching them to the current nuclear orientation of a state, can at least qualitatively help us 
understand which coalition is leading each nuclear debate and how each coalition interacts with 
the others within the nuclear policy arena.  
A. Security debates 
Security debates within the nuclear policy arenas of these states are contested by the 
PNWCs, the PNECs that seek a peaceful international environment via nonproliferation efforts, 
and the ANWC that opposes any activities in regard to acquiring or building nuclear weapons. 
As the regional power structure shifts in Northeast Asia, these states are at a critical juncture for 
evaluating their non-nuclear weapons policies. 
The PNWCs would likely have the most robust views on security debates as the PNWC‟s 
primary objective has been, and still is, to maximize its national security. Even with extended 
nuclear deterrence guarantees from the United States, the PNWCs are skeptical about their 
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alliance with the United States. The PNWCs do not believe that Washington would exchange 
New York for the sake of Seoul, Tokyo, or Taipei. As a result, the PNWC advocates “nuclear 
sovereignty.” The PNWC has a firm conviction that a nuclear state can only be deterred by 
another nuclear state. As JST decided to end their aspiration for nuclear weapons, the PNWCs 
were forced to hide behind the shadows of the PNECs. Given the constraints on nuclear weapons, 
the PNWCs have sought a more realistic goal, latent nuclear capability, and have done so 
throughout the pre-Fukushima era. However, intensifying geopolitical tensions and movements 
to decommission civilian nuclear reactors was a wake-up call for the PNWCs.   
On the opposite side of the security debate, the ANWC opposes any activities in regard to 
acquiring or building nuclear weapons. The ANWC‟s objective can be divided into domestic and 
international objectives. Domestically, the ANWC would like to remove all nuclear facilities and 
any material that could be used for building nuclear weapons. Internationally, the ANWC‟s goal 
is the disarmament of nuclear weapons.  
The PNECs in JST would like to distance themselves from the PNWCs and get involved 
in security debates; yet, the PNECs‟ objective to build ENR facilities and to stop any 
decommissioning movement of nuclear reactors aligns with the interests of the PNWCs. 
Therefore, PNECs have repeatedly proclaimed that their reason of interest in ENR facilities and 
stopping decommission movement differs from the PNWCs. Furthermore, the PNECs have been 
promoting the nonproliferation movements domestically by establishing the nonproliferation 
centers and sponsoring nonproliferation conferences while strengthening the safeguards for 
nuclear technologies.  
 
 
 
68 
 
B. Economic debates 
The economic debates within the nuclear policy arenas of these states are led by the 
PNECs, which have a keen interest in expanding their nuclear industries on the international 
market. On the other side of the debate, the ANECs are contesting that nuclear energy is a cheap 
source of energy that benefits their economies. 
Pre-Fukushima era, the PNECs had exclusive power in the nuclear policy decision-
making processes in JST. The PNEC‟s main objective always has been to maximize nuclear 
energy output for the purposes of economic and energy security. Hence, the PNECs always 
preferred economic integration with the global economy, which allowed for steady nuclear fuel 
supplies. However, as these states‟ nuclear energy programs and nuclear technologies surpassed 
the top nuclear suppliers -such as the U.S., France, and Russia- these states strived for peaceful 
nuclear sovereignty, which allows these states to escape from being dependent on outside 
sources of nuclear fuel supply. Furthermore, the complete fuel cycle with ENR facilities brought 
a competitive edge to these states‟ nuclear industries in the world market. Nevertheless, even 
within the PNECs, there is a split between one group, which supports peaceful nuclear 
sovereignty to acquire the ENR facilities, and another group, which would like to maintain stable 
nuclear fuel supplies via the U.S. and other outside suppliers. Although these parties within the 
PNECs disagree upon their methods to acquire fuel supply, they are in agreement that PNEC 
needs to distance itself from PNWC, which also supports the idea of acquiring the ENR facilities.  
On the opposite side of the spectrum of the economic debate, the ANEC opposes any 
activities in regards to building nuclear facilities. The ANEC‟s main objective has been, and still 
is, to remove all nuclear related facilities. The ANECs have been arguing that nuclear energy is 
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not just bad for the environment, but it is also bad for the economy. The ANECs emphasize that 
building nuclear power plants is expensive. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the 
ANEC has been making an argument that one nuclear incident can cancel out decades of profit 
gained from operating nuclear reactors. For example, cleanup costs for the Fukushima incident 
up to date cost Japan over $200 billion and will continue to climb as there is no definite deadline 
when this cleanup will end (Yamaguchi, 2016). It is also argued that safety improvement of each 
nuclear reactor would cost more than $640 million (Freebairn, 2016). Moreover, waste disposal, 
decommissioning, and safety improvement costs can exponentially increase the overall costs of 
nuclear energy, making it more expensive than fossil fuels.      
C. Safety debates 
The safety debates within the nuclear policy arenas of these states are led by the ANECs, 
which have been promoting the catastrophic risks of nuclear energy. On the other side of the 
debate, the PNECs are still standing by their motto that nuclear energy is cheap, safe, and clean. 
The PNECs in JST argued that the Fukushima incident was an unfortunate tragedy that was 
caused by natural disaster and pledged to take action to make sure this kind of tragedy does not 
happen again. As a result, the PNECs promised to establish stricter safety regulations and make 
safety improvements on each nuclear reactor.  
The Fukushima incident and nuclear scandals triggered “allergic” reactions to nuclear 
energy in the society of JST. With increasing concerns over the safety and transparency of 
nuclear energy, the ANECs quickly gained momentum in the nuclear policy arenas and became 
one of the dominant powers in the nuclear policy decision-making process. This movement 
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quickly evolved into a debate between decommissioning and more stringent regulation within the 
nuclear policy arenas of the states.  
Conclusion 
Nuclear orientation and policies are mediated by nuclear debates. In the aftermath of 
Fukushima, nuclear debates are now facilitated by political competition between domestic 
coalitions within the nuclear policy arenas. The interplay of the four domestic coalitions (the 
PNEC, the PNWC, the ANEC, and the ANWC) within the nuclear policy arena and how 
international and domestic conditions are filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions are 
essential in determining the nuclear orientations of these three states post-Fukushima. Political 
competition between these domestic coalitions led to multiple agendas represented by different 
domestic coalitions entering the nuclear policy arenas. Furthermore, political competition allows 
for an environment where security, economy, and safety debates can compete to see which 
debate is taken as the highest priority by decision-makers. Upcoming case study chapters will 
examine the nuclear debates on security, economy, and safety that take place in the nuclear 
policy arena. These nuclear debates are systematically analyzed across the cases as mentioned in 
the research design section in chapter one. 
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Chapter 3 Japan 
Introduction 
Japan offers a compelling case for studies of nuclear proliferation. In the post-Fukushima 
era, Japan is experiencing divergence from policy consensus on the subject of nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear policy discrepancy is occurring at all levels of Japanese society. 
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially during the pre-Fukushima era, the 
nuclear policy arena of Japan has been dominated by one or two domestic coalitions with limited 
political competition within the nuclear policy arena. The dominance of certain coalitions within 
the nuclear policy arena strongly influenced the decision making of Japanese nuclear policy. The 
Japanese nuclear or atomic period can be categorized into three phases: 1) the Imperial Japan era 
which was dominated by the military (pro-nuclear weapons coalition), 2) the post-World War II 
era (post-war era) or pre-Fukushima era which was dominated by pro-nuclear energy and anti-
nuclear weapons coalitions, and 3) the post-Fukushima era where there has been no dominant 
coalition within the nuclear policy arena of Japan [See Figure 3.1].  
Figure 3.1: The Nuclear Decision-Making Process of Japan Based on Three Phases 
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On May 28, 2011, during the first session of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Prime Minister Naoto Kan said the 
following in comparing the military of the Imperial Japan era to the nuclear village (Genshiryoku 
Mura) of the pre-Fukushima era
35
: 
I believe the manner in which the military held sway over politics prior to the war and the 
actions of the nuclear village with the Federation of Electric Power Companies at its center 
have something in common… This is to say that over the past forty years, TEPCO and the 
Federation of Electric Companies have enjoyed a gradual tightening in their control over the 
administration of nuclear power…It is my understanding that their policy has been to 
ostracize and remove from the mainstream all experts, politicians, and bureaucrats who are 
critical of nuclear power. Further to protect themselves, most who witnessed this ostracism 
looked on but offered no resistance. I say this with great remorse for I, too, am responsible 
(Kan, 2012, p. 160). 
Prime Minister Kan also stated that “to fundamentally reform the governance of nuclear 
power we must first elucidate the nuclear village‟s organizational and social psychological 
structures, which resemble those of the military before the war, and then dismantle them” (Kan, 
2012, p. 161). As the military was in control over the administration of nuclear power during the 
Imperial Japan era, Prime Minister Kan became the first prime minister to officially 
acknowledge that the nuclear village (pro-nuclear energy coalition) was in full control over the 
administration of nuclear power for the past forty years. 
                                                          
35
 According to Jeffrey Kingston (2012), the nuclear village “shares a common mentality and sensibilities about 
nuclear energy and that means ostracizing naysayers and critics and denying them the access and benefits that 
members enjoy.” 
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The Fukushima incident of March 11, 2011, was a major shock to both Japanese elites 
and the public. The myth of absolute safety (zentai anzen shinwa) was shattered in the minds of 
both the Japanese political leaderships and the general public. As a result, progressive and 
moderate political parties, notably the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or 
Minshutō), defected and changed sides from the pro-nuclear energy camp to the anti-nuclear 
energy camp. Former high ranking officers of the Liberal Democratic Party or Jiyū-Minshutō 
(LDP or Jimintō), including ex-Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, also defected to the anti-
nuclear energy camp. Overwhelmingly, public opinion quickly consolidated around an anti-
nuclear energy sentiment. The Asahi Shimbun reported in 2012 that over 80% of the Japanese 
public opposed nuclear energy (Kingston, 2012). Although the rating has gone down to 61%, as 
reported in a 2018 survey by The Asahi Newspaper, the majority of the Japanese general public 
still opposes the restarting of nuclear power plants and would like to see a gradual phase out of 
nuclear energy (Arichika, 2018).  
On the other hand, on March 8, 2011, three days before the Fukushima incident, right-
wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, in an interview with The Independent, urged Japan to 
develop nuclear weapons to counter the threat from China and other neighbors. He continued by 
claiming that “all our enemies: China, North Korea, and Russia – all close neighbors – have 
nuclear weapons,” and “that diplomatic bargaining power means nuclear. All the [permanent] 
members of the [United Nations] Security Council have them” (McNeil, 2011). Furthermore, 
security concerns have been heightened due to the North Korean nuclear and missile tests, the 
rise of the Chinese military and its nuclear arsenal, escalating geopolitical tensions over the 
maritime and territorial disputes, and alliance abandonment anxieties. Among conservatives and 
right-wing organizations, discussions have been reopened on the matter of the Three Non-
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Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing, and not allowing nuclear weapons on 
Japanese soil. Throughout the years, the conservative LDP has often played the nuclear option 
card as a strategic instrument to reaffirm the American security commitment or to increase the 
political backing of the conservative coalitions by rousing the nationalistic sentiment. According 
to an NHK survey in 2018, approximately 88% of the Japanese public feel threatened by North 
Korea‟s nuclear and missile tests. In addition, 90% of the Japanese public considered that Japan 
could be invaded by a different country or subjected to terrorism. Consequently, even though 
skepticism about the safety of nuclear energy continues to loom in Japan, the LDP, led by Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, decided to maintain nuclear energy as a key component of Japan‟s 
energy/economic plan. The Abe administration, while steadily applying right-wing agendas 
within the Japanese government, decided to slowly restart nuclear reactors. The sluggishness of 
the Japanese economy and intensifying geopolitical tensions in the region has taken precedence 
over the safety and social norms. 
How have these changing international and domestic conditions affected the debate 
within the nuclear policy arena of Japan? How has this changing debate influenced the nuclear 
orientation of Japan toward nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? Furthermore, what is the 
likelihood that Japan will reverse its non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years? In 
addressing these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, it will examine the nuclear 
debates and policy consensus and competition that existed prior to the March 2011 Fukushima 
disaster. Second, this chapter will examine how the nuclear debate and political competition 
within the nuclear policy arena of Japan have changed in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident. Finally, it will analyze how changing debates and political competitions within the 
 
 
75 
 
nuclear policy arena have affected the nuclear decision-making and nuclear orientation of Japan 
by focusing on key challenges in the economy, safety, security, and social norms. 
Imperial Japan Era 
The Imperial Japan era was dominated by the Japanese military and its effort to win a war 
against the U.S. and its allies. Similar to the United States and Germany, Imperial Japan‟s atomic 
interest also started from the war effort in the early 1940s. Requested by Prime Minister T ̅j ̅ 
Hideki to conduct feasibility tests on producing an atomic bomb in 1940, Lieutenant Colonel 
Suzuki Tatsusaburo, a physicist, submitted a report suggesting that the manufacturing of an 
atomic bomb was feasible (Hadfield, 1995). Japanese war efforts to develop an atomic bomb 
pressed Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) to fund an atomic bomb project in 1941, identified as the 
Ni-go Kenky ̅ (Ni-Project). Ni-Project was named after Nishino Yoshio, head scientist of this 
project at the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in Tokyo ((Rikagaku Kenky ̅-jo or 
Riken). An inter-service rivalry between IJA and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), led IJN to fund a 
separate Kyoto based atomic program which was dubbed as F-go Kenky ̅ (F-Project), with the 
letter F standing for fission. F-Project was headed by Professor Arakatsu Bunsaku of Kyoto 
University (Shapley, 1978). In the aftermath of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945 and the Ni- and F-Project were terminated without 
producing tangible results for IJA and IJN. The failure to develop an atomic bomb was largely 
due to inadequate funding, manpower, technical resources, and a lack of collaboration between 
IJA and IJN (Dower, 1978, 1993; Low, 1990). On the eve of October 30, 1945, Japanese 
ambition to build an atomic bomb came to an end as the Joint Chief of Staff of Occupation Force 
(the U.S. General Headquarters or GHQ) ordered a permanent ban on all atomic energy research 
in Japan and to seize all research facilities and equipment related to atomic energy. Furthermore, 
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the GHQ dismantled and scrapped all cyclotrons at Riken, Kyoto, and Osaka in November 1945 
(Shapley, 1978, p. 156; Kuznick, 2011).  
Post-War or Pre-Fukushima Era 
A. Reinitiating nuclear research in Japan 
Since the surrender in 1945, the GHQ prohibited atomic or nuclear research in Japan. The 
GHQ also ordered a press code on September 19, 1945, to censor all newspapers and 
publications in relation to an atomic bomb. The media censorship was reinforced on October 4, 
1945, as the GHQ summoned five major newspaper editors, Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, 
Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun, and Nippon Keizai Shimbun, and announced prepublication 
censorship.
36
 The GHQ predicted that information regarding an atomic bomb could “disturb 
public order in Japan (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Virtual Museum, 2003). According to Robert 
Lifton (1991, p. 327) in his book Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima, “this censorship 
originated largely from fear that writings from about the weapon could become a stimulus for 
some form of Japanese retaliation.” Fearing retaliation, the GHQ only permitted Japanese 
newspapers to print the official American claim that two bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki for the purpose of shortening the war and for the sake of peace (Nishi, 1982, p. 102). 
Due to the GHQ‟s media censorship, the Japanese public was not fully aware of the horror of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused by the atomic bombs (Akiyama, 2003, p. 72). The 
prepublication censorship was steadily phased out by 1948, but the press code remained in place 
until the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. The ban on all nuclear 
research was also lifted with the Peace Treaty (The Nippon Foundation, 2011).  
                                                          
36For more details on Japan‟s media censorship during the occupation period see Toshio Nishi (1982) and 
Nobumasa Akiyama (2003). 
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Even though the ban on nuclear research was lifted, the movement to reinitiate nuclear 
research in Japan did not gain momentum until the end of 1953. U.S. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower gave an Atom for Peace speech at the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. 
The position of the United States shifted as the U.S. nuclear industry strived to expand its market 
overseas (Watanabe, 2016, p. 630). The Atom for Peace program was developed to make certain 
that states that are aligned with U.S. interests, including Japan, would accept the civilian use of 
nuclear technology for the purpose of peaceful usage. Following President Eisenhower‟s Atom 
for Peace speech, Japanese conservative politicians proposed a budget of 235 million yen for 
nuclear study (Watanabe, 2016, p. 631). Japanese National Diet quickly passed the Atomic 
Energy Basic Act and allocated approximately 235 million yen for nuclear research in 1955. The 
following two factors drove Japan into promoting nuclear energy in the 1950s. As a result of the 
Korean War, Japan enjoyed its economic boom in the early 1950s. Japan sought nuclear energy 
as the new energy source to support its rapidly growing economy. Japanese political elites, 
especially conservative politicians with strong ties to Keiretsu, a conglomeration of businesses, 
considered nuclear power as a long-term solution to Japan‟s energy shortage (Hein, 1990; 
Watanabe, 2016). Nuclear energy became the cornerstone of the Yoshida doctrine which 
allocated most of the national resources to reconstructing Japan‟s economy.37 Consequently, 
President Eisenhower‟s Atom for Peace speech provided a valid justification for promoting the 
civilian use of nuclear energy in Japan.  
                                                          
37
The Yoshida doctrine is a set of postwar foreign and security policies which try to guarantees its national security 
through an alliance with the United States, maintain self-defense force at a minimal level, and allocate resources 
conserved by maintaining small self-defense force and relying on the alliance for domestic economic reconstruction. 
For further detail on the Yoshida doctrine, see Sugita (2016). 
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On the other hand, the rise of China and the rise of communist influence in the Northeast 
Asia region created security concerns for both Japan and the United States. Some of the security 
experts argued that the civilian nuclear energy program provided a good cover up for Japan‟s 
intention, or hedging policy, to increase its nuclear technical capacity (tacit knowledge) to build 
nuclear weapons at a later time (Fitzpatrick, 2016). In addition, communist encroachment in Asia 
throughout the 1950s-1960s was a good reason for the United States to look away from Japan‟s 
technological advancement to acquire uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology which 
could lead to the pathways of developing nuclear weapons (Burr, 2017a). From this point on, a 
robust pro-nuclear energy coalition and loosely connected pro-nuclear weapons coalition, 
silently encouraging the pro-nuclear energy coalition, quickly coalesced around economy and 
security agendas respectively. Even though Japan was the victim of the devastation of atomic 
bombs, due to the media censorship, as explained above, it was not until the Lucky Dragon 
Number 5 (Daigo Fukuryū-Maru) incident on March 1, 1954, that anti-nuclear sentiment 
extended nationwide. The Japanese public had shown little reluctance to reinitiating nuclear 
research and to the matter of the nuclear budget proposal in early 1954. However, the Lucky 
Dragon Number 5 incident unleashed an enraged anti-nuclear movement nationwide. The 
general public and progressive parties quickly united around anti-nuclear agendas and formed 
anti-nuclear coalitions (anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons). This was the beginning of 
the kaku arerugi (nuclear allergy) in Japan.
38
By mid-1954, the nuclear policy arena of Japan 
experienced political competition between four nuclear political coalitions. However, only the 
PNEC and the ANWC was able to influence the decision making of nuclear policy in Japan 
throughout the post-war era. From this point on, as shown in Figure 3.2, the next section will 
                                                          
38
 The term “nuclear allergy” was coined by John Foster Dulles in 1954, see Solingen (2007). 
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cover the changes, from the perspective of the pro- and the anti-nuclear coalition, which occurred 
on Japan‟s nuclear spectrum prior to the Fukushima incident.   
Figure 3.2: Japan‟s Pre-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
                             
B. The pursuit of atomic (nuclear) energy and the Pro-Nuclear Energy Coalition (PNEC) 
In the aftermath of World War II, as the only victim of atomic bombs, Japan quickly and 
assertively condemned nuclear warfare. The Japanese public, who experienced the horror of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Lucky Dragon Number 5 incident on March 1, 1954, was not 
receptive to the idea of nuclear weapons or nuclear energy. In a response memorandum to 
President Eisenhower‟s concerns in relation to the Japanese nationwide anti-U.S. and anti-
nuclear demonstrations, US Secretary of State John F. Dulles claimed that “[t]he Japanese are 
pathologically sensitive about nuclear weapons,” and that “[t]hey feel they are the chosen victims 
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of such weapons” (United States Department of States, Office of the Historian, 1954).39 In 
alignment with President Eisenhower‟s Atom for Peace program, the U.S. recognized the 
symbolic significance of assisting Japan, as the only victim of atomic bombs, with peaceful 
utilization of nuclear power (Kuznick, 2011, Sovacool &Valentine, 2012; Krooth, Edelson, & 
Fukurai, 2015; Mochizuki  & Ollapally, 2016).  
In 1955 with the full backing of the United States, a strong pro-nuclear energy coalition 
(PNEC) quickly coalesced around the idea of peaceful utilization of nuclear power. The Japanese 
government, which was dominated by the LDP, formed a solid PNEC together with local 
government, the Japanese ministries in control of nuclear policy (Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Import [MITI]
40
 and Science and Technology Agency [STA]), utility companies, nuclear 
vendors, the financial sector including the Keiretsu, and a segment of NGOs, academia, think 
tanks, and media. All these actors within the PNEC shared the view that nuclear power would 
enable the reconstruction of Japan in terms of energy production and economic growth and 
would be a step toward energy independence (Kurosaki, 2017, p. 51). The PNEC is often called 
the nuclear village. There is significant overlap with the so-called Iron Triangle of Keiretsu, the 
bureaucracy, and the LDP that has made major decisions in Japan from 1955 (Kingston, 2012). 
Over the decades, as Japan‟s nuclear industry grew, so did the nuclear village‟s influences over 
the nuclear program (Hymans, 2011). As Prime Minister Kan stated in his speech to the National 
Diet on May 29, 2011, the nuclear village has had full control over the administration of nuclear 
power for the past forty years (Kan, 2012, p. 161).   
                                                          
39
This memorandum includes three initiatives taken by the United States to lower the anti-U.S. and anti-nuclear 
sentiment in Japan. The United States decided to compensate the injured fisherman, to strengthen the exchange of 
information in regards to radioactivity with Japan, and to provide official apology over the Lucky Dragon Number 5 
incident during Prime Minister Yoshida‟s visit to the United States in late 1954.     
40
 MITI was later reorganized and renamed to METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) 
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In the aftermath of President Eisenhower‟s Atom for Peace speech, the U.S. and Japanese 
governments collaborated to make efforts to shift the public attitude in Japan concerning the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology.
41
However, the PNEC encountered heavy criticism from the 
public and anti-nuclear coalitions. The survey conducted by U.S. Information Service (USIS) 
discovered that 60 percent of the Japanese public felt that nuclear energy was “more of a curse 
than a boon to mankind” (Kuznick, 2011). Nonetheless, Japan made strong efforts domestically 
and internationally to demonstrate that nuclear energy could be utilized for peaceful purposes. In 
1954, the Atomic Energy Basic Act was passed by the National Diet and brought into effect in 
1955. The purpose of the Atomic Energy Basic Act was to contribute to the advancement of 
society and the quality of living standard via research, development, and utilization of nuclear 
energy. The Atomic Energy Basic Act also clearly states: “The research, development, and 
utilization of nuclear energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes.”42 In 1956 Japan joined the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and established national agencies for nuclear 
energy as follows: 1) Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 2) Science and Technology Agency 
(STA), and 3) Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and The Atomic Fuel 
Corporation merged to Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). 
By the end of 1956, even with all the efforts inside and outside of Japan, 70% of the 
Japanese public still believed that nuclear technology was harmful (Kuznick, 2011). The 
Japanese government, with the support of the United States, launched a campaign to convince 
the public to embrace nuclear energy. At the forefront of this campaign, Matsutaro Shoriki, a 
media tycoon, politician, and CIA asset, with the backing of Yasuhiro Nakasone, a politician 
                                                          
41To publicize Japan‟s national opportunity for the peaceful application of nuclear energy, the United States made a 
strategic decision to begin clandestine propaganda operations and psychological programs throughout Japan. For 
more detail on the U.S. propaganda and psychological operations in Japan, see Krooth, Edelson, and Fukurai (2015). 
42
 For the full text of the Atomic Energy Basic Act adopted on December 19 1955, see 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_download/?ff=09&id=2233 
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who later becomes prime minister in 1982-1987, played leading roles in promoting nuclear 
energy in both political and public spheres of Japan.
43
 In 1956 Shoriki was named the first 
chairman of Japan‟s AEC with the help of Nakasone, who was the chair of the Atomic Energy 
Committee of the National Diet. Just a few months after, he was appointed as the first minister of 
STA, which had great influence over Japan‟s nuclear energy program. Owned by Shoriki, the 
conservative media Yomiuri Shimbun and Nippon Television Network (NTV) led the campaign 
to change public attitudes toward nuclear technology and energy in the late 1950s. From 1954 on, 
a high volume of pro-nuclear energy articles and TV programs, which advertised nuclear energy 
as cheap, clean and safe, were published and aired by Yomiuri Shimbun and NTV respectively 
(Krooth, Edelson, & Fukurai, 2015).
44
  
Furthermore, in 1955, Yomiuri Shimbun, in collaboration with USIS, co-sponsored the 
exhibition on the “Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” (Tanaka & Kuznick, 2011).  During the 
opening of the exhibition, U.S. ambassador John M. Allison read a message from President 
Eisenhower proclaiming the exhibit “a symbol of our countries' mutual determination that the 
great power of the atom shall henceforward be dedicated to the arts of peace” (Trumbull, 1955, p. 
14). The exhibition on the “Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” was staged in Tokyo and 
seven other cities including Hiroshima. A total number of 917,000 people visited the exhibition 
during 1956 and 1958 exhibits (Tanaka & Kuznick, 2011). The exhibitions were effective in 
changing how the Japanese public perceived nuclear energy nationwide (Trumbull, 1955; Tanaka 
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 Shoriki, who played a major role in supporting and maintaining Imperial Japan‟s military war propagandas in the 
1930s and 1940s, was imprisoned by the U.S. occupation forces as an alleged Class-A war criminal. However, 
Shoriki was later released and picked up by the CIA as an asset. Shoriki, as a media entrepreneur and politician, 
proved to be a valuable asset for the CIA‟s covert propaganda campaign in Japan. Shoriki‟s code name was 
PODAM and POJACKPOT-1. Yomiuri Shimbun was also coded as POBULK. For more detail on Shoriki and the 
CIA‟s role in this see Krooth, Edelson, and Fukurai (2015). 
44
 In January 1954, Yomiuri Shimbun launched daily column Tsuini taiyō o toraeta genshiryoku wa hito o kōfuku ni 
suru ka (Finally Captured the Sun: Does Nuclear Power Make People Happy), advertising the wonders of nuclear 
power plants. This column was released as a book later that year. 
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& Kuznick, 2011; Zwigenberg, 2014). As pro-nuclear energy articles, films, and exhibitions 
bombarded the public, by 1958, negative sentiment about nuclear energy declined to 30% 
(Kuznick 2011; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). 
The diminishing public opposition against nuclear energy provided an optimistic 
atmosphere for the PNEC to initiate their plans to construct nuclear power plants as Japan‟s new 
primary energy source. However, the real gain of this campaign came from delinking the 
public‟s perception between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy (Tanaka & Kuznick, 2011). 
The campaign successfully mobilized the public nationwide to embrace an idea that nuclear 
weapons and nuclear energy did not go side by side, that nuclear weapons are bad, but nuclear 
energy is good for the Japanese society. According to Tanaka and Kuznick (2011), most people 
in Hiroshima, including many hibakusha (atomic bomb survivor) and organizations representing 
hibakusha such as Nippon Hidankyo, held two implicitly conflicting views: the campaign against 
nuclear weapons must continue, but nuclear energy for peaceful use should be welcomed and 
endorsed. Throughout the pre-Fukushima era, the PNEC and the ANWC worked relentlessly to 
promote their agendas within the nuclear policy arena; yet, the PNEC and the ANWC did not 
compete for political influence within the nuclear policy arena since their agendas never crossed 
each other. From the position of the ANWC, nuclear weapons and nuclear power were separate 
agendas. 
As the PNEC gained momentum with the backings of the government, Keiretsu, the 
media, and the general public, Japan started the construction of its first nuclear power plant at 
Tokai in 1961. The Tokai nuclear power plant initiated its commercial operation in 1966. As 
Japan struggles to escape from the energy dependency, the PNEC made an effort, since the 
1950s, to advance both front-end and back-end to complete the fuel cycle. In July 1971, Japan 
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started construction of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). The following year, as a national 
project, Japan launched the development of the gas centrifuge process for developing uranium 
enrichment technology and building enrichment plants (Watanabe & Murase, 1977). By 1979 
Japan finally reached, as shown in Figure 3.2, an economic equilibrium to build enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities. Japanese nuclear experts have argued that it is economical for a state 
with over twenty nuclear reactors to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This was 
vigorously debated during the Carter-Fukuda summit in March 1977 as President Carter called 
reprocessing “uneconomical” (Oberdorfer, 2003, p. 461). However, Japan had already achieved 
or was in the process of achieving both the front-end and back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
before the NPT was ratified in June 1976.  
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, MITI played a significant role in promoting and 
allocating resources to nuclear energy, signaling to major businesses that nuclear energy would 
become the cornerstone of Japan‟s energy and economic policy (Samuels, 1981; Johnson, 1982). 
Japan and MITI viewed nuclear power as a major foundation in their long-term energy strategy 
(Pickett, 2002). The plan to make Japan more energy independent by reducing dependence on 
imported oil was reinforced when the 1973 oil crisis, a rapid surge in crude oil prices, literally 
shocked all levels of society in Japan. The 1973 oil shock revived the drive for nuclear power, 
which overwhelmed the criticism for nuclear pollution in the late 1960s (Mckean, 1981). In 
response to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, Japan decided to diversify its energy sources 
comprising an increase in the utilization of nuclear power. When the oil crisis first hit in 1973, 
only five nuclear power plants were in operation and generated approximately 2% of Japan‟s 
electricity. However, by the end of 1980, Japan had twenty-two operating reactors generating 
approximately 12% of Japan's electricity (Suttmeier, 1981). The drive for nuclear power 
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heightened as Japan constructed thirty two nuclear reactors throughout the 1980s to end of 1997. 
Since 1997, only five more nuclear power plants were built and went into operation in Japan. 
However, in the early 2000s, Japan‟s nuclear industry was heading into the era known as the 
nuclear renaissance. Japanese nuclear companies such as Toshiba and Hitachi were winning 
multiple bids to build nuclear reactors in countries like China, Vietnam, Turkey, the UK, and the 
U.S. 
As Japan continued to expand its overseas sales of nuclear power plants, the construction 
of nuclear reactors overseas has become a new lucrative export commodity. Domestically, by the 
eve of March 11, 2011, Japan had 54 nuclear reactors generating nearly one-third of its total 
electricity. However, this nuclear renaissance was short lived as the earthquake and tsunami 
engulfed the Fukushima nuclear power plants. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, all 
nuclear reactors stopped their operations by the end of 2012. 
C. Japan’s non-nuclear policy efforts and the Anti-Nuclear Weapons Coalition (ANEC) 
During the post-war era, the Japanese government denied that they had any intentions to 
build nuclear weapons and maintained their non-nuclear policy. In the aftermath of World War II, 
Japan, as a country, and the Japanese citizens, as an individual, made a great effort to redefine 
their identity. The Japanese Peace Constitution, anti-militarism and anti-nuclear weapons 
sentiment, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principle, in chronological order, shaped the post-war 
image of Japan. The Japanese constitution which was ratified in 1946 is frequently referred to as 
the Peace Constitution due to Article 9, which states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international 
peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
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potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” 
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, n.d.).
45
 Over the years, the Japanese Peace 
Constitution has become a fundamental part of the Japanese identity. According to Thomas 
Berger (1993) and John Dower (2000), post-war Japan is identified as a culture of pacifism. 
Another aspect that shaped the post-war image of Japan was antimilitarism which was 
based on a feeling of victimization. Berger (1993) explains that the foundation of antimilitarism 
started because Japanese felt victimized by both the West and their military which was 
antagonistic towards human rights and democracy. Moreover, as Dower (2000) stated, the most 
chanted slogan during the post-war era in Japan was Heiwa Kokka Kensetsu (Construct a Nation 
of Peace) which became “rallying cries for the creation of a nation resting on democratic, 
antimilitaristic principles” (p. 177). The pacifist and antimilitaristic movements, which were 
driven by the GHQ, thrived in the aftermath of the war. Yet, anti-nuclear sentiments or nuclear 
allergies did not extend nationwide until the Lucky Dragon Number 5 incident on March 1, 1954, 
due to the media censorship placed on the atomic bomb by the GHQ. The Lucky Dragon incident 
made a long lasting impression among the Japanese public that anyone could become a victim of 
nuclear weapons. By the end of 1954, over 20 million Japanese signed the petition known as the 
Suginami Appeal for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The petition garnered 
more than 30 million signatures by August 1955 (Aldrich, 2013). As anti-nuclear sentiment 
extended nationwide, both houses of Japan's National Diet “unanimously passed resolutions that 
called for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear energy,” in 
April 1954 (Kamiya, 2002, p. 64). 
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 For the full text of the Constitution of Japan, see 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
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In 1955, with the backings of the general public and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), 
anti-nuclear sentiment quickly coalesced around the idea of opposing nuclear weapons and 
formed the anti-nuclear weapons coalition (ANWC). In 1955 Gensuikyō which stands for 
Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai (Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) 
formed a strong ANWC together with the JCP, Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Sōhyō (the General 
Council of Trade Unions of Japan), hibakusha organizations, and a segment of NGOs, think 
tanks, the media, and academia. All these actors within the ANWC shared the domestic objective 
to remove all nuclear facilities and any material that could be used for building nuclear weapons 
and the international objective of disarmament of nuclear weapons. However, the Gensuikyō is 
not monolithic on policy, and there are disagreements between members over various issues that 
are bitterly contested, especially over the promotion of nuclear energy (Totten and Kawakami 
1964). As the JCP and other members of Gensuikyō strongly supported nuclear energy, the JSP 
and Sōhyō, which opposes both nuclear energy and weapons, split from the Gensuikyō to form 
the Gensuikin (Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) in 1965 (Aldrich, 2013). 
From that point on, the anti-nuclear movement split into two groups: one that supported nuclear 
energy but opposed nuclear weapons and one that opposed both nuclear energy and weapons.  
As public pressure mounted over nuclear weapons, conservative LDP Prime Minister 
Eisaku Satō introduced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Hikaku San-Gensoku) in 1967. 
Although the Japanese Diet adopt the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971, they were never 
written into law. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles prohibit Japan from manufacturing, 
possessing, or permitting the entry of nuclear weapons into the country or in its air or sea 
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space.
46
 Prime Minister Satō only wanted to introduce the first two principles; yet, he was 
pressured by his cabinet, even members from the LDP to add a third prohibition, which prohibits 
entry of nuclear weapons into Japan (Green & Furukawa, 2007).  
In 1968 Prime Minister Satō, broadened the Three Non-Nuclear principles into the Four 
Pillars of Japan‟s non-nuclear policy. The Four Pillars are to 1) maintain the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles; 2) pursue global nuclear disarmament; 3) promote the use of nuclear power for 
peaceful purposes; and 4) rely on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Even though the four 
pillars of Japan‟s non-nuclear policy reassert the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the main 
purpose of this policy was to reaffirm Japan‟s reliance upon U.S. extended deterrence. This was 
a strategic move by Prime Minister Satō and the LDP to balance the third prohibition of the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles which could weaken U.S. nuclear umbrellas. Throughout the post-
war era, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were challenged, but the allergic reactions toward 
nuclear weapons remained strong nationwide. Japanese leaders and policymakers have stood by 
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. As Mochizuki (2007) pointed out, it was “taboo” even to 
openly discuss the prospect of nuclear armament.
47
 Although the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
are not enshrined in law, they have been enshrined as the national norm in Japanese public 
opinion (Rublee, 2009). 
Throughout the post-war era, although Japanese leadership, especially under the 
leadership of the LDP, made periodic remarks regarding the possibility of acquiring nuclear 
weapons, Japan led international campaigns against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As 
shown in Figure 3.3 below, the government of Japan has demonstrated its obligation to prevent 
                                                          
46
 Third principle of prohibiting the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan has been violated throughout the post-war 
era, as U.S. ships, aircraft carrier, and submarines entered the ports of Japan with tactical nuclear weapons onboard.   
47
 Nuclear Taboo in this chapter refers to the reluctance of public discussions on the issues of nuclear weapons 
option. 
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the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and delivery vehicles through joining 
non-proliferation regimes and international organizations. Furthermore, Japan was the founding 
member of all existing multilateral export control regimes, which tried to fill the gap caused by 
the NPT of 1968.
48
 In 1997, Japan became the fourth state overall and first nuclear weapon 
capable state to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 1999 Japan, once 
again, became the first nuclear weapon capable state with both enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities to ratify the IAEA‟s Additional Protocol. During the pre-Fukushima era, Japan 
maintained a solid record of adhering to its policies of non-nuclear weapons and peaceful usage 
of nuclear energy.  
Figure 3.3 Japan‟s Participation in Nonproliferation Regimes and Activities 
              
D. Nuclear hedging posture and the Pro-Nuclear Weapons Coalition (PNWC)  
From the early years of the post-war era, Japan, especially conservative politicians from 
the LDP, has suffered from the dilemma of nuclear abolition and nuclear deterrence (Campbell 
& Sunohara, 2004; Green & Furukawa, 2007; Solingen, 2007; Umebayashi, Hirose, Nakamura, 
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 The NPT specified that the IAEA would provide safeguards for exports of nuclear supplies but did not incorporate 
any safeguard against proliferation or export of dual usage technology. 
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& Suzuki, 2015; Ota, 2018). In other words, leadership in Japan could not disregard the strong 
anti-nuclear weapons sentiment, but they also could not overlook the importance of nuclear 
deterrence, covered by either U.S. nuclear umbrella or domestic nuclear program, for the sake of 
their national security. As a consequence, Japan‟s past administrations have made numerous 
public statements asserting their commitment to Japan‟s non-nuclear policy to pacify public 
anxieties. 
 On the other hand, throughout the post-war era, senior level Japanese politicians, 
including several prime ministers, periodically expressed their support for acquiring indigenous 
nuclear weapons. These public statements were perceived as either taking hedging stance or 
putting pressure on the United States to reaffirm its commitment to the nuclear umbrella. In the 
post-war era, Japan faced multiple security concerns regionally and domestically; yet, Japan was 
limited by the Peaceful Constitution, especially by Article 9, to maintain security forces that have 
only defensive capabilities. Although nuclear weapons are not specified in the Peaceful 
Constitution, they are prohibited because nuclear weapons are generally considered to be 
offensive weapons. This was reinforced when the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 went into 
effect, which banned the military use of nuclear energy. Moreover, in the post-war era, to 
minimize security concerns, especially in the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, 
Japan heavily relied upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the Peaceful 
Constitution continuously raised the question on the legality of nuclear weapons. 
The encroachment of communism in Northeast Asia, the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, 
and the skepticism of nuclear umbrella quickly coalesced around the idea of nuclear hedging or 
developing nuclear latency and formed the pro-nuclear weapons coalition (PNWC). However, 
unlike the PNEC, literally, the PNWC has never openly surfaced in political or public spheres. 
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Thus, this research contends that there is a loosely connected coalition between conservative 
politicians, political parties, and a segment of the military, think tanks, the media, and academia. 
The PNWC‟s primary objective has been, and still is, to maximize its national security. 
Throughout the years, the PNWC of Japan has been skeptical about their alliance with the United 
States and its policy of extended nuclear deterrence. The PNWC does not believe that 
Washington would trade New York for the sake of Tokyo. Therefore, the PNWCs‟ national 
security objective has been to either acquire indigenous nuclear weapons or obtain nuclear 
latency in the case of the failure of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, throughout the post-war 
era, as Japan decided to abandon their aspiration for nuclear weapons, the PNWC has hidden 
behind the shadow of the PNECs. Occasionally, conservative politicians in Japan have discussed 
the possibility of a nuclear option, but most of the time, nuclear weapons discussions have kept a 
low profile in both the political and public spheres. The PNWC challenged the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles and the Peaceful Constitution multiple times, but these challenges never led to 
any action taken by the PNWC due to the heavy criticism and pressures from their domestic 
constituencies.  
During the post-war era, high ranking Japanese officials, including a succession of prime 
ministers, every so often indicated, in unguarded moments, their support for obtaining 
indigenous nuclear weapons (Campbell & Sunohara, 2004).
49 
As many conservatives raised the 
possibility of nuclear weapons throughout the post-war era, despite the continuous denials by the 
Japanese government, the prospect of Japan‟s nuclear armament has been a subject of interest for 
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 This research assumes that succession of prime ministers, until LDP lost one-party dominance in 1993, supported 
nuclear weapons. This is because of the faction politics within the LDP. Throughout the post-war era, strong faction 
leaders such as Kishi, Sato, Tanaka, and Fukuda vouched for nuclear weapons. Faction members showed strong 
loyalty to their faction and leadership. Two of the largest LDP factions prior to the change of political funding law in 
mid-1990 were led by Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda. The prime ministers from the LDP until 1993 came from 
either Tanaka‟s or Fukuda‟s faction.  
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security experts and scholars. As the geopolitical tensions and alliance abandonment anxieties 
intensified, Japan naturally examined the nuclear options and embraced the hedging posture in 
the early 1950s. 
According to Muto Ichiyo (2013), since nuclear research was reinitiated, Japan was 
prepared to embrace the nuclear hedging posture. The debate over the nuclear options was on the 
table since the budget was proposed for nuclear research in early 1954. Muto focused on how 
this budget was first proposed by Kuranosuke Oyama on March 4, 1954, Member of Parliament 
(MP) of the Kaishintō (Reformist) Party, which later became part of the LDP. According to 
Yuko Fujita‟s essay in Kakushite kaku busō suru Nihon (Japan Stealthily Goes for Nuclear 
Arming), Oyama presented this budget proposal to “enable Japanese public to understand atomic 
weaponry and acquire the ability to use it” (Muto, 2013, p. 187). Oyama went on to state that, “it 
is top priority that we obtain the capacity to understand nuclear weapons, both new and those 
presently being developed, and to use them if only to avoid being given outdated weapons from 
the U.S. under the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) agreement” (Muto, 2013, p. 187). Muto 
argued that the initial motivation behind a budget of 235 million yen was not for the peaceful use 
of nuclear power, but to be a foundation for Japan‟s nuclear weapons ambition. 
Throughout the post-war period, prime ministers of Japan had strong tendencies to stay 
within the parameters of Yoshida doctrine. Japanese leadership felt comfortable concentrating on 
economic reconstructions because they had strong confidence in the U.S. alliance and U.S. 
nuclear umbrella (Campbell & Sunohara, 2004). Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, a conservative 
from the LDP, also supported the strategic value of the U.S. alliance and the extended U.S. 
nuclear deterrent. A letter from the US ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur (1957), to the 
Secretary of State cited that “[Kishi] has acknowledged to me Japan‟s dependence on the U.S. 
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nuclear deterrent to prevent general war. He shares our concept of mobile striking forces held in 
readiness against aggression.”50Yet, as Prime Minister Kishi faced strong public outcry against 
the revision of the defense treaty with the United States, during the National Diet session in 1957, 
stated that defensive nuclear weapons would not challenge the constitution. This shows the 
extent to which Prime Minister Kishi was concerned over the American security guarantees and 
the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent. This was the first official public statement by seating prime 
minister of Japan on the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. To circumvent the negative 
reactions from the general public regarding the statement about nuclear weapons, Prime Minister 
Kishi decided to address the Japanese security concerns by reaffirming the extended U.S. nuclear 
deterrent within the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. This led to the signing of a nuclear 
secret deal, which allowed U.S. naval vessels with tactical nuclear weapons to enter Japanese 
ports with a prior consultation between Washington and Tokyo.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, public statements by high ranking Japanese officials, 
including prime ministers, regarding the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons continued at 
odds with Japan‟s non-nuclear policy. During the January 1965 U.S.-Japan summit, Prime 
Minister Eisaku Satō, the younger brother of Prime Minister Kishi, conveyed his concerns 
regarding China‟s nuclear test in 1964. Prime Minister Satō expressed to President Lyndon 
Johnson that Japan should have nuclear weapons if China possessed nuclear weapons. Prime 
Minister Satō further expressed his concern by stating that the Japanese public currently opposes 
but the public, especially the younger generation, could be educated (Furukawa, 2003; Campbell 
& Sunohara, 2004). The nuclear test conducted by China in 1964 also urged several conservative 
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 Letter from the Ambassador in Japan (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State, Tokyo, 25 May 1957 in Foreign 
Relations of the Unites States (FRUS): 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, Part 1 Document 159. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d159 
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politicians, including Yasuhiro Nakasone, Shintaro Ishihara, and other LDP members, to call for 
a reassessment of Japan‟s non-nuclear policy (Akiyama, 2003).  
As Satō administration faced heavy criticisms from the Japanese public regarding the 
nuclear weapons, to reassure the anxious Japanese public, Prime Minister Satō announced the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles in December 1967. In 1971, the National Diet formalized the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, but it was never written into the law. It was later revealed in a 
declassified U.S. state department telegram that Prime Minister Satō‟s backing for the Three 
Non-nuclear Principle was a political scam to pacify the general public. During the outgoing 
party of U.S. Ambassador Alexis Johnson in 1969, Prime Minister Satō described the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles as “nonsense” (“Peace Prize winner Sato called nonnuclear policy 
„nonsense,‟” 2000). In 1968, Prime Minister Satō enlarged the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
into the Four Pillars of Japan‟s non-nuclear policy. The main purpose of the four pillars of 
Japan‟s non-nuclear policy was to reaffirm Japan‟s reliance upon U.S. extended deterrence. This 
was a strategic move by Prime Minister Satō and the LDP, a ruling party, to balance the third 
prohibition of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which could perhaps weaken U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. From the fear of weakening U.S. nuclear umbrella, Prime Minister Satō secretly 
ordered a nongovernmental study on Japan‟s nuclearization in 1968. However, the study 
concluded that the cost of developing nuclear weapons would be much larger than the gains. The 
study claimed that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was sufficient to protect Japan from nuclear China 
and that acquiring nuclear weapons can isolate Japan from the international community and its 
allies (Campbell & Sunohara, 2004; Green & Furukawa, 2008).  
On the contrary to the 1968 study, the white paper released by the Japanese defense 
agency (JDA) in 1972, commissioned by director Yasuhiro Nakasone, stated that “as for 
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defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, 
purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the Constitution” (Campbell and Sunohara, 
2004, p. 222). From this point on, the PNWC argued that small-yield tactical nuclear weapons 
could be defined as defensive and for that reason, were permitted under the constitution. On 
March 20, 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who succeeded Satō as Prime Minister in 1972, 
reaffirmed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, but also commented that “while we are not able to 
have offensive nuclear weapons, it is not a question of saying we will have no nuclear weapons 
at all” (Harrison, 1996, p. 13). These official public statements by prime ministers are a good 
indicator that the nuclear option has been discussed within the political sphere which includes the 
LDP (the ruling party) and in Diet sessions throughout the post-war era.    
The dilemma over the nuclear weapons carried on to how Japan addressed the NPT in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. Even though the NPT was open for signatures in July 1968, Japan did not 
sign the treaty until February 1970 and did not officially ratify the NPT until June 1976. This 
was seen as buying time for Japan to achieve both front-end and back-end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. The PNWC argued that the NPT discriminated between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear 
weapons states and might deny Japan‟s option to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, before ratifying 
the NPT, for different purposes both PNWC, for the purpose of nuclear latency, and PNEC, for 
the purpose of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, made great efforts domestically and 
internationally to acquire uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies and facilities. The 
thinking behind the PNEC and the PNWC was documented in 1969 Japan‟s Foreign Ministry‟s 
internal document known as Waga Kuni no Gaiko Seisaku Taiko (Guidelines of Japan‟s Foreign 
Policy). The document recommended that Japan continue to maintain its non-nuclear policy but 
noted the importance of maintaining the economic and technical capabilities necessary to 
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produce nuclear weapons (Green and Furukawa, 2008). In the early 1960s, Japan was conducting 
research on enriching uranium via gaseous diffusion at Tokai-Mura Laboratory. During the 
Classification of Gas Centrifuge meeting between U.S. and Japan in 1967, the U.S. group 
stressed that they had “no intention . . . of placing any restrictions on the research and 
development of methods for the manufacturing of enriched uranium” (Burr, 2017a, p. 132). In 
1969 Japan has successfully enriched uranium using gaseous diffusion (JAEA). In 1972, as a 
national project, Japan launched a development program of gas centrifuge process for developing 
uranium enrichment technology and building enrichment plants (Watanabe and Murase, 1977). 
Japan also successfully extracted plutonium in 1968 and started to build a reprocessing facility at 
Tokai in 1975.  
Thus, as far as the enrichment and reprocessing technologies were concerned, Japan was 
able to achieve both front-end and back-end before the NPT was ratified in June 1976. In 1977, 
Japan and the United States reached a conditional agreement allowing Japanese reprocessing to 
continue. In 1988, under the Reagan administration, revised U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement, known as the U.S.-Japan 123 Agreement, allowed Japan to reprocess U.S. origin 
nuclear fuels. Even though it was the PNEC, at both political and public spheres, that fought for 
the necessity of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, this was a clear win for the PNWC as 
Japan gained two pathways to develop nuclear weapons. However, throughout the 1980s to early 
1990s, the PNWC failed to gain any momentum for strong nuclear weapons policy within the 
nuclear policy arena as Japan continues to remain committed to their non-nuclear policy.     
Coming out of the Cold War, Japanese leadership came to recognize both modernizations 
of Chinese military including its nuclear arsenal and North Korea‟s nuclear weapons 
development program presented a more dangerous and realistic threat to Japan than that which 
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emanated from the Communist blocs during the Cold War. Furthermore, the discovery of North 
Korea‟s secret nuclear weapons development program in 1994 led to a revitalization of the 
nuclear weapons debate in Japan. The JDA secretly conducted Japan‟s nuclear option in 1995 
but came to a similar conclusion as the 1968 study that the cost of acquiring nuclear weapons 
would out weight the benefits (Campbell & Sunohara, 2004). However, as North Korea launched 
a Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998, right-wing conservatives continued to express the 
possibility of the nuclear option.  
Notably, Vice Minister of the Defense Agency Shingo Nishimura argued that Japan 
should join the nuclear club. In an interview with The Washington Post in August 1999, 
Nishimura stated that “Japan must be like NATO countries. We must have the military power 
and the legal authority to act on it. We ought to have aircraft carriers, long-range missiles, long-
range bombers. We should even have the atomic bomb” (Chandler, 1999). In October 1999, 
Nishimura further reinforced his argument in an interview with Japan‟s Weekly Playboy 
magazine that the time is ripe for a national debate on the nuclear option. During the interview, 
Nishimura made an analogy between nuclear weapons and a rape, aimed toward China, by 
implying that rejecting nuclear weapons would be equivalent to sanctioning rape (Chandler, 
1999). Nishimura‟s nuclear option statement and his rape analogy resulted in a public outcry in 
Japan and neighboring states. As pressure mounted from both the public and political spheres, 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi called for, and accepted, the resignation from Nishimura. The 
controversy over Nishimura's remarks stressed the severe sensitivity of the nuclear weapons 
issue in both political and public spheres.  
Nevertheless, the rising power of China and the escalation of the North Korea nuclear 
crisis in 2002 alarmed Japan‟s leadership. As of result, Japanese leadership repetitively raised the 
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question regarding the acquisitions of nuclear weapons.
51
 For example, in May 2002, the Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe stated during his speech at Waseda University that, “the 
possession of nuclear bombs is constitutional, so long as they are small” (Hayashi, 2012).52 Just a 
week after Abe‟s speech, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda supported Abe‟s claim on 
nuclear weapons by suggesting that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles could come under 
review.
53
 Fukuda stated that “in the face of calls to amend the Constitution, the amendment of 
the principles is also likely” (French, 2002).  
However, unlike 1999 when Nishimura was forced to resign, Fukuda or Abe was not 
forced to resign from their positions for their nuclear remarks. This can be noted as that the 
reluctance of public discussions on the issues of nuclear weapons option, “nuclear taboo,” has 
started to erode in both political and public spheres in Japan (Mochizuki, 2007; Green and 
Furukawa, 2007; Johnson, 2012). Furthermore, the escalation of North Korean nuclear and 
missile crisis since 1998 and the movement to revise the Constitution by the Koizumi 
administration in the early 2000s also expedite the erosion of nuclear taboo within both political 
and public spheres in Japan (C. Hughes, 2007). 
As the rise of China and the second North Korean nuclear crisis escalated the geopolitical 
tensions, in April 2002, Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the Liberal Party (LP), claimed that “it 
would be so easy for [Japan] to produce nuclear warheads. We have enough plutonium at nuclear 
power plants in Japan to make several thousand such warheads” (Watts, 2002).54Although 
Ozawa was addressing the security concerns, knowingly or unknowingly he became the first 
                                                          
51
 North Korea acknowledged their clandestine program to enrich uranium in 2002. North Korea also restarted its 
nuclear weapons development program as the 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed in Oct 2002. 
52
 In 2002, Shinzo Abe was Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Koizumi Cabinet. 
53
 Yasuo Fukuda is son of Takeo Fukuda who was the 42
nd
 Prime Minister and leader of Fukuda faction within the 
LDP. 
54
Liberal Party joined the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to form the largest opposition party in 2003. 
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politician from pro-nuclear coalition camp to make an official statement which indicates the 
apparent link between the nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons. What is significant about 
this statement is that it came out from the opposition party. Since 2002, discussion over the 
nuclear option started to occur in both political and public spheres. The academic and the media 
also have taken part in the public debate over the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The North 
Korean missile launched over Japan and their nuclear program reignited the doubts on the 
American guarantees of Japanese security under the mutual defense treaty. Taro Kono, an MP 
and young upcoming Liberal Democratic Party politician, made a remark against U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, stating that “simply put, we doubt that the United States would sacrifice Los Angeles 
for Tokyo,” thus Japan needs to revise the Peaceful Constitution to defend itself (French, 2002). 
The debate over the nuclear option in Japan intensified as North Korea conducted its first 
nuclear test on October 9, 2006. Prominent politicians including Former Prime Minister 
Nakasone and the LDP Policy Research Chair Shōichi Nakagawa publicly supported the idea 
that Japan should start the debate over the nuclear option. Few days later, Foreign Minister Tarō 
Asō, in support of Nakagawa, addressed a similar view to the committee in the Diet: “when a 
country next to us comes to have [Nuclear Weapons], it is important to have various discussions 
on it as another way of thinking” (Shanker and Onishi, 2006). However, even after North 
Korea‟s nuclear test, approximately 80% of the Japanese public, according to the 2006 Yomiuri 
survey, do not want Japan to seek indigenous nuclear weapons (Green & Furukawa, 2008). 
Throughout the post-war era, Japanese leaders continuously address the importance of the US 
alliance and US nuclear umbrella; however, it is also true that Japanese leadership and the 
PNWC repetitively expressed their concerns over the American security guarantees. Thus, 
nuclear hedging stance, covered up by its civilian program, can be considered as an insurance 
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policy for Japanese leadership. Japan successfully obtained both uranium and plutonium paths 
toward building nuclear weapons; yet, Japan have never gone beyond utilizing the reprocessing 
and enrichment for peaceful purposes. The PNWC do not intend to develop nuclear weapons any 
time soon, but obtaining the level of nuclear latency provides them with great comfort in the case 
of alliance abandonment.     
Post-Fukushima Era 
On the eve of March 11, 2011, there were 54 nuclear reactors in operation in Japan 
producing approximately 25% of the country‟s electric power. However, in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima incident, all nuclear reactors were shut down in Japan for maintenance purposes. The 
Fukushima disaster initiated a second nuclear allergy era in both political and public spheres in 
Japan. Furthermore, the incident created a new dimension in the overall nuclear debate in Japan‟s 
discussion about nuclear safety. As nuclear safety issues became salient, political power quickly 
coalesced around establishing new political coalitions with anti-nuclear agendas. If the pro-
nuclear energy and the anti-nuclear weapons coalitions dominated the pre-Fukushima era with 
limited political competition within the nuclear policy arena, Japan is experiencing intensified 
political competition between multiple coalitions within the nuclear policy arena in the post-
Fukushima era. The debate within the nuclear policy arena intensified as Japan restarted nine out 
of thirty nine existing reactors to produce approximately 6% of the overall energy in Japan in 
2018.
55
 For the first time, we saw a clear division between the proponents and opponents of 
nuclear energy. The ANEC swiftly gained momentum within the nuclear policy arenas of Japan 
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 As of February 13, 2019, only 9 out of 39 existing reactors are in operation. Six more reactors received operating 
licenses but have not yet started their operation, and 16 reactors have been closed permanently (to be 
decommissioned) since the Fukushima incident due to safety issues. For more detail on the licensing situation of 
nuclear reactors in Japan see Japan Nuclear Safety Institute. 2018 licensing status for the Japanese nuclear facilities. 
Available from: http://www.genanshin.jp/english/facility/map/index.html 
 
 
 
101 
 
by pointing out that nuclear energy is not cheap, clean, or safe and proposing to decommission 
nuclear reactors. The PNEC quickly responded by promising stricter safety regulations and 
proposing ideas on how to improve the safety of nuclear reactors. Ongoing nuclear safety 
debates between the ANEC and PNEC and the escalating geopolitical tensions forced the PNWC 
to come out from hiding to take advantage of the chaotic environment within the nuclear policy 
arena. The ANWC remain strong as the general public are still supportive of the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles; however, their influence within the political sphere has weakened as the 
power of the JCP and the JSP declined within the National Diet.       
In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi incident, the myth that nuclear power was 
absolutely safe had been broken and the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 
became apparent in nuclear debates within the nuclear policy arena. The Fukushima incident is 
considered a turning point for Japan‟s policy consensus on the subject of nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons. In the post-Fukushima era, several nuclear policy changes occurred alongside 
the policy preference shift by domestic coalitions and social norm [See Figure 3.4]. As the myth 
about nuclear safety was shattered, shown in Figure 3.4, the most significant shift of nuclear 
policy preference occurred in the realm of the social norm as the majority of the general public 
support shifted from the pro-nuclear energy camp to the anti-nuclear energy camp. The ANWC, 
which supported the pro-nuclear energy policy prior to the Fukushima incident, also shifted their 
policy preference from maximizing nuclear energy to zero-nuclear energy. Even though the 
shared goal of all members of the ANEC is zero-nuclear energy, the newly joined members of 
the ANEC prefer more moderate policy shift of gradually phasing out nuclear energy over the 
immediate zero-nuclear energy policy. Another notable shift in nuclear policy preference is by 
the PNWC in the aftermath of Fukushima. Following the incident, Japan shuts down the 
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operation of all 51 nuclear power plants and the DPJ, the ruling party, decides to shift Japanese 
nuclear energy policy, which could possibly lead to dismantling the civilian nuclear program. 
The PNWC, who kept a low profile prior to the Fukushima incident, felt threatened that this new 
nuclear energy policy shift might foreclose Japan‟s option to acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, the 
PNWC slowly started to take actions to protect the paths to developing nuclear weapons.  
Figure 3.4: Nuclear Policy Preference of Domestic Coalitions in Pre- and Post-Fukushima Era 
 
The most noteworthy policy change was to phase out nuclear power plants by 2039 by 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 2012. The decision to phase out and 
decommission nuclear power plants by 2039 represented a major change from the past nuclear 
energy policy. However, this decision was quickly overturned in late 2012, as the LDP, led by 
Prime Minister Abe, regained the majority of the National Diet and control of the government 
from the DPJ in the general election. Although the majority of the public, 64% according to the 
2017 JAERO survey shown in Figure 3.5 and 61% according to the 2018 survey by the Asahi 
Shimbun, seems to be in favor of phasing out nuclear energy, the Abe administration is slowly 
restoring nuclear power plants (Arichika, 2019). The Abe administration approved the new Basic 
Energy Plan on July 3, 2018, which confirmed that nuclear energy would remain a key 
 
 
103 
 
component of Japan‟s energy strategy in the coming years. Under the new Basic Energy plan, the 
ratio of nuclear energy in Japan‟s overall energy as of 2030 will remain at 20-22 percent 
(Ohtsuki, 2018). According to nuclear experts, approximately 30 reactors need be in operation to 
meet 20-22 percent target. Based on the new Basic Energy Plan, it can be easily concluded that 
more reactors would come online in the near future. Similarly as shown in Figure 3.6, the 
Japanese nuclear orientation is circling back to the original position that it had prior to the 
Fukushima incident.  
Figure 3.5: How Should Japan Utilize Its Nuclear Power in the Future?  
             
Sources: Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO). 2018 Genshiryoku ni kansuru Seronchōsa (2018 
Public Opinion Survey on Nuclear Energy, p. 107). 
As explained in the introduction, the post-Fukushima era is like the warring states period 
within the nuclear policy arena of Japan. Although the LDP and Abe administration maintained a 
strong commitment toward nuclear power by making nuclear power a key component of 
economic and energy policies, there is no dominant coalition within the nuclear policy arena of 
Japan. Given the shock of Fukushima and increasing geopolitical tensions in the region, safety 
and security have begun to gain prominence within the nuclear policy arena. In short, while 
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economic performance is still a major factor, it is not the only factor that should be considered by 
the decision-makers of Japan.  
In the post-Fukushima era, these political agendas on the economy, safety, and security 
have allowed new political coalitions with different nuclear agendas to emerge and compete 
within the nuclear policy arena of Japan. The changing debates and political competition 
(interplay between political coalitions) within the nuclear policy arena will be examined and 
international and domestic conditions will be filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions 
(pro-nuclear energy, pro-nuclear weapons, anti-nuclear energy, and anti-nuclear weapons 
coalitions) in order to determine the nuclear orientation of Japan. From this point on, as shown in 
Figure 3.6, the next section will cover the changes from the perspectives of pro- and anti-nuclear 
coalitions, which occurred on Japan‟s nuclear spectrum in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident. 
Figure 3.6: Japan‟s Post-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
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A. Anti-Nuclear Energy Coalition (ANEC) 
In the post-Fukushima era, the voice of the ANEC was reinforced within the nuclear 
policy arena of Japan. The ANEC quickly gained momentum in the nuclear policy arena and 
became one of the dominant powers in the nuclear policy decision-making process. Over the 
years, the ANEC has been emphasizing the catastrophic risks of nuclear energy, which was 
overlooked by the PNEC. However, it was only after the Fukushima incident that the ANEC‟s 
criticisms attracted public attention. The Fukushima incident allowed the ANEC to gain 
nationwide legitimacy beyond the core members of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan. Finally, 
the voices of the anti-nuclear energy organizations such as Gensuikin and Citizens‟ Nuclear 
Information Center (CNIC), one of the earliest NGOs that promoted the awareness of risk on 
nuclear energy, started to receive public attention in Japan. From the perspective of the ANEC, 
the Fukushima incident was a manmade disaster just waiting to happen. In short, the ANEC 
blamed the PNEC or the nuclear village for ignoring decades of warnings from experts to secure 
the safety of nuclear reactors (Avenell, 2016). In a report released in July 2012, the Japanese 
parliament-appointed committee criticized years of collusion between Tokyo Electric Power 
(TEPCO), the industry regulator, and politicians, and labeled the tragedy of the Fukushima 
incident as manmade. In the aftermath of Fukushima, the PNECs‟ motto was adopted and 
inverted by the ANEC resulting in the motto nuclear energy is not cheap, clean, or safe. As a 
result of the Fukushima incident, the ANEC‟s conviction was fortified that nuclear power plants 
are vulnerable to natural disasters and safety cannot be guaranteed through tougher regulations. 
Thus, the ANEC advocates a path towards a zero nuclear energy policy; therefore, they would 
like to either phase out nuclear power gradually or decommission all nuclear reactors in Japan.  
 
 
106 
 
The ANEC was the largest benefactor of the Fukushima incident. For starters, a ruling 
party, the DPJ, have switched sides from pro-nuclear energy to anti-nuclear energy. The DPJ has 
changed its energy platform to zero nuclear energy. The Kan administration, under the DPJ, in 
2012 introduced a new energy policy to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2039. As the DPJ 
dissolved in 2016, the zero-nuclear power platform was passed down to the Constitutional 
Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) and the Democratic Party of People (DPP), opposition parties 
which partially broke off from the DPJ. In March 2018, four opposition parties, including the 
CDP and DPP, submitted a bill to the National Diet to terminate nuclear power generation. 
However, the bill died before reaching the floor of the National Diet due to strong opposition 
from the LDP and Kōmeitō (Sako, 2018).  
The anti-nuclear energy movement became more vocal in both political and public 
spheres as several former prime ministers have joined the anti-nuclear energy campaign and 
spoken out to end nuclear power in Japan. In February 2014, former Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa, with the backing of former LDP Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, unsuccessfully 
ran for governor‟s office for Tokyo on an anti-nuclear platform. Out of former prime ministers, 
Koizumi was the most vocal against the utilization of nuclear energy in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima incident. Koizumi claimed that the METI deceived him during his time as prime 
minister, which claimed “nuclear energy is safe, low-cost and clean,” and it would be difficult to 
replace 30 percent of Japan‟s electricity generated by nuclear power plants. Koizumi said it was 
a “big lie” (Arichika, 2019). Furthermore, Koizumi argued that Japan did not experience power 
shortage while all 51 nuclear reactors were shut down and “Japan can do without nuclear plants” 
(Arichika, 2019). Later in 2014, Koizumi joined hands with his former political partners and 
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rivals to start Genjiren, an anti-nuclear association and extend the zero-nuclear power campaign 
nationwide. 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, conservative political parties such as the LDP 
and Kōmeitō were also partially divided on the issue of nuclear energy policy. Foreign Minister 
Tarō Kōno, an upcoming leader in the rank of LDP, has actively campaigned for phasing out 
nuclear power since 2011. Koizumi contends that many politicians within the LDP “support 
nuclear power passively out of respect for Abe,” and “could be persuaded to embrace a zero-
nuclear policy under a different leader” (Osaki, 2018). However, the real gain for the ANEC was 
the backing of the general public including the hibakusha and its organizations, such as Nihon 
Hidankyō. Prior to the Fukushima incident, the majority of the public was in favor of either 
maintaining or expanding nuclear power. However, in post-Fukushima, the majority of the 
public is now in favor of either immediately shutting down all reactors or gradually phasing out 
nuclear power. Over the past six decades, Mr. Hoshino, atomic bomb survivor, and Professor 
Yamada, chairman of Fukushima's atomic bomb survivors group, were proponents of nuclear 
energy while condemning nuclear weapons; however, in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, 
they believe none of the nuclear reactors should be restarted (Sieg, 2015). If the PNEC was 
successful in delinking nuclear energy from the pessimistic opinion of nuclear weapons in 
1950s-1960s, the Fukushima incident relinks the pessimistic (catastrophic) view of nuclear 
weapons with nuclear energy. In 2011 most Japanese lost their faith in nuclear power. According 
to the 2017 public survey taken by Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO), over 
64% of the Japanese public would like to phase out or decommission all nuclear power while 
only 7% supported maintaining and expanding nuclear power in coming years. Furthermore, the 
distrust ratio of Japan‟s nuclear energy community climbed from 10% in 2010 to approximately 
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30% in 2017. Furthermore, a 2018 survey by the Asahi Shimbun reported that only 27% of the 
public supported the restarting of nuclear power plants nationwide (Denyer, 2019). 
B. Pro-Nuclear Energy Coalition (PNEC) 
If the competition within the nuclear policy arena were a zero-sum game, then the PNEC 
would have been the biggest loser in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. In particular, the 
DPJ, the ruling party, defected to join the anti-nuclear energy movement and the general public 
quickly turned away from pro-nuclear energy to support the anti-nuclear energy movement. As 
Prime Minister Kan and the DPJ switched their nuclear energy policy from pro- to anti-nuclear 
energy, the government ministries in control of nuclear policy, METI and STA, also turned away 
from the PNEC. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, even the LDP, who is closely 
connected to the PNEC, kept a low profile and maintained their distance from nuclear energy. 
Post-Fukushima, the Japanese government initially allowed the operation of seventeen nuclear 
reactors; however, by May 2012, Prime Minister Kan ordered the shutdown of all nuclear 
reactors in Japan for the purpose of safety maintenance. Under the DPJ government, the Japanese 
agencies in charge of nuclear policy came out with a plan to gradually phase out nuclear energy 
by the 2030s. Furthermore, under the direction of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and the DPJ 
cabinet, Japan reorganized the regulatory framework by replacing the Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA) with the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) to separate the authority 
on regulation and utilization of nuclear energy. The outlook of the PNEC seemed very 
pessimistic in the aftermath of Fukushima 
However, the bad fortune of the PNEC started to overturn as the LDP won by a landslide 
victory over the DPJ in the 2012 general election. The LDP and the Kōmeitō coalition acquired 
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325 out of 480 seats in the House of Representatives (or known as the lower house). The LDP 
and the Kōmeitō coalition secured a two-thirds‟ majority in the lower house, which is enough to 
override the upper house (known as the House of Councilors), where the ruling DPJ still 
maintained the largest single party (“Results for the December 2012 General Election,” 2012). 
The biggest fortune for the PNEC was that the LDP was not a ruling party at the time of the 
Fukushima incident and collapse of the DPJ before the 2012 general election. Even though it was 
collusive ties between the LDP, nuclear regulators, and nuclear industries throughout the pre-
Fukushima era that created the manmade disaster of the 311, the blame of Fukushima was put on 
the DPJ, a ruling party, during the 2012 general election. By November 2012, according to the 
Kyodo news poll, the public support for Prime Minister Noda and his DPJ cabinet had reached a 
record low of 17.7 percent (“Support for Cabinet Falls to Record Low,” 2012). The DPJ also lost 
the majority in the House of Representatives as over one hundred politicians, led by party elder 
Ichiro Ozawa, defected from the DPJ to distance themselves before the upcoming general 
election in December 2012.   
As the conservative coalition of the LDP and Kōmeitō regained the House of 
Representatives, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his LDP cabinet wasted little time in restoring 
the influence of the PNEC to move away from the nuclear free society envisioned by the DPJ in 
early 2012. Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, during his first press report as the Minister of METI, 
denied the nuclear energy policy proposed by the previous administration by stating that “we 
cannot say for sure that Japan will be free of nuclear power by the 2030s” (Watanabe & Okada 
2012). As noted by Jeffrey Kingston, “The nuclear village [was] back in the driver‟s seat” (Saito 
& Sieg, 2013). Seven months after regaining the House of Representative, the conservative 
coalition of the LDP and Kōmeitō also recaptured the majority of the House of Councilors during 
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the 2013 Japanese House of Councilors election. As the Abe administration gained more 
momentum within the political sphere, even with strong opposition against restarting the nuclear 
reactors, 25 reactors at 15 plants applied for permission to restart by the end of 2014.  
As the Abe administration approved the new 2018 Basic Energy Plan which aimed for 
nuclear energy to cover 20-22 percent of Japan‟s overall energy, nine nuclear reactors are back 
online and six reactors are waiting for approval by NRA to restart their operation in 2019. Prime 
Minister Abe has stated that only reactors that have cleared the “world‟s most stringent 
regulation standards” would be allowed to restart (Sheldrick & Kato, 2015). While the growth of 
the nuclear energy industry was stalled domestically, Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet 
pursued the growth of Japan‟s nuclear energy industry continuously through the overseas market. 
However, in recent years, the Japanese government‟s strategy to export nuclear reactors overseas 
has also run aground due to the rising safety costs and declining profitability. As the cost of 
constructing nuclear reactors doubles, the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Hitachi decided to 
pull out from the nuclear projects in Turkey and Great Britain. Even though the fortune of luck 
has changed for the PNEC since the Fukushima incident, the PNEC lost ground within the 
nuclear policy arena as the politicians and segments of academia, think tanks, and the media 
along with the social norm defected to the anti-nuclear camp.    
C. Anti-nuclear weapons coalition (ANWC) 
Post-Fukushima, the ANWC in Japan is considered the weakest coalition within the 
nuclear policy arena. The anti-nuclear weapons movement lost its traction nationwide as the JCP 
and JSP weakened and became limited to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas and hibakusha. The 
anti-militarism and anti-nuclear sentiments have weakened somewhat as nationalism surges in 
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Japan. However, as long as the Japanese Peace Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles enjoy strong public support, the ANWC in Japan will maintain some degree of 
influence within the nuclear policy arena and decision-making process. The ANWC‟s main 
domestic objective has been, and still is, to remove all nuclear facilities and any fissile material 
such as plutonium stockpiles that could be used for building nuclear weapons. Internationally, 
the ANWC‟s goal is the disarmament of nuclear weapons. However, today, most of the ANWC 
also support either gradually phasing out nuclear energy or the immediate shutdown of nuclear 
reactors. Thus, post-Fukushima, the ANWC and ANEC have been combining their efforts, 
domestically and internationally, to fight against both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.  
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the general public and hibakusha felt 
betrayed by the Japanese government, which continuously promoted the cheap, clean, and safe 
traits of nuclear power. Most importantly for hibakusha, the Japanese government lied about 
how nuclear energy differs from nuclear weapons. Mr. Hirose, a hibakusha, acknowledged 
Japan‟s postwar embrace of nuclear energy, trusting government assertions that it was both safe 
and necessary for the nation‟s economic rise. Now Mr. Hirose wishes that “[Japan] had the 
courage to speak out earlier against nuclear energy.” Mr. Yamada, the atomic survivor from 
Nagasaki, claimed that the “[Japanese government] convinced us that nuclear power was 
different from nuclear bombs,” and now he feels “Fukushima showed us that they are not so 
different” (Fackler, 2011). One of the reasons behind the limited competition within the nuclear 
policy arena during the pre-Fukushima era was that a large number of the ANWC supporters also 
supported nuclear energy. However, in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, most of the 
ANWC removed their support for nuclear energy. According to the mayor of Hiroshima, Kazumi 
Matsui, opinions on nuclear energy were divided, as “some seek to abandon nuclear power 
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altogether with the belief that mankind cannot coexist with nuclear energy, while others demand 
stricter regulation of nuclear power and more renewable energy” (Fackler, 2011). 
Even today, the utmost concerns for the ANWC are nonproliferation movements, which 
include the disarmament of nuclear weapons and complete denuclearization of a state. The 2015 
NHK survey shows that 81.2% of the Japanese public believed that Japan should never acquire 
nuclear weapons. Since April 2016, the ANWC, including the Nihon Hidankyo has collected 
signatures for the “Appeal of the Hibakusha,” which called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. 
On October 10, 2018, the Nihon Hidankyo submitted over 8,300,403 signatures to the First 
Committee of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly (“„Appeal of the Hibakusha,‟” 
2018). However, since Prime Minister Abe and the LDP regained the control of the National 
Diet, the ANWC is concerned that the Abe administration‟s action to amend the Japanese Peace 
Constitution is pulling the nation away from the pacifist and antimilitaristic ideals that have 
symbolized Japan since the end of World War II.  
D. Pro-Nuclear Weapons Coalition (PNWC) 
The debate over the nuclear option in Japan has heightened as North Korea conducted 
multiple nuclear tests since 2006. Throughout the post-war era, the conservative leadership, 
especially the LDP, has stayed within the boundaries of the Yoshida doctrine; yet, the leadership 
was always concerned with the American security guarantees and the U.S. extended deterrent. 
Thus, Japanese leadership often played their nuclear option card to draw out reassurance from 
the United States over the security commitment toward Japan. This nuclear hedging posture was 
considered as an insurance policy for the Japanese leadership in the case of the failure of the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella. Japan successfully obtained both uranium and plutonium paths toward building 
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nuclear weapons; yet, Japan has, under no circumstance, moved on beyond utilizing reprocessing 
and enrichment for peaceful purposes. The PNWC does not expect to develop nuclear weapons 
any time soon but maintaining the level of nuclear latency provides them with great comfort in 
the case of alliance abandonment. Given the constraints on nuclear weapons, the PNWC has 
sought a more realistic goal, latent nuclear capability, and has done so throughout the pre-
Fukushima era. However, the intensifying geopolitical tensions and the movements to 
decommission civilian nuclear reactors were a wake-up call for the PNWC in Japan.  
As the DPJ and ANEC shutdown all 51 operating nuclear reactors for maintenance 
purposes in 2012, and deliberate a bill to phase out nuclear energy by 2039, the PNWC rushed to 
break away from their long policy position of maintaining a latent nuclear capability. The PNWC, 
who kept a low profile in both the political and public spheres of Japan, felt threatened that the 
DPJ‟s energy plan to phase out nuclear powers could possibly lead to disbanding the civilian 
nuclear program. Consequently, removing all latent nuclear capabilities within Japan could block 
both pathways to developing nuclear weapons. The fear and anxiety that nuclear powers could be 
closed down forever forced the PNWC‟s hand to take action and amend Japan‟s Atomic Energy 
Basic Law of 1955.  
Japanese security experts and scholars downplayed the role of the PNWC or nationalistic 
conservatives within the nuclear policy arena.
56
 This is true even after the Japanese leadership 
has shown nuclear hedging stance throughout the years and made a sneaky move in amending 
the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 by adding the phrase of nuclear security for the purposes 
of nuclear energy in 2012. According to the 2015 Research Center for Nuclear Weapons 
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 Author have asked questions regarding the role of conservatives who supported the idea of nuclear option during 
my interviews with scholars, nuclear energy experts from the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), and 
Japanese defense officials in Tokyo, 2017. They all downplayed the role of the PNWC within the nuclear policy 
arena and nuclear decision-making process. 
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Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) report, the tendencies to favor nuclear weapons 
dependence within Japan is considered the demeanor of a small fraction of politicians and certain 
government bureaucracies (Umebayashi, Hirose, Nakamura, & Suzuki, 2015). In short, the 
report claims that there is nothing to worry about and the PNWC can be brushed aside since only 
a small fraction favors the acquisition of nuclear weapons. What have to be noted here is that this 
small fraction of politicians and certain government bureaucracies are at the apex of Japanese 
nuclear decision-making processes. As explained beforehand, the PNWC advocates nuclear 
autonomy. The PNWC‟s main objective has been, and still is, to maximize its national security. 
The PNWC has been skeptical about their alliance with the United States and its policy of 
extended nuclear deterrence. The PNWC does not believe that, when push comes to shove, 
Washington would trade New York for the sake of Tokyo. Therefore, the national security 
objective of the PNWC has been to either acquire indigenous nuclear weapons or to reacquire 
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, the rise of China, nuclear North Korea, and the uncertainties over U.S. 
commitment has forced Japanese policymakers to reconsider their military strategy (Mochizuki, 
2007, Hughes, 2017; Heginbotham & Samuels, 2018). The Abe administration and the LDP 
cabinet, during both the first and second terms, have shown a commitment to shifting Japan‟s 
national defense posture from minimalism that relies on the U.S. alliance to more autonomous 
defense posture that relies on fortifying their military capabilities. Alliance abandonment 
concerns have heightened in Japan as only 49% of the Japanese public, according to the 2018 
survey by NHK, claimed that the United States is a reliable ally (NHK, 2018). The Abe 
administration is currently in the process of reforming the Constitution. Prime Minister Abe 
would like to add a clause to Article 9, which explicitly permit the existence of Japan's military. 
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Prime Minister Abe and his party declare an interest to rush a revision of the Constitution, as the 
LDP and its coalitions hold the two-third majority (a requirement to propose a revision) in both 
upper and lower houses.  
It is argued by many Japanese security experts and scholars that connecting the dots 
between the movement of amending the Japanese Peaceful Constitution and nuclear weapons are 
going too far.
57
 During an interview with the author, former Vice-Minister of Defense Hideshi 
Tokuchi denied any connection between the movement to amend the Constitution and the 
potential for development of nuclear weapons. He stated that Japan is committed to the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella and that there is no contingency plan to acquire indigenous nuclear weapons. 
However, what if the PNWC is part of something bigger? What if there is a larger picture being 
drawn by the Abe administration or the LDP? This study assumes that the PNWC, the Japanese 
hedging stance, and Japan‟s ambition for nuclear weapons could be part of the nationalistic 
conservative movement to make Japan great again.  
The surge of nationalism in Japan in recent decades, where pacifism and antimilitarism 
dominates, is nothing surprising (Hasegawa & Togo, 2008; Mochizuki & Porter, 2013; Kato, 
2014; Kingston, 2016; Saaler, 2016). It is the realization of a nationalistic movement that has 
been long embedded within Japan since its surrender in 1945. This could have been planned out 
for a very long time as Prime Minister Satō, in 1965, stated that the Japanese public, especially 
younger generations, could be educated to change their perception. In 2006, under the Abe 
administration, during his first term as prime minister, the National Diet passed the Patriotic 
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 Author have asked questions regarding the connection between the movement of amending the Constitution and 
nuclear weapons during my interviews with scholars and senior Japanese defense officials including former Vice-
Minister of Defense for International Affairs Hideshi Tokuchi in Tokyo, 2017. Author received one consistent 
answer from my interviewees that there is no connection between the movement of amending the Constitution and 
nuclear weapons. 
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Education Law, which requires schools to encourage patriotism in the classroom (Wallace, 2006). 
Many have shown concerns about the rise of state supported authoritarianism within Japan‟s 
education system. Yuki Honda, a professor at the University of Tokyo, stated that new national 
curriculum under the Patriotic Education Law would put heavier pressure on students to 
contribute to the nation in ways not seen since World War II (Solomon, 2018). Furthermore, 
Professor Honda is concerned that Prime Minister Abe wants to revive the Imperial Rescript on 
Education which promoted loyalty and patriotism among students during the Imperial Japan era 
(Solomon, 2018).  
During the second term of the Abe administration, nationalism surged more rapidly in 
Japan. The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll claimed that regional rivalry 
between Japan and its neighboring states was rising as nationalism surged in Japan. The 2016 
Genron NPO Poll reported that 44.6% of Japanese had unfavorable impressions of South Korea, 
while nine out of ten Japanese had unfavorable impressions of China (The Genron NPO, 2016). 
Rising regional rivalry, especially between Japan and China, led both conservative and moderate 
politicians to deal with China in a resolute manner (kizen to shita taido). In other word, Japanese 
politicians implemented a tougher stance toward China (Suzuki, 2015). 
 Furthermore, since Prime Minister Abe took office in 2012, the right-wing agenda has 
been gradually enforced within the Japanese government. Steve Bannon, the former White 
House chief strategist, praised Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for his nationalistic approach by 
calling him a “Trump before Trump” (Osaki, 2017). Prime Minister Abe is a special adviser for 
the Nippon Kaigi, the largest right-wing organization that makes every effort to rebuild Japan on 
a nationalist basis (Yoshifumi, 2017). Unlike his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, prime minister 
from 1957 to 1960, and other prime ministers during the post-war era, who used the nuclear 
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option card to reaffirm the American commitment, Prime Minister Abe is utilizing the nuclear 
option card to rouse nationalistic sentiments and to gain political backing from conservative 
constituencies and right-wing organizations.  
The movement to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the 
movement to amend Japanese Peaceful Constitutions, the movement to set the foundation for 
nuclear latency and to acquire nuclear weapons could be all part of one nationalistic movement 
to make Japan great again. As shown in Figure 3.7, as nationalism surged, the support for nuclear 
weapons also increased. The PNWC does not expect to develop nuclear weapons any time soon; 
however, we must keep close eyes on Japan as nationalism continues to surge.  
Policy Implication: Nuclear Weapons Debates 
In recent years, security conditions surrounding Northeast Asia have changed 
significantly from those of the Cold War. The rise of China‟s military, the arrival of North Korea 
as a self-recognized nuclear power, regional rivalry, and alliance abandonment concerns have 
increased tensions within Japan as well as between Japan and its neighboring states. Equally to 
the post-war era, Japanese leadership continues to show ambivalence towards nuclear weapons. 
As the only victim of the atomic bombs, Japan continues to face the nuclear dilemma between 
pursuing the goal of nuclear weapons abolition and its dependence on nuclear weapons for 
national security. In the post-Fukushima, the PNEC tries to disassociate with the PNWC by 
getting out of the back-end (reprocessing) process of the nuclear fuel cycle debate. The ANEC 
and the ANWC, with the backing of the Japanese Peace Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, fight for nuclear free Japan. They understand that shutting down all nuclear reactors is 
a first step to remove all fissile materials in Japan which could eventually block the pathways 
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that can lead to developing nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the PNWC has amended the 
Atomic Basic Energy Law of 1955 and is pushing for the revision of the Japanese Peace 
Constitution to establish a legal basis for acquiring nuclear weapons.  
In the aftermath of a nuclear test by North Korea in 2006, 82% of the Japanese public felt 
threatened by the action of North Korea (Izumi & Furukawa, 2007). Even in 2018, 80.8% of the 
Japanese public continues to believe that nuclear North Korea is a threat to Japan (NHK, 2018). 
Furthermore, according to Figure 3.7, as the nuclear threat intensified from North Korea, the 
public support for nuclear weapons has also been increasing within Japan.
58
 According to the 
Mainichi Shimbun, over 60% of the general public agreed to restart the discussion on whether or 
not Japan should acquire nuclear weapons (Mochizuki, 2007). On the other hand, in 2006 
approximately 80% of the Japanese still rejected the idea of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons 
(Green & Furukawa, 2008). Even after multiple nuclear tests by North Korea, the Japanese 
public supported the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. According to an NHK survey conducted in 
August 2010, 90.2% supported the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (NHK, 2010).  
Furthermore, 49.2% out of 90.2% who supported the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
suggested that these principles should be written into the law (NHK, 2010). Even with all of the 
security concerns, 48.9% of Japanese responded in the NHK 2015 survey that U.S. nuclear 
deterrence is unnecessary (NHK, 2015).
59
 Domestically, the ANWC and ANEC promoted zero-
nuclear policy. Internationally, the ANWC and ANEC promoted the disarmament of nuclear 
weapons and urged the Japanese government to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons (TPNW) adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017. However, Japan refused 
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 The Genron NPO survey portrays a different picture than the NHK survey. According to the survey conducted by 
the Genron NPO, only 9% of the general public supports nuclear weapons in 2017. This research decided to utilized 
the NHK data due to neutrality of NHK in comparison to the Genron NPO. 
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 This is a 14.1% increase from the 2010 survey conducted by NHK.  
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to join the TPNW because joining the TPNW would go against Japan‟s defense posture, which 
relies heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japanese leadership continues to rely on the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella for its national security while continuing to leave the door open for the possible 
nuclear option.  
Figure 3.7: Public Support for Nuclear Weapons                   
          
Sources: 1968 & 1981 data was from Hughes (2007). 1998 data was from Gallup Poll
60
. 2017 data was from FNN 
survey.
61
 2018 data was from NHK survey.
62
  
While the DPJ was fighting for their political survival in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident to regain the confidence of its domestic constituencies. Thus, the LDP and Kōmeitō 
were successfully able to reach an agreement through back channel negotiation with the DPJ to 
add a clause of national security to Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955. On June 
20, 2012, without any hurdle from the National Diet led by the LDP, Japan‟s Atomic Energy 
Basic Law (1955) was amended to add “national security” as one of several purposes for nuclear 
power (Ozeki & Tanaka, 2012). This clause was incorporated at the request of the LDP and 
Kōmeitō, the largest opposition in 2011. This modification was agreed on by both the DPJ and 
the LDP coalition, as the DPJ wanted to pass the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear 
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 For further detail on 1998 data, see Gallup, 1999. 
61
 For further detail on 2017 data, see FNN, 2017  
62
 For further detail on 2017 data, see NHK, 2018 
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Regulation Authority. Thus, this bill was passed by the National Diet only four days after its 
deliberation (Ozeki & Tanaka, 2012). Although the Abe administration, who took office in 
December 2012, reassured the public that the amendment would not conflict with the “peaceful 
use” of nuclear power, it started public debates on whether the wording of “national security” 
includes military use of nuclear power (Ozeki & Tanaka, 2012; Samuels & Schoff, 2013). This is 
significant because whatever is stated within the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 is officially 
recognized as law, whereas the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which stops manufacturing, 
possessing, and permitting of nuclear weapons, is just a norm. 
 The original version of the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 denied nuclear energy to 
be used other than for peaceful purposes; however, by adding national security phrase into 
Article 2, the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 became open for interpretation. If the Japanese 
government ever wanted to develop nuclear weapons then this national security phrase within the 
Atomic Energy Basic Law could provide legitimacy (legal basis), a loophole to circumvent the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles. To prove the apparent link between nuclear energy and nuclear 
weapons, just weeks after the bill was passed in National Diet, former defense minister and LDP 
senior politician Ishiba Shigeru interviewed with the Associated Press stating that “having 
nuclear plants shows to other nations that Japan can make nuclear weapons” (Kageyama, 2012). 
In response to Shigeru, Tatsujiro Suzuki, former vice chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy 
Commission, stated “if people keep saying nuclear energy is for having nuclear weapons 
capability, that is not good” and “it‟s not wise. Technically it may be true, but it sends a very bad 
message to the international community” (Kageyama, 2012).   
In addition, Japan‟s pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which once promised a self-
sustaining energy source, at least for now, came to an end. The PNEC and the PNWC are 
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debating over the complete nuclear fuel cycle, as the PNEC sought different solutions to fulfill 
the back-end process of the nuclear fuel cycle. The PNEC and the PNWC supported ENR 
programs for different purposes, but regardless they were on the same boat of completing the 
nuclear fuel cycle. As the NRA announced the shutdown of Monju fast breeder reactor for not 
being commercially and economically viable in 2016, the PNEC quickly revised its domestic 
strategy, at least in the short term, to expand dry casket storage for resolving the problem of 
disposing of spent fuel.
63
 The LDP politician Taro Kono strongly argued that “we need to 
terminate the impossible dream of the nuclear fuel cycle,” and “the fast breeder reactor is not 
going to be commercially viable” (Tsukimori & Sheldrick, 2016). However, unlike the PNEC, 
shutting down the Monju fast breeder reactor could be a problem for the PNWC and Japan‟s 
nuclear latency. The Monju fast breeder was the rationale for the reprocessing program in Japan. 
The fast breeder reactor was built to burn plutonium as a source of fuel derived from the waste of 
conventional nuclear reactors. With the canceling of Monju fast breeder, Japan loses its 
legitimacy of maintaining its large amounts of plutonium stockpile. Therefore, it might be hard 
for Japan to maintain 47.3 tons of plutonium which could be used to build more than 6,000 atom 
bombs. Approximately 11 tons of plutonium is in Japan while 36 tons of plutonium is stored 
abroad. In March 2014, Japan pledged to return 300kg of weapons-grade plutonium which they 
received from the United States in the early stage of nuclear power program (Yamaguchi & Pace, 
2014). Furthermore, in 2018, Japan has decided to reduce its plutonium stockpile but failed to 
provide how and by how much.  
Most of the experts argue that the strong public support against acquiring nuclear 
weapons based on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and formidable domestic institutional 
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 The Monju Fast Breeder reactor project cost the Japanese government over $8.5 billion to date and it will cost 
another $3.2billion to decommission.  
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barriers against nuclearization make it highly unlikely that Japan would emerge as a nuclear state 
in the foreseeable future (Hyman, 2011). However, we need to put close tab on Japan, as 1) 
Japanese leadership periodically made public statements regarding nuclear option and how the 
Constitution does not disallow nuclear weapons; 2) Domestic institutional barrier, at least within 
the legality of nuclear weapons have been broken; the Atomic Basic Energy Law which has been 
amended in 2012 could now provide a legal basis necessary for acquiring nuclear weapons for 
the purpose of national security; 3) Japanese leadership, especially the LDP, have shown a 
tendency to disregard the public opinion for the sake of economy and security.  
Policy Implication: Nuclear Energy Debates  
In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi incident, a question that quickly surfaced in 
both political and public spheres was the necessity of nuclear power in Japan. During the pre-
Fukushima era, nuclear energy was considered as the ultimate energy source in Japan because it 
was thought to be cheap, clean, and safe. Therefore, it was never seriously confronted or debated 
within the nuclear policy arena of Japan. However, post-3/11, the “Myth of Absolute Safety,” 
known as “Zentai Anzen Shinwa” existed no more. According to a public survey taken by Japan 
Atomic Energy Relations Organization (2018), the percentage of the public who considered that 
nuclear power was necessary was 77.4% in 2010; however, this ratio plunged to 37.7% in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima incident.
64
 To the Public, nuclear energy was no longer cheap, clean 
or safe, as it was thought to be, prior to the Fukushima incident. As a consequence, in the post-
Fukushima era, public opinion and public trust in nuclear energy have dramatically shifted in 
Japan. 
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 See 2018 Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization Survey Data. JAERO have conducted annual public 
opinion survey on nuclear energy.  
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In 2012, Japan, under the guidance of Prime Minister Noda and the DPJ cabinet, 
established the NRA to separate the authority on regulation and utilization. This was the first 
action to dismantle the nuclear village by creating an independent agency that audits the nuclear 
regulations. The leadership believed the new independent regulatory agency could break the 
collusive links between the regulator and the nuclear industry that existed through the pre-
Fukushima era. If NISA had authority over both regulation and utilization, which caused the 
conflict of interests between these two functions, the NRA was an independent agency with more 
autonomy to solely focus on auditing the nuclear regulations. The NRA strengthened the 
regulatory system by developing a contingency plan against severe accidents, introducing the 
back-fit system, and instituting a forty-year operational time limit for nuclear reactor facilities 
(NRA, n.d.).  
Furthermore, if the majority of the public was in approval of either maintaining or 
expanding nuclear power prior to the Fukushima incident, only 7% of the public was still in 
favor of doing so in 2017. Moreover, 64% of the Japanese public would like to either 
immediately decommission or gradually phase-out all nuclear reactors in 2017 [See Figure 3.5]. 
As nuclear safety and security issues became salient in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, 
political power within Japan rapidly coalesced around establishing new political coalitions with 
anti-nuclear agendas. With the backing of the public, the ANEC argues that nuclear power is not 
safe; therefore, Japan must initiate an exit strategy for nuclear power. Since the LDP took back 
control of the National Diet in 2012, bills which requested the termination of nuclear power were 
submitted to the National Diet by opposition parties such as DPJ, Democratic Party (DP), CDP, 
and DPP. Yet, none of these bills reached the National Diet for a deliberation. The Abe 
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administration argued that the safety issue could be managed by improving the regulation and by 
truly making Nuclear Regulation Authority an independent agency.  
Furthermore, the PNEC argued that nuclear energy is necessary for the growth of the 
Japanese economy. However, Figure 3.8 shows that 34.4% of the public, most likely part of the 
ANEC, do not believe nuclear energy is necessary for the growth of Japanese economy while 
only 16.5% think nuclear energy is necessary for the Japanese economy. Almost 47.8% of 
Japanese are not sure at this time, most of these individuals still fall under the ANEC and ANWC, 
but they are moderates that would like to see the gradual phasing of nuclear energy. Even with 
shutting down all nuclear reactors, the Japanese economy was able to grow over 2% from the 
year 2012 to 2014 (“Japan GDP Annual Growth Rate,” n.d.). The growth was pinpointed by the 
former Prime Minister Koizumi, who stated that Japan‟s economy could do without nuclear 
energy. In addition, as Japanese economic growth averaged out around 1.5% during 2015-2018 
while restarting the operation of nuclear reactors, this gives more confidence to the ANEC that 
Japan can do without nuclear energy (“Japan GDP Annual Growth Rate,” n.d.). 
Figure 3.8: Could the Japanese Economy Grow Without Utilizing Nuclear Energy?  
                           
Sources: Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO). 2018 Genshiryoku ni kansuru Seronchōsa (2018 
Public Opinion Survey on Nuclear Energy, 121). 
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However, despite all the polling data which showed strong public opposition to restarting 
the nuclear reactors, the anti-nuclear sentiment did not carry over to the general elections. Even 
with all the efforts by the DPJ to alleviate the Fukushima crisis and to improve and fix the 
nuclear regulatory system, the LDP and the Kōmeitō coalition acquired 325 out of 480 seats in 
the House of Representatives in the 2012 general election (“Results for the December 2012 
General Election,” 2012). The biggest fortune for the LDP was that it was not a ruling party at 
the time of the Fukushima incident. Even though the Japanese public understood that it was 
collusive ties between the LDP, nuclear regulators, and nuclear industries throughout the pre-
Fukushima era that created the manmade disaster of the Fukushima, the blame of the Fukushima 
incident was put on the DPJ as the DPJ was the ruling party at that time. During the campaign of 
the 2012 general election, the LDP focused on their economic platform while keeping their 
mouth shut in terms of nuclear energy. Yet, the DPJ which campaigned under the platform of 
zero-nuclear energy lost by a landslide to the LDP.  
Furthermore, as an opponent of the LDP continued to campaign under the zero-nuclear 
platform, LDP continued to dominate the election on both upper and lower houses. Seven 
months after regaining the House of Representative in late 2012, the LDP and Kōmeitō also 
recaptured the majority of the House of Councilors during the 2013 Japanese House of 
Councilors election. Following the 2018 general election, the LDP and Kōmeitō coalition hold 
two-third majority in both upper and lower houses. This shows that safety concerns over nuclear 
energy within the Japanese politic did not translate into votes and that economy and security 
issues still took precedence over safety. Yet, the question of what happens if the LDP was in 
power during the Fukushima incident remains. 
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Conclusion 
As the only victims of atomic bombs, Japan continues to face a nuclear dilemma between 
pursuing the goal of nuclear weapons abolition and its dependence on nuclear weapons for 
national security while vigorously pursuing nuclear energy. This was the result of the interplay 
between the domestic coalitions and policy consensus that was reached within the nuclear policy 
arena. During the post-war era, international conditions such as the rise of China, nuclear North 
Korea, the U.S. alliance abandonment, and the regional rivalries continued to raise the question 
regarding the nuclear option. Yet, it brought policy consensus within the security debates that 
Japan needed to heavily rely on the American security guarantees and the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
while hedging for nuclear latency. On the other hand, domestic conditions, such as the Japanese 
Peaceful Constitution, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and anti-militarism led to the policy 
consensus of Japan‟s non-nuclear policy.   
However, as of March 11, 2011, Japan‟s policy consensus on the subject matter of 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons started to deviate as the policy preferences of domestic 
coalitions and social norms shifted. As a tsunami overwhelmed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plants, the myth about nuclear safety was shattered. The public was infuriated when they 
discovered that TEPCO and the Japanese government were not being transparent during the early 
phase of the Fukushima crisis. Within days, the Fukushima incident unleashed a nationwide anti-
nuclear movement. Japan experienced two divergences in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident. First, it was the divergence and convergence among domestic coalitions. In the 
aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the ANEC and the ANWC converged, as both coalitions 
preferred zero-nuclear energy, while the PNEC and the PNWC were divided in regards to 
Japan‟s nuclear option and back-end process of the nuclear fuel cycle. Second, it was the 
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divergence between the political and public spheres. Even with the majority of public opinion 
diverging from the Japanese government in the matter of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, 
the gap between the public and leadership really did not impact the general elections because 
safety concerns did not translate into a vote. Thus, as the LDP took control of both the upper and 
lower houses of the National Diet, they were able to restart the nuclear reactors while ignoring 
public opinion in the name of economic prosperity and national security.  
The Japanese nuclear orientation is slowly circling back to the original position that it had 
prior to the Fukushima incident, but with different directives. In the post-Fukushima era, the 
interactions between the domestic coalitions within the nuclear policy arena resulted in five 
directives. The debate over safety and economy by the PNEC, the ANEC, and the ANWC 
established three directives as follows: 1) Establish tougher nuclear regulations, 2) Reduce 
Domestic Nuclear Energy Output, and 3) Maintain Nuclear Export Policy. The security debate 
between the PNWC and alliance of the ANWC and the ANEC established two directives as 
follows: 1) The revision of the Atomic Basic Energy Law of 1955, and 2) Maintaining the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles.   
In the post-Fukushima era, nuclear policy changes occurred alongside the policy 
preference shift by domestic coalitions and social norms. The shift of public opinions and social 
norms since the Fukushima incident reinforced the ideals of the anti-nuclear camps. However, 
Japan has an ambition to become the power house of Asia once more. Thus, nuclear weapons 
might not be an end goal but a necessary step on its way to becoming a great power. Moreover, 
the surge of the nationalistic movement forced the PNWC‟s hand to take a step beyond nuclear 
latency by establishing a legal basis for acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the 
conservative administration led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was re-elected as head of his 
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ruling Liberal Democratic Party until 2021, revealed that public opinion could be snubbed for the 
sake of economy and national security. Thus, the international community must keep a close eye 
on Japan because, when push comes to shove, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles might not be 
enough to stop Japan‟s ambition for nuclear weapons.    
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Chapter 4 South Korea 
Introduction 
Nuclear energy has been a major component of the platforms of every South Korean 
administration, both conservative and progressive, prior to the Fukushima incident. Nuclear 
energy has been the backbone of South Korea‟s industrialization and advancement of its science 
since the 1950s. The Lee Myung-bak administration signed a $40 billion commercial nuclear 
reactor deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2009 (Bakr and Cho, 2009). This signaled 
that South Korea was ready to become a nuclear technology supplier and compete with other 
major players, such as the U.S., France, Japan, and Russia, in the nuclear energy market. As 
nuclear energy played a vital role in the economic miracle of South Korea and is strongly 
supported by the majority of politicians, the national nuclear energy agenda was never seriously 
challenged in both political and public spheres in South Korea. Yet, in the aftermath of 
Fukushima, nuclear ambivalence is a perfect phrase to describe the current circumstances in 
South Korea. Nuclear ambivalence can be found in all levels of Korean society. The nuclear 
policy arena, which was once dictated by the pro-nuclear energy coalition (PNEC), is in disarray. 
In the post-Fukushima era, South Korea is experiencing divergence from policy consensus on the 
subject of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. 
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially during the pre-Fukushima 
era, the nuclear policy arena of South Korea has been dominated by one domestic coalition with 
limited political competition within the nuclear policy arena. The dominance of specific 
coalitions within the nuclear policy arena strongly influenced the decision making of South 
Korea‟s nuclear policy. During the Third Republic of Korea (ROK) to the end of the Yushin 
 
 
130 
 
system
65
, all policies including nuclear policies were dictated by one man, a military dictator, 
President Park Chung-hee.
 66
 However, during the Fifth Republic of South Korea
67
, nuclear 
weapons became a taboo word within the political and scientific spheres in South Korea.
68
 
Throughout the 1980s to the pre-Fukushima era, the Korean public discussed nuclear matters in 
terms of nuclear energy and economy, and only occasionally in terms of security. 
The South Korean nuclear or atomic period can be categorized into three phases: 1) the 
Third Republic of Korea to the end of the Yushin system which was dominated by the military 
dictatorship (pro-nuclear energy and nuclear weapons), 2) the post-Yushin system to pre-
Fukushima era which was dominated by pro-nuclear energy coalitions, and 3) the post-
Fukushima era where there has been no dominant coalition within the nuclear policy arena of 
South Korea [See Figure 4.1].  
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 The Third Republic of South Korea existed from 1963 to 1972 as military junta, known as the Supreme Council 
for National Reconstruction, transferred its power back to the civilian rule in 1971. However, ironically, Park 
Chung-hee, a general who led the military junta which overthrew the Second Republic of South Korea in May 1961, 
became the president of South Korea from 1963 to 1972. President Park declared martial law and dissolved the 
National Assembly on October 17, 1972 and adapted the Yushin Constitution which released the limits on 
presidential reelection. The Yusin Constitution turned Park's presidency into a lawful dictatorship. In short, the 
Yushin system paved the way for President Park to become president-for-life.  
66
 I have asked questions regarding the political competition on nuclear policy in South Korea during my interviews 
with scholars, nuclear energy experts at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and nonproliferation experts at 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade .  They all agreed that, during the Third Republic of Korea to the end of the 
Yushin system, nuclear policy was dictated by one man, President Park Chung-hee; however, in the aftermath of 
Park, my interviewees acknowledged that it was PNEC or “nuclear mafia” that dominated the nuclear policy arena 
of South Korea.  
67
 The Fifth Republic of South Korea existed from 1981 to 1987 as military returned the power back to the civilian 
rule once more. Chun Doo-hwan, successfully orchestrated the coup d‟état of December Twelfth in 1979, served as 
the President of South Korea from 1981 to 1987.  
68
 According to my interviews with scholars and nuclear experts, the word nuclear weapons were forbidden within 
the government ministries, research institutes and scientific communities.  
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Figure 4.1: The Nuclear Decision-Making Process of South Korea Based on Three Phases 
             
Political competition between domestic coalitions within the nuclear policy arena and 
public interests on the subject of nuclear issues has reached an all-time high. In the aftermath of 
Fukushima, a wide range of nuclear issues such as safety, transparency, and corruption started to 
surface in both public and private spheres. The Fukushima incident brought to surface all of the 
nuclear issues, even ones from long past, which were once suppressed under the name of 
economic prosperity. These developments led to the rise of strong public opposition against 
nuclear energy which ended the long-standing policy consensus regarding nuclear energy in 
South Korea. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, only 34% of South Koreans felt that 
nuclear energy was safe (Kim, 2012).  
Yet, even though the public was beginning to show a strong allergic reaction after the 
Fukushima incident, approximately 64% of the South Korean public still had a favorable image 
of nuclear energy as reported in a 2011 survey by Win/Gallup International (Gallup Korea, 2011). 
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Furthermore, even with a nuclear disaster occurring in a neighboring state, approximately 68% 
of Koreans, based on the 2011 survey conducted by Research & Research, still supported the 
idea of developing indigenous nuclear weapons. Even in 2017, according to the survey by 
Realmeter, 53.5% of Koreans supported the development of nuclear weapons (TBS, 2017). 
Despite a long-standing pro-nuclear energy policy, post-Fukushima South Korea is ambivalent 
towards its nuclear orientation, as the Korean public is evenly split between the pro-nuclear and 
anti-nuclear energy camps in 2018.  
The Fukushima incident significantly shifted the political platforms of major parties in 
South Korea. The major conservative political party‟s platform still supported nuclear energy, 
but limited new constructions of nuclear reactors domestically. Progressive political parties, 
which long supported nuclear energy, turned away from nuclear energy and are now positioned 
in the anti-nuclear energy camp. In June 2017, South Korea‟s President Moon Jae-in stated that 
South Korea would terminate all plans to build new nuclear power plants. South Korea also will 
not extend the lifespan of existing nuclear power plants in a bid to phase out nuclear power.
69
 
However, progressive political parties are still supportive of expanding their global market share 
in the nuclear industry. The Moon administration would like to continue expanding overseas 
sales of nuclear power plants, as they have become a new lucrative export commodity for South 
Korea.  
On October 9, 2006, the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK or 
North Korea) declared that it successfully conducted a nuclear test and proclaimed that it has 
officially joined the club of nuclear weapons states. While heavily condemning the Republic of 
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 South Korean President Moon Jae-in delivers a speech during a ceremony marking Korean Memorial Day at the 
National Cemetery in Seoul, South Korea, June 6, 2017 
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Korea (hereafter ROK or South Korea) and the U.S. military exercises as preparation for war, by 
late 2017, North Korea had openly conducted a total of six nuclear and multiple ICBM tests. At 
the same time, the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has been weakening since the early 2000s, was 
under heavy stress as a result of President Trump pressuring South Korea to pay more for the 
defense provided by the United States. Alliance abandonment concerns, which existed since the 
1950s in South Korea, worsened as the New York Times reported that President Trump requested 
options for reducing the number of U.S. troops in South Korea (Landler, 2018). In addition, 
Japan‟s ongoing movements to remilitarize and to amend its pacifist constitution caused 
concerns within the security community in South Korea. Despite unending provocative actions 
by North Korea and alliance abandonment concerns, South Korea remains committed to its non-
nuclear posture. However, these developments also raised concerns in South Korea about the 
future credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which has kept South Korea from seeking 
its indigenous nuclear weapons.  
How have these changing international and domestic conditions affected the debate 
within the nuclear policy arena of South Korea? How has this changing debate influenced the 
nuclear orientation of South Korea toward nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? Furthermore, 
what is the prospect that South Korea will reverse its non-nuclear weapons policies in the 
coming years? In addressing these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, it will 
examine the nuclear debate and the resulting policy consensus that existed prior to the March 
2011 Fukushima disaster. Second, this chapter will examine how the nuclear debate within the 
nuclear policy arena of South Korea changed after the Fukushima incident. Third, it will analyze 
how changing debates and political competitions within the nuclear policy arena have affected 
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the nuclear decision-making and nuclear orientation of South Korea by focusing on critical 
challenges in the economy, safety, security, and social norms. 
Post-World War II Era 
A. Atomic bomb and liberation 
On the morning of August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the world‟s first deployed 
atom bomb over Hiroshima. As the atom bomb, known as Little Boy, exploded 2,000 feet above 
Hiroshima, the bomb immediately killed over 80,000 people and demolished the city to the 
ground. Three days later, a second atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, immediately killing 
70,000 people (Hall, 2013).  In the following week, on August 15, 1945, Japan had surrendered 
unconditionally to the Allies, effectively ending World War II. As the only victim of atomic 
bombs, Japan quickly and vigorously condemned nuclear warfare. The Japanese public, who 
experienced the horror of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Lucky Dragon Number 5 incident on 
March 1, 1954, was not receptive to the idea of nuclear weapons or nuclear energy.  
However, on August 15, 1945, is remembered differently in Korea. Unexpectedly, 
Koreans were liberated from the Empire of Japan, as Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced 
unconditional surrender to the Allies on the noon of August 15, 1945. Thus, the atom bombs that 
the United States dropped on Japan in 1945 were seen as a gift that brought liberation to the 
Korean people (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009). In the opening of Korean Nuclear Energy: Twenty Years 
of History, it claimed that “the atomic bomb was not the object of fear but a gift that brought 
liberation to Korean people” (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1979). Huyn Won Bok 
(1973) claimed, in his book The Road of Scientist, that the atomic bomb, which played a key role 
in defeating Japan, symbolized liberation and power of science to many young Koreans. The role 
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of the atomic bomb and science attracted many nationalistic young students to science and 
engineering in the aftermath of World War II. The interest of the atomic bomb continued until 
the Third Republic of South Korea, as Korean newspapers, both conservative and progressive, 
especially Chosun Ilbo, Dong A Ilbo, and Kyunghyang Shinmun continued to publish articles on 
the atom bombs and related subjects.
70
 For example, Dong A Ilbo (a conservative newspaper) 
published 302 articles on the atom bombs and related subjects from late 1945 to 1950 while 
Kyunghang Shinmun (progressive newspaper) published 275 articles.
71
 Thus, unlike Japan, the 
atomic bomb which helped Korea to be liberated from Japan had a positive image within both 
political and public spheres. Furthermore, the leadership of South Korea viewed the atomic 
bomb as a symbol of the power of science and technology that Korea should seek to develop in 
order to become a strong modern nation (“Jokukjaegeon-ui Kwahakseolgye [Scientific Design 
for Reconstructing the Fatherland],” 1947). 
B. 1950s Setting foundation for nuclear energy and nuclear latency 
As Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, Korea encountered a new set of foreign 
occupiers. The Soviet Union swiftly entered northern Korea as they declared war against Japan 
on August 8, 1945. Afraid that the entire Korean Peninsula might fall under the influence of the 
Soviet Union, the United States proposed dividing the Korean Peninsula at the 38
th
 parallel. As 
the Soviet Union accepted the proposal, American armed forces moved in to occupy the south 
and the Soviet armed forces occupied the north of the 38
th
 parallel. The Republic of Korea, led 
by Syngman Rhee, was established on August 15, 1948, under the UN-observed election in May 
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 Due to heavy media censorship during the Third Republic of Korea and the Yushin system, Korean news agencies 
stopped publishing sensitive articles. As Park‟s administration conducted secret atomic weapon research, the subject 
matter of atom bomb was heavily censored.   
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 For archived articles on atomic bombs and related subjects from Dong A Ilbo and Kyunghang Shinmun, search 
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1948. However, the Soviet occupied North did not participate in the nationwide general election 
which was agreed upon by the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, the northern block under the 
leadership of Kim Il-sung established the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea) on September 9, 1948. As agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States, 
they both withdrew their troops from the Korean Peninsula by mid-1949. On the dawn of June 
25, 1950, nearly six months after the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced the so-
called Acheson Line (U.S. defensive line covering Northeast Asia), North Korea crossed the 38
th
 
parallel and invaded South Korea.
72
 North Korea has taken the Acheson Line as a signal that U.S. 
interest in South Korea was waning, which pushed Kim Il-sung to convince Stalin to start the 
war to reunify the Korean Peninsula (Cumings, 2010).
73
  
During the three years of conflict, both sides suffered over 4 million casualties. The 
Korean War finally came to an end with the signing of the Korean War Armistice agreement in 
July 1953 (Cumings, 2010).
 In the aftermath of the Korean War, South Korea‟s highest security 
priority was retaining the U.S. military presence in the Korean Peninsula (Kim, 2005; Chang, 
2011). Rhee‟s administration recognized that the Korean War would not have happened if the 
U.S. armed force did not withdraw from South Korea. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty 
was signed in October 1953, as President Rhee understood the importance of the U.S. military 
commitment to South Korean defense as a deterrent against North Korean aggression. From this 
point on, South Korean administrations relied heavily on US armed force to play a deterrent role 
against North Korea. Thus, South Korean administration reacted very sensitively toward any 
effort that signaled the possible alliance abandonment. The Korean War not only embedded the 
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importance of U.S. armed forces but also embedded the importance of the atom bomb in both 
political and public spheres in South Korea during the Korean War and afterward.  
The war was over, but interest in the atom bomb continued to rise in South Korea and 
peaked with President Truman‟s announcement on November 30, 1950, that the United States 
would use the atom bomb in Korea, if necessary (“President warns we would use atom bomb in 
Korea, if necessary,” 1950). Both progressive and conservative Korean newspapers throughout 
the war, mainly from Dong A Ilbo and Kyunghang Shinmun, published articles arguing the 
possible usage of an atom bomb, why it was necessary to use the bomb, and how we must use 
the atom bomb against the communist invaders.
74
 During 1950- 1953, almost all of the 
newspaper articles in South Korea were supportive of the usage of an atom bomb against North 
Korea. In the aftermath of the Korean War, President Rhee showed his support for the atom 
bomb by stating that the ban on the atom bomb is meaningless and annihilating communists 
during the war with atom bombs would be more useful for the civilized world (“Wonpokjehan 
mugachi [Ban on atom bomb has no value],” 1954).  
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the number of U.S. forces in South Korea (USFK) 
decreased significantly based on President Eisenhower‟s New Look strategy which relied more 
on nuclear weapons to deter communist aggression. North Korea continued to violate 
subparagraph 13D under the Korean Armistice Agreement by building and modernizing their 
military (“Transcript of Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State,” 
1953). As President Rhee continued to be wary of alliance abandonment, President Eisenhower 
approved the recommendation by the Department of Defense to pursue buildup and 
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modernization, which also included nuclear armament of the USFK. On May 14, 1957, Secretary 
of State Dulles discussed the possible introduction of “more modern, more effective” weapons to 
the USFK and the ROK (“Wilson States U.S. may send Atomic Arms to South Korea,” 1957). In 
addition, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson indicated that these more modern and more 
effective weapons could possess “dual capability” that could be conventional and atomic (“U.S. 
Studies Change of Arms for Korea,” 1957). In 1958, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons began to be 
deployed to the USFK (Cumings, 1998).   
However, continued North Korean threats backed by the Soviet Union and China, 
continued mistrust of Japan, and alliance abandonment concerns pushed Rhee‟s administration to 
seek an alternative option to protect and maximize its national security. In 1957 President Rhee 
invited Yoon Se-won, the director of the nuclear energy department, to ask if South Korea can 
make an atom bomb. Mr. Yoon answered the question by saying: “Not at this moment, but we 
can if we continue the research.” President Rhee replied by saying: “That is good for now! 
Please continue the good work! Please look for a place to build a nuclear research institute! We 
will provide strong support!” (Park, 2004, p. 12). In the late 1950s, the Rhee administration 
started to heavily fund nuclear energy research with a weapons program as a long-term objective. 
On the other hand, the devastation of the Korean War worsened the energy problem of 
South Korea as war flattened the energy system that was already lacking prior to the war. South 
Korea struggled to provide the power necessary for its economy from the establishment of 1948, 
as most of the hydropower plants that were built during the Japanese colonial era were located in 
North Korea. As the Korean Peninsula was officially divided on May 14, 1948, North Korea cut 
all electricity lines crossing the 38
th
 parallel. Thus, as a way to address the energy issue, South 
Korea turned to nuclear energy in the 1950s as the U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower made a 
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speech on Atom for Peace at the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. This provided an 
opportunity for South Korea, being an energy-scarce country, to seek nuclear energy. The Rhee 
administration was hopeful that nuclear energy would eventually resolve the issue of energy 
insufficiency and serve as a foundation in the South Korean economy. Similarly, the public 
sphere also supported the idea of nuclear energy, as Korean newspapers were bombarded with 
articles on nuclear energy during the 1950s. Dong A Ilbo alone published over 1000 articles in 
support of nuclear energy from 1954 to 1959.  
In July 1955, the United States and South Korea made a provisional agreement on the 
civil uses of atomic energy. On September 20, 1955, the provisional agreement which allowed 
atomic energy to be used for peaceful purposes was presented to the Korean National Assembly 
and was passed by the Foreign Committee of National Assembly on September 28, 1955 (“US-
ROK Agreement, Peaceful Usage of Nuclear Power,” 1955). South Korea quickly initiated their 
nuclear energy program as the United States and the ROK signed the Agreement for Cooperation 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Korea Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy on February 3, 1956.
75
 The agreement was 
limited to the acquisition and construction of a research nuclear reactor for basic research. The 
agreement did not discuss the civilian power reactors or politically sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 
technology (KAERI 1979, 1990). This was the first step toward developing a nuclear program in 
South Korea that could be utilized in both the economy and military.  
On March 9, 1956, South Korea launched the department of atomic energy within the 
Ministry of Education. Furthermore, President Rhee sent 127 government sponsored scientists, 
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including director Yoon of the nuclear energy department, to the United States to study 
everything about nuclear technology (Park, 2004). In 1957, South Korea joined the IAEA and 
launched its nuclear program with a 100kw research reactor imported from the United States 
(Sheen, 2011). The Atomic Energy Law was passed and ratified by Korean National Assembly 
on February 22, 1958, and went into effect as President Rhee publicly announced the Atomic 
Energy Law on March 11, 1958. South Korea established an Office of Atomic Energy within the 
Ministry of Education and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) in 1959 to 
oversee the basic research of nuclear technology.  
Since South Korea‟s liberation in 1945, the atom bomb and atomic energy have 
submerged deeply into the political and public spheres of South Korea. Throughout the 1950s, 
the atom bomb was represented as the liberator and power necessary for national security while 
atomic energy symbolized the future prosperity of South Korea. As explained above, the Rhee 
administration launched nuclear energy research to resolve the energy problem and serve as the 
foundation of South Korean economy; yet, silently, South Korea also sought nuclear weapons 
programs as a long-term national objective. However, President Rhee did not hide his ambition 
to acquire an atom bomb (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009). At the ground-breaking ceremony for 
constructing the TRIGA-Mark II, a first research nuclear reactor, and Atomic Energy Research 
Institute on July 14, 1959, President Rhee stated “in the future, the Atomic Energy Research 
Institute will have to make an excellent Atomic Machine” (Oh, 2016a).   
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Figure 4.2: South Korea‟s Pre-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
 
The Third Republic of Korea to End of the Yushin System  
A. The pursuit of atomic (nuclear) energy and the PNEC 
Student protests on April 19, 1960, known as the Sa-il-gu protest forced President Rhee 
to resign on April 26, 1960. The Second Republic of Korea only lasted nine months, as Prime 
Minister Jang Myeon and his cabinet were not able to proceed with any of their policy reforms as 
President Yoon Bo-sun and old members of the Democratic Party criticized and directly 
challenged the policy reforms every step of the way. This led to further economic and social 
instability within South Korea. The new parliamentary system of the Second Republic of Korea 
was quickly overturned by a military junta, led by Park Chung-hee, known as the Supreme 
Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) in May 1961. The utmost goal of the Supreme 
Council for National Reconstruction was to clean up the widespread corruption and to re-
stabilize the economy (Hanguk Gunsa Hyukmyongsa Pyonchanwiwonhoe, 1963, p. 240). The 
military junta legitimized its intrusion in politics by referencing to the responsibilities of 
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economic development. In short, the key aspect of the military revolution was to advocate 
national reconstruction through state-directed programs to accomplish the modernization of 
South Korea (Hanguk Gunsa Hyukmyongsa Pyonchanwiwonhoe, 1963, p. 243; Haggard, Kim, 
& Moon, 1991, p. 857; Park, 2017, p.161-167). In order to achieve their goals, the SCNR re-
initiated the investigation into illicitly accumulated wealth, which the Jang administration started 
in 1960, and commenced a series of five year economic development plans (Cole and Lyman, 
1971; Kim, 1976, 470).  
As the SCNR declared martial law, all political parties and unions were banned and the 
press was kept under heavy censorship. In July 1961, a revolutionary court and prosecution 
office was established to purge bureaucrats, politicians, and military officers that were connected 
to either corruption or anti-revolutionary movements (Hanguk Gunsa Hyukmyongsa 
Pyonchanwiwonhoe, 1963, p. 1826-1848; Solingen, 2007, p. 87). The leadership of the 
Democratic Party and other progressive parties was forbidden from participating in political 
activities. The number of politicians banned from the politic sphere reached seventy four by the 
end of 1961. In addition, 1,873 bureaucrats were condemned for their involvement in corruption 
scandals or anti-revolutionary activities. The military was not exempt from the purge, led by the 
SCNR, as 40 generals were removed and over 1,900 military officers retired (Hanguk Gunsa 
Hyukmyongsa Pyonchanwiwonhoe, 1963, p. 1743-1854). The SCNR quickly gained control 
over all government agencies by appointing military personnel to key positions throughout the 
government. 
Furthermore, the SCNR also monopolized the financial sector by partially nationalizing 
the Bank of Korea and establishing the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to regulate the budget 
of all government agencies and to control the money flow coming in and out of South Korea. As 
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the investigation into illicitly accumulated wealth also targeted Chaebol in South Korea, the 
arrangement of the government-Chaebol relationships also became more hierarchical (Kuk, 1988, 
p. 113; Chang, 1997, p. 45-51).
76
 A founder of each Chaebol was arrested and threatened to 
return all illicitly accumulated wealth to the state. Chaebol and other entrepreneurs in South 
Korea were either induced or coerced to pay substantial contributions to the government and to 
join the state structured economic development plan (Kim, 1976, p. 471; Jones & SaKong, 1980, 
p. 69; Kuk, 1988). Unlike Japanese Keiretsu, Korean Chaebol had no financial independence. 
Throughout the 1960s to early 1990s, Chaebol heavily relied on the government controlled credit 
institutions. The rise and fall of Chaebol were evidently decided upon by political favor and 
government subsidies. Thus, the position or ranking of Chaebol changed often throughout the 
1960s and 1970s based on the loyalty they showed to the Park administration (Kuk, 1988, p. 
109-110). Mr. Chung Joo-young, the founder of Hyundai Corporation, stated in an interview that 
President Park collected a significant contribution from Chaebol, but “he was an honest and 
diligent man…He only thought about improving our nation” (Oh, 2013). Mr. Chung also noted 
that President Park occasionally called him and other Chaebols into the Blue House (Cheong Wa 
Dae) to provide guidance over how to approach things at the time and things that Chaebols 
should do in the future (Oh, 2013). Thus, throughout the 1960s to the early 1990s, Chaebol 
remained subject to policy direction and financial discipline by the government.  
Even though the military junta transferred power back to civilian rule in 1964, the power 
remained with Park Chung-hee as he was elected as the president in 1964. Park and military 
junta did not fulfill their initial promise to the public that any member of military junta will not 
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run for the presidency. As Park was elected to the President of the Third Republic of Korea, the 
new Constitution of 1962 provided President Park with strong executive power. This was 
because the new Constitution of 1962, which was designed by the SCNR, focused on the 
centralization of power to the executive branch. Furthermore, a weak unicameral National 
Assembly was formed, as the Constitution returned to the presidential system from the 
parliamentary system in 1964. The new constitution provided full authority to President Park in 
the appointment of the cabinet, including the prime minister, and considerable influence over the 
judiciary branch. The constitution also provided the president with a wide range of emergency 
power to restrict the freedom of the press, speech, and assembly. The new Constitution of 1962, 
along with the political party act that was reinforced by the SCNR, restricted political activities 
by all political parties, including the ruling party. 
Furthermore, as South Korea adopted the Yushin Constitution in 1972, President Park 
reduced the National Assembly to rubber-stamp as he appointed approximately one third of its 
members. President Park removed any decision-making authority in the cabinet and kept the 
press under heavy censorship (Stokes, 1979). The Park administration tightly censored its 
domestic press and restricted access of the Korean public to the foreign news source. The 
government also placed a Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) official in all of the 
offices of the ROK print and broadcast media (Committee on International Relations U.S. House 
of Representatives, 1978, p. 259).
77
 As noted before, during the military junta, the Third 
Republic of Korea, and the Yushin period, all decision-making was solely decided by one man, 
President Park Chung-hee. In short, President Park was at the top of the military-industrial 
pyramid. It was reported in the Committee on Foreign Relations of Senate in 1973 that President 
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Park intended to utilize the Yushin Constitution to stay in power forever unless he dies or his 
regime is overthrown. President Park claimed in his book, Our Nation’s Path,  that South Korea 
was not ready for democracy, “it is ironic, but the totalitarian system was necessary to remove all 
non-democratic elements within South Korea and to improve the quality of living of Korean 
people” (Park, 2017, p. 164-165). 
This was no different in the nuclear policy arenas throughout Park‟s presidencies. The 
purge also occurred within the nuclear community. If the Rhee administration approached the 
nuclear community and their research with a hands-off policy, the SCNR had utilized a more 
hands-on approach toward the nuclear community and their research. The military junta replaced 
the Director of KAERI with Colonel Oh Won-son and opened up the Human Resources 
Committee of the Nuclear Energy Department to purge the first generation of nuclear experts 
who voiced concerns regarding the hands-on approach of the SCNR, such as Yoon Se-won (Park 
2004, 48-62; Oh, 2016b). If the Rhee administration of the 1950s established the foundation for 
atomic research and focused on basic research of nuclear energy, then the Park administration of 
1960s to 1980s decided to focus on applied research of nuclear energy, which sought to answer 
the real problems of South Korea. The 1962 Science and Technology White Paper claimed that 
the five year nuclear energy plan established by the Rhee administration in 1959 did not fit the 
reality of South Korea and must be scrapped. It is argued by South Korean nuclear experts that 
Park‟s administration tried to erase and downplay the nuclear achievements of the Rhee 
administration, as the Park administration tried to legitimize the military junta and Park‟s 
presidency. However, the Park administration enjoyed the legacy of the Rhee administration, as 
most of the 127 scientists returned to South Korea with expertise in nuclear physics and nuclear 
engineering in the early 1960s. South Korea‟s first research reactor, TRIGA Mark II, which was 
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initiated by the Rhee administration, began its operations in 1962. According to nuclear experts 
in South Korea, President Rhee and President Park were the only two presidents that had 
comprehensive knowledge about nuclear technology and showed personal attention to the 
development of nuclear technology.
78
  
It was under the direction of Park‟s military junta that the civilian nuclear program was 
initiated and became firmly situated within South Korea‟s national development plan. Under the 
SCNR, Park and his military regime set the foundation of a series of five year economic 
development plans that were launched in 1962. The government agencies, a national bank, and 
Chaebol under the direction of the EPB became the biggest supporters of Park‟s five year 
economic development plan. The SCNR also launched a series of five year energy plans that 
went side by side with a five year economic development plan. As South Korea continued to 
suffer from energy shortage in the 1950s and early 1960s, the SCNR launched Nuclear Energy 
Development Council (NEDC) within the Office of Atomic Energy to check the feasibility of 
constructing civilian nuclear reactors.  
In 1965, the Economic Science Review Council (ESRC), an advisory committee for the 
president, finally decided to incorporate nuclear energy into South Korea‟s energy plan and to 
construct the first civilian nuclear reactor by 1975. However, President Park ordered the ESRC to 
push up the timetable by 1974 (KAERI, 1979). In the following year, the Office of Atomic 
Energy and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)
 79
, following the recommendation by 
the ESRC, created the Nuclear Energy Development Review Council (NEDRC) to review the 
nuclear energy plan that would be incorporated into the second five year energy plan in 1967 
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(KEPCO, 1981). As the pro-nuclear energy coalitions quickly coalesced around the idea of 
energy independence, the South Korean government, which was dominated by President Park, 
formed a solid PNEC together with the Korean ministries in control of nuclear policy (Office of 
Atomic Energy and KAERI), utility company (KEPCO), and the financial sector including the 
Chaebol and Bank of Korea. Even though the PNEC was formed under the direction of President 
Park, nuclear experts believed that nuclear mafia did not exist within the PNEC during the Third 
Republic of Korea until the end of the Yushin system.
80
 It is well-known that President Park 
often checked up on the progress on the development of a nuclear energy program. In short, as 
the government tightly controls the nuclear industry, the governance of nuclear energy in South 
Korea can be characterized by a state-industry unitary structure with President Park making final 
decisions regarding nuclear policies (Kim, 2017). 
As the Office of Atomic Energy grew, directly presided by the president, it became the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1969. On the 10
th
 anniversary, the AEC rolled out a 
nuclear energy plan to finish the construction and operate the first civilian program by the end of 
the third five year plan. They further planned to build the first domestic nuclear reactor using 
their technology by the end of the fourth five year plan (Bae, 1969). In July 1965, the United 
States-ROK cooperation agreement was amended to allow for the transfer of nuclear reactors and 
nuclear fuel, which allowed South Korea to discuss the construction of civilian nuclear reactors. 
After 15 years of planning and accumulating nuclear knowledge and expertise, South Korea 
finally commenced the construction of the first nuclear reactor Kori-1 in 1970. The U.S. firm 
Westinghouse built the Kori-1 on a turnkey basis. The AEC desired to achieve self-reliance in 
the development of atomic energy by 1981 (AEC, 1968).  
President Park‟s desire for self-reliance in the development and utilization of atomic 
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energy amplified as President Nixon signaled strategic retrenchment in 1969. Even though South 
Korea was part of the opening day signatory of the NPT, they did not ratify the NPT until April 
1975. The delay of ratification of the NPT can be connected to Japan‟s delay in ratification to 
fulfill their complete nuclear fuel cycle. According to Mr. Oh Won-chul, Second Secretary for 
Economic Affairs, who was in charge of nuclear development in South Korea in the 1970s, 
President Park ordered Mr. Oh to raise South Korea‟s nuclear technology level to match that of 
Japan‟s nuclear technology (Kim, 2010). Meanwhile, South Korea has taken a step forward to 
secure nuclear fuel independence from the United States in the 1970s. In 1974, the KEPCO tried 
to finalize its contract with Canada to construct a heavy water nuclear reactor that uses natural 
uranium for fuel. In 1973, KAERI initiated negotiations to purchase an NRX research reactor 
from Canada and tried to purchase a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility from Belgium and 
reprocessing facility from France. In 1974, South Korea established the Korea Nuclear 
Engineering Services and the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute to reinforce their 
ambition of completing the nuclear fuel cycle.  
However, the plan to complete the nuclear fuel cycle came to a halt, as India conducted 
their peaceful nuclear explosive test of 1974. The Indian peaceful nuclear explosive test showed 
that civilian nuclear programs could be easily diverted into building nuclear weapons. As India 
used an NRX research reactor to build nuclear weapons, the United States tried to halt all sales 
related to nuclear energy to South Korea because the United States felt that these nuclear 
technologies could be easily utilized by South Korea to build nuclear weapons. The Park 
administration tried to resolve the issue by giving up on the NRX research reactors, but the 
United States requested South Korea to also give up on the fabrication facility from Belgium and 
reprocessing facilities from France. The United States argued that since South Korea‟s nuclear 
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energy program is at an early stage, it was not economically viable or desirable at this moment. 
In December 1975, the United States send a final warning to South Korea to either give up on 
both fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities or the United States would cancel the loan 
allocated for Kori-2 and stop the export of Kori-2. Additionally, the United States would stop 
purchase of heavy water reactor (CANDU) from Canada, and stop conventional arms sales to 
South Korea (Ha, 1991, p. 154; Oberdorfer, 2014, p. 65-68). President Park had no choice but to 
give up on the fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities to continue the civilian nuclear 
program. The debacle over the nuclear fuel cycle only increased Park‟s desire for self-reliance in 
the development of atomic energy. South Korea adopted a non-turnkey approach from the fourth 
nuclear reactors to increase the utilization of technology transfer. With all the obstacles 
mentioned above, South Korea still managed to finish the construction of Kori-1 and started the 
operation in 1978. 
B. The pursuit of nuclear weapons and the PNWC 
Unlike the highly promoted civilian nuclear program, South Korea secretly initiated a 
nuclear weapons program in early 1972 (Kim, 2010). The U.S.-ROK relationship in the 1960s 
was relatively calm as South Korea fought alongside the United States in Vietnam. However, 
unlike the 1960s, South Korea faced extremely high threats from North Korea and deteriorating 
security ties with the United States in the 1970s. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the DPRK‟s 
military provocation toward South Korea increased in frequency as North Korea recovered from 
the Korean War. In 1968, North Korea attempted the assassination of President Park and seized 
the U.S.S. Pueblo. In 1969 American reconnaissance plane EC-12 was shot down by North 
Korea (Spector, 1990, p. 121-122). However, it was the Guam doctrine in 1969, which called for 
greater self-reliance by South Korea on its defense, and the U.S. decision to reduce USFK in 
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March 1970, which triggered President Park to seriously consider the nuclear option. President 
Park‟s feeling of insecurity increased as President Nixon pulled out the Seventh Infantry 
Division without consenting the Park Administration in mid-1971 and the surprise Sino-
American rapprochement of 1971-1972. The signing of the Shanghai communiqué in 1972 
without notifying the U.S. allies in the region came as a shock to President Park. Furthermore, as 
the United States was dragged deeper into the Vietnam War, President Park felt that it was 
undermining the U.S. security commitment to South Korea (Korea and the Philippines: 
November 1972, 1973, p. 10). In response to growing security anxiety, President Park decided to 
covertly develop nuclear weapons.  
The development of nuclear weapons was guided under the Weapons Exploitation 
Committee (WEC) that was created in November 1971. According to the 1978 Report on the 
Investigation of Korean-American Relations, the WEC was a “covert, ad hoc committee 
responsible under the Blue House for weapons procurement and production” (Investigation of 
Korean-American Relations, Vol. 1, 1978, p. 79-80). The WEC revolved around Oh Won-chul, 
Second Secretary for Economic Affairs and other high-ranking Blue House officials (Cho, 2002). 
The WEC made a unanimous recommendation to President Park to proceed with the 
development of nuclear weapons (Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Vol. 1, 1978, p. 
80; Cho, 2000; Kim, 2010). Mr. Oh Won-chul, in his interview with Chosun Monthly in 2010, 
acknowledged that the Park administration fiddled with the nuclear option in 1970 as the United 
States decided to reduce USFK. Mr. Oh stated that in 1972, President Park ordered Mr. Oh by 
saying: “We need nuclear weapons to maintain our peace, seek necessary technology” (Kim, 
2010). As President Park decided to move on with the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, 
the pro-nuclear weapon coalition (PNWC) quickly coalesced around the idea of nuclear 
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sovereignty. The PNWC was only comprised of President Park and members of the WEC, as the 
entire program was maintained with utmost secrecy. President Park was concerned with the 
possibility of information leak if the development of nuclear weapons were all conducted at one 
research institute such as the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). Thus, under the 
guidance of Mr. Oh, researchers at ADD were relocated to seven research institutes, including 
the KAERI, the ADD, and Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). Then the program 
was broken down to seven individual projects to hide the fact that South Korea was seeking 
nuclear weapons. President Park received two separate reports on the progress of nuclear 
weapons. He not only received the general reports from Mr. Oh but also personally received the 
technical reports from the KAERI. This shows how much President Park desired nuclear 
weapons (Kim, 2010). In late 1972, South Korea initiated covert operations to acquire 
technology that was necessary for developing nuclear weapons.  
For two years into the development of nuclear weapons, South Korea‟s clandestine 
nuclear weapons program seemed successful. However, the situation quickly changed as India 
conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. In the aftermath of India‟s nuclear test, the 
United States became increasingly alert to clandestine nuclear weapons programs worldwide. 
The early suspicion that South Korea might be seeking nuclear weapons was reported in 
Ambassador Philip Habib‟s telegram to the Department of State on July 30, 1974. Ambassador 
Habib stated that “based only on growing independence of Korean attitude toward defense 
matters and increasing doubts about [the] durability of U.S. commitments that most senior ROK 
defense planners desire to obtain capability eventually to produce nuclear weapons” (Burr, 
2017b). As the United States discovered South Korea‟s ambition to build nuclear weapons, the 
United States demanded Paris, Brussels, and Ottawa to halt all sales related to nuclear 
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technology to South Korea.  
President Park, in an interview with the Washington Post in June 1975, showed concerns 
for alliance abandonment and strongly argued that if the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not protect 
South Korea, then South Korea will use all its capability to develop nuclear weapons to secure 
national security. The U.S. ambassador in late 1975 fired back by stating that “If the ROK 
proceeds as it has indicated to date, [the] whole range of security and political relationships 
between the U.S. and ROK will be affected”(Pollack & Reiss, 2004). The relationship between 
the United States and South Korea intensified as President Carter proposed a new plan to 
withdraw USFK from the Korean Peninsula in 1976. South Korea eventually gave up on the 
purchase of fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities to alleviate the situation with the United 
States. To improve the bilateral relationship and to minimize the feeling of insecurity of South 
Korea, the United States-ROK agreed to establish the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The 
CFC was officially inaugurated in November 1978. Furthermore, the Carter administration also 
removed the withdrawal plan in 1979, reducing the feeling of insecurity in South Korea. The 
nuclear weapons program came to a sudden halt as President Park was assassinated in October 
1979. According to Mr. Oh, the Park administration was only a few years away from making 
indigenous nuclear weapons (Kim, 2010).  
Post-Yushin System and the Pre-Fukushima Era 
A. The rise of the PNEC  
Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah became acting President on October 26, 1979. However, 
President Choi did not have his own political base especially in the military or in the KCIA, the 
only intuitions with political power (Halloran, 1979). On December 12, 1979, General Chun 
Doo-hwan, successfully orchestrated the coup d‟état against President Choi. Turning President 
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Choi to a figurehead, General Chun virtually controlled the government by early 1980. In May 
1980, General Chun declared martial law and became de-facto ruler of the country. As President 
Choi decided to resign in August 1980, Chun Doo-hwan was elected, with 99% of Electoral 
College, as the President of the Fifth Republic of Korea which existed from 1981 to 1987.  
As the first civilian nuclear reactor, Kori-1 began commercial operation in 1978, nuclear energy 
became part of South Korea‟s energy mix for the first time. Since the Kori-1 operation started, 
nuclear energy has been an unquestioned reality of Korean domestic politics, as it was the major 
driving force behind Korean economic prosperity. However, in the aftermath of the assassination 
of President Park, as the United States heavily pressured General Chun to abandon nuclear 
weapons programs, the nuclear industry also suffered the consequences. President Reagan 
invited President Chun to the White House in February 1981. This invitation symbolized that the 
U.S.-ROK relation has moved beyond the coup d‟état on December 12, 1979, and the Kwangju 
massacre on May 18, 1980. 
 The invitation was seen as recognition of the Chun administration by the United States 
as the rightful government of South Korea. Even though no official agreement was announced 
during President Chun‟s visit to Washington, the Chun administration decided to hand over all 
nuclear weapons related data and abandon nuclear weapons programs while the Reagan 
administration authorized the sale of F-16 and other conventional arms to South Korea (Lee, 
2004). As President Chun tried to remove all of the suspicions from the United States regarding 
the nuclear weapons program, over 800 researchers from the ADD and the KAERI were 
dismissed in the aftermath of President Chun‟s visit to Washington in 1981 (Kim, 2010). 
Furthermore, “nuclear” and “atomic” became taboo words within the political and scientific 
spheres in South Korea during the 1980s. It took almost a decade for these words to be spoken 
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freely in the political or public sphere in South Korea. However, this time around the revival of 
“atomic” or “nuclear” was purely for the purpose of energy security.  
Eight more nuclear reactors, which started construction in the late 1970s, went into 
operation in the 1980s. Yet, new construction of nuclear reactors was turned down by the Chun 
administration during the late 1980s. Furthermore, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 
removed “atomic” from its name and became the Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute. 
The KAERI budget was almost 50% of the Ministry of Education Science and Technology‟s 
(MEST) overall budget in 1969; however, during the Chun administration, the KAERI budget 
started to decline every year and by 1987 the KAERI budget was only 11% of the MEST‟s 
overall budget (KAERI, 1991, p. 642). President Chun placed KAERI under the oversight of the 
MEST. This was significant since previously KAERI had a direct (reporting) line to the Blue 
House. It is argued by South Korean nuclear experts that from this point on, KAERI stopped 
reporting directly to the Blue House and presidents of South Korea stopped showing personal 
interest in the development of nuclear technology.
81
  
As interest in the development of nuclear technology by the Blue House dwindled in the 
1980s, the technocrats, a close-knit group of scientists that are linked by school ties and 
hometown, started to dictate both public and private nuclear related institutions in South Korea. 
It is reported that 1,500 nuclear researchers in both public and private sectors in 2010 were 
comprised primarily of graduates of KAIST and Seoul National University (SNU) (Lee, 2013). 
As the graduates of KAIST and SNU dominated the position of high ranking officials at the 
NSSC and other government agencies which regulated nuclear industries, the rest of the agencies 
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were occupied by fellow alumni of these officials. This was also true in the KAERI, the Korea 
Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), the Korea Nuclear Energy Foundation (KNEF) and 
government owned utility companies, the KEPCO and its subsidiary Korea Hydro & Nuclear 
Power (KHNP), which constructed and operated nuclear reactors in South Korea. As nuclear 
renaissance arrived in South Korea in the 1990s, the technocrat also became a robust pro-nuclear 
force within the bureaucracy of South Korea.  
While the technocrat rises to power within the nuclear industry, the relationship between 
Chaebol and government also started to shift in South Korea in the late 1980s (Kuk, 2010; Song, 
2016). The Chun administration privatized the banks and deregulated the law which limited FDI 
by foreign investors. In the early 1990s, South Korea slowly opened up its financial market and 
allowed Chaebol into non-banking financial institutions. This allowed Chaebol to manage and 
expand their businesses more independently from the government (Kuk, 2010). The IMF crisis 
of 1997 dissolved several Chaebol, including the Daewoo who was the second largest Chaebol 
in South Korea throughout the 1990s. As Chaebol withstood the 1997 IMF crisis, they learned to 
always reserve a large amount of cash, especially in U.S. dollars, for crises. As Chaebol went 
global in the late 1990s and reserved large amounts of cash, they became independent from the 
government‟s financial control (Kim, 1997). In addition, most of Chaebol started to operate 
some kind of scholarship programs in the late 1970s and by the time the first truly democratic 
government was launched in the early 1990s in South Korea, individuals who received 
scholarships from Chaebol started to take positions within the high ranks of the bureaucracy 
(Kang, 1990). Throughout their time in the bureaucracy, they become mouth and ear for Chaebol 
within the bureaucracy. Most of these individuals were guaranteed jobs within Chaebol after 
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they retire from the bureaucracy. This was also true within the nuclear industry, as many 
technocrats were on the payroll of Chaebol.  
The PNEC in South Korea is often called the “nuclear mafia.” As the technocrats and 
individuals who received a scholarship from Chaebol dominated the bureaucracy, nuclear 
industry, and national assembly, the policy-making coalition known as the “nuclear mafia” was 
formed in South Korea to protect their collective interests in nuclear energy.  The nuclear 
technocrats wanted to expand nuclear energy domestically and internationally while maintaining 
a closed inner circle within the nuclear community. Chaebol would like to continue to expand 
nuclear market domestically and internationally as all of the nuclear power plants were 
constructed by the construction companies owned by Chaebol. The nuclear power plant 
constructions were dominated by Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, and Doosan. They also wanted to 
maintain the discounted electricity price from the KHNP which started under the Park 
administration in the 1970s to support Chaebol to gain competitiveness within the global market.  
Under the export-led industrialization policy by President Park in the 1970s, Chaebol 
enjoyed electricity subsidies from the Korean government. As the relationship between Chaebol 
and the government moved away from hierarchical to an equal in the 1990s, Chaebol threatened 
to move their factories and production lines overseas if electricity subsidy was taken away from 
them. It was reported during the national audit that Chaebol was benefiting from the discounted 
electricity. According to a comparative analysis of the national audit data 2008-2010 on the cost 
per electricity and sell price to top ten Chaebol in South Korea, the KHNP lost over $1.5 billion 
for selling electricity at the discounted price. According to national assemblyman Noh Young-
min from the Democratic Party, this is like providing illegal subsidies to Chaebol (Oh, 2011). 
During the national audit in 2013, national assemblyman Choo Mi-ae from the Democratic Party 
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once more pointed to how the KEPCO lost over $10 billion in the last ten years in electricity sold 
to Chaebol in South Korea (Shim, 2013). During both national audits, the CEO of KHNP 
promised to look into the matter, but at the end of 2018, Chaebol still enjoyed the discounted 
electricity from the KHNP. The interest of the nuclear technocrat and Chaebol during the late 
1980s to Fukushima led to maximizing nuclear energy. The identity of the nuclear mafia who 
dictated nuclear energy policy within South Korea throughout the late 1980s to the pre-
Fukushima did not surface in the public sphere until the aftermath of the Fukushima incident.   
As South Korea‟s economy expanded, more nuclear power plants were constructed. 
During the 1990s, seven nuclear reactors went into operation. Furthermore, South Korea 
launched a nuclear export business in May 1993, as South Korea won the bid to operate and 
conduct maintenance of Chinese nuclear power plants in the Guangdong area. Five more nuclear 
reactors were built and went into operation by February 2011. In 2009, South Korea outbid 
France and Japan to construct four APR1400 nuclear reactors in the UAE. Former Vice President 
of the KEPCO Byun Jun-yeon who led the UAE deal said “it was an epic moment for Korean 
nuclear industry.”82 The APR1400 was the first nuclear reactor modified and constructed by 
South Korean technology and know-how.
83
 Furthermore, Daewoo Engineering & Construction 
formed a consortium to build a multi-purpose research reactor in Jordan in 2010. It seemed that 
South Korea was heading into the nuclear renaissance both domestically and overseas in 2010. 
During the Summit of Honor on Atoms for Peace and Environment in 2010, former President 
Kim Yong-sam claimed that “we are entering the age of nuclear renaissance” and Prime Minister 
Chung Un-chan stated “South Korea is going to build 18 more nuclear power plants and increase 
the nuclear energy to 59% of total energy output” (Lee, 2010). However, this was quickly halted 
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by the Fukushima incident in 2011. The Fukushima incident halted all new construction plans of 
nuclear power plants in South Korea, as the prolonged debate over the construction of nuclear 
power plants started in both political and public spheres.  
B. Nuclear weapons debate and nonproliferation efforts  
As South Korea learned that North Korea was covertly working on the nuclear weapons 
program, a small number of conservatives have argued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
that South Korea also needed to acquire nuclear weapons to deter North Korea‟s nuclear 
weapons program. Yet, under the two progressive administrations from 1997 to 2007, the voice 
of PNWC was silenced to the background. However, as North Korea conducted their first 
nuclear test in October 2006, the conservative politicians escalated the tensions in both political 
and public spheres. They turn the entire North Korean nuclear issue into a political crusade to 
win the 2007 presidential election. The Grand National Party (GNP) attacked the sunshine policy 
of progressive administration for being an open wallet for North Korea to develop its nuclear 
weapons programs. In the aftermath of North Korea‟s first nuclear test, a small entourage of 
national assemblymen from the GNP claimed that South Korea needed to acquire nuclear 
weapons. National assemblyman Goh Jo-hong from the GNP claimed that “we should be able to 
make an argument to acquire nuclear weapons” (Lim, 2006). Another national assemblyman 
from the GNP Kim Hak-song also argued that “South Korea needs to reevaluate our 
denuclearization commitment” (Lim, 2006). Former Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Park Keun, also argued that South Korea needs to pursue nuclear weapons. Former President 
Kim Young-sam claimed that the Roh administration needs to officially end the sunshine policy. 
He further attacked sunshine policy and other government initiatives, such as Kaesong industrial 
complex and Keumgang mountain tourism, as the funding sources that led to North Korea‟s 
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development of nuclear weapons (“DJ „daehwalo bughaek haeche‟..YS "poyongjeongchaek 
pyegileul [DJ „dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program via talks‟...YS „sunshine 
policy needs to be thrown out‟],” 2006). The conservative media such as Dong A Ilbo, Chosun 
Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo also started to pour out articles about bringing back U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons to the Korean Peninsula and how the Roh administration assisted North Korea‟s nuclear 
weapons program via the sunshine policy. This news frame continued all the way up to the 2007 
presidential election and assisted Lee Myung-bak and the GNP to reclaim the Blue House.  
As North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in 2009, the voices in favor of nuclear 
weapons came out from a wider audience including politicians, academics, journalists, and right 
wing organizations. Former Chief Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Professor of SNU Chung 
Chong Wook claimed that “we should not rule out the possibility of our own nuclear deterrent” 
(Chung, 2009). National Assemblywoman from the conservative Liberty Forward Party Park 
Sun-young contends that we need to achieve nuclear sovereignty by acquiring nuclear weapons 
(Shin, 2009). Yet, what we have to notice here is that the GNP, a ruling party, and its members 
refrained from making comments on nuclear sovereignty in the aftermath of North Korea‟s 
second nuclear test. Throughout the Lee administration and even when ROKS Cheonan was 
sunken by North Korea in March 2010, the members of the GNP kept silence in regards to 
nuclear sovereignty. Only when the 2012 presidential election came around did the members of 
the Saenuri Party (formerly the GNP) initiate the debate regarding the nuclear weapons once 
more. Thus, it can be inferred that conservative politicians utilize nuclear weapons as a political 
tool to rouse the conservative base and bring conservative bases together before the general and 
presidential elections. This study assumes that there is a loosely connected coalition, the PNWC, 
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between conservative politicians, political parties, and the segment of the military, think tanks, 
the media, and academia, backed by social norms.  
Since the early 1990s, a vast number of scholarly works and policy reports have indicated 
that a majority in South Korea supported the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons. According to a 
survey conducted by JoongAng Ilbo, in the aftermath of the first nuclear test by North Korea in 
2006, 65% of the Korean public supported the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons (Shin, 2006). 
This was a warning sign for the international community and the United States that South Korea 
could go nuclear in the future if geopolitical situations and nuclear North Korea were to become 
unmanageable. A series of polling data ranging from the 1990s to 2009 also shows that the 
majority of the Korean public supports the idea of arming their country with nuclear weapons 
[see Figure 4.3]. 
Figure 4.3 South Korean Public Support for Nuclear Weapons 1996-2009 
 
Source: 1996 & 1999 data was from a Research And Development Corporation (RAND) survey.
84
 2006 data was 
from JoongAng Ilbo.
85
 2009 data was from an East Asia Institute survey.
86
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161 
 
However, this polling data also illustrates another side of the story, that the percentage of 
public support of nuclear weapons in South Korea has been declining since the late 1990s[see 
Figure 4.3]. As progressive administration led by Kim Dae-jung came into power in 1998, the 
perceived threat of North Korea started to decline. Throughout two consecutive progressive 
administrations of President Kim and President Roh who sought inter-Korean reconciliation, the 
level of threat posed by North Korea to the general public significantly dropped. According to 
the survey taken by Chosun Ilbo in 2002, 64% of the Korean public believed that North Korea‟s 
nuclear weapons would be aimed at other countries (Hong, 2002). Only 24% stated that North 
Korea‟s nuclear weapons would be pointed toward South Korea (Hong, 2002). In the aftermath 
of the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea, the public support for nuclear weapons was at 
65% (Shin, 2006). This was a significant drop from 82% in 1999. Even after the second nuclear 
test by North Korea in 2009, the survey by East Asia Institute (EAI) portrayed that public 
support for nuclear weapons further declined to 60.5% (Chung & Chung, 2009). It seems from 
multiple surveys that the public support for nuclear weapons is clearly in decline in South Korea. 
This trend could be due to the inter-Korean reconciliation movement initiated by the Kim and 
Roh administrations. Only time would tell if this trend would continue in South Korea, especially 
in the time of a conservative administration.  
Since the 1980s, as another form of reassurance that South Korea had ended its nuclear 
weapons development efforts, South Korea took a step forward to join international 
nonproliferation and arms control regimes. Under the NPT obligations, South Korea is prohibited 
from manufacturing, receiving the transfer of, or controlling directly or indirectly a nuclear 
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device. According to South Korea‟s defense paper in 2012, South Korea had been fulfilling its 
obligation as a credible member of the NPT since its ratification in 1975 and had shown the 
international community the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear issue at the annual NPT 
meeting. As shown in Figure 4.4, South Korea has demonstrated its obligation to prevent the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and delivery vehicles through joining 
non-proliferation regimes such as international organizations and supporting the regulations such 
as IAEA safeguards and additional protocols.  
The additional protocol which was signed on June 21, 1999, went into force on February 
19, 2004. As additional protocols entered in force, the South Korean government had 180 days to 
report all nuclear materials and nuclear related studies conducted in South Korea. In August 
2004, South Korea reported to IAEA all of the nuclear materials and past nuclear studies in 
South Korea to show it‟s commitment to nonproliferation moving forward. In this report, South 
Korea acknowledged that KAERI had conducted chemical enrichment experiments from 1979 to 
1981 and a laser enrichment experiment in 2000. South Korea claimed that a chemical 
enrichment experiment was shut down as President Chun minimalized nuclear research and 
prohibited nuclear research that can be seen as suspicious effort to develop nuclear weapons in 
1981. For the laser enrichment experiment in 2000, South Korea claimed that this was purely the 
result of scientific interest of researchers at KAERI while testing Gadolinium. Former Director 
of KAERI, Chang In-soon, stated that uranium enrichment test only occurred due to the 
researcher‟s curiosity, and it was not reported to the Ministry of Scicene and Technolgoy at that 
time because it only utilized a small quantity of uranium and gained an insufficiently small 
amount (0.2kg) of enriched uranium (Korean Nuclear Society, 2010). The Roh administration 
claimed that it wanted to promote South Korea‟s transparency toward nuclear studies and 
 
 
163 
 
commitment toward nonproliferation through its report provided to IAEA in 2004. Furthermore, 
in May 2008, the IAEA declared that it “considers all past undeclared activities involving 
uranium enrichment…conversion, and plutonium separation experiments as resolved” (Kane, 
Lieggi, & Pomper, 2011). 
Even though they made little mistakes on the way, South Korea made relentless efforts in 
nonproliferation in international politics. However, these actions at the international level did not 
spill over to the domestic sphere. According to Acting President of Institute of Foreign Affairs 
and National Security (IFANS) Jun Bong-Geun, the word “nonproliferation” did not exist in the 
Korean domestic sphere until January of 2011, a year before South Korea hosted the 2012 
Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul.
87
 In March 2014, the Park administration established an 
academic think tank called the Nuclear Non-proliferation Education & Research Center (NEREC) 
at KAIST to undertake education and research for fostering international nuclear 
nonproliferation favorable for the peaceful global use of nuclear technology. 
Figure 4.4: South Korea‟s Participation in Nonproliferation Regimes and Activities  
 
Source: South Korea‟s Defense White Paper 2012 
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 Author has conducted an interview with the Acting President of IFANS Jun Bong-Geun on September 9, 2016 in 
Seoul, South Korea. 
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C. Anti-Nuclear camp prior to the Fukushima incident 
The Korean Church Women United (KCWU) continued to support ethnic Korean atomic bomb 
survivors since the end of World War II. Yet, anti-nuclear sentiment did not organize into a 
movement until the late 1980s in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear incident (Kim, 2011). 
The anti-nuclear movement was led by NGOs and academia but had a hard time attaining the 
backing of politicians, the media, and the public. The ANEC‟s main objective has been, and still 
is, to remove all nuclear related facilities. The Korea Federation for Environmental Movement 
(KFEM) made some small victories via grassroot movements by halting the construction of a 
nuclear waste repository at Kyungbook in 1989 and forced government to disband their plans to 
build new nuclear reactors at nine locations nationwide (Kim, 2011, p. 131). The ANEC 
emphasized the catastrophic risks of nuclear energy but failed to increase public awareness 
regarding the risks of nuclear energy or influence the government nuclear energy policy 
throughout the 1980s until the Fukushima incident. These anti-nuclear movements did not spread 
nationwide since the South Korean press heavily criticized these anti-nuclear demonstrations in 
the late 1980s to 1990s. Some major conservative newspapers even denounced anti-nuclear 
slogan as the chants on behalf of the communists. All these efforts by the ANEC have been 
overlooked due to the continuing economic success of South Korea and the PNEC‟s motto that 
nuclear energy is cheap, clean, and safe.  
Post-Fukushima Era 
On the eve of March 11, 2011, there were 21 nuclear reactors in operation in South Korea 
producing approximately 31% of the country‟s electric power (KEPCO, 2012, p. 5). According 
to the Korea Energy Economics Institutes (KEEI) survey in 2011, approximately 80 percent of 
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the South Korean general public supported the development of nuclear energy in 2009 (Cha, 
2011, p. 31). The Fukushima incident is considered a turning point for South Korea‟s policy 
consensus on the subject of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. In the post-Fukushima era, 
several nuclear policy changes occurred alongside the policy preference shift by domestic 
coalitions and social norms [See Figure 4.5]. As the myth about nuclear safety was shattered, 
corruption scandals which include nuclear incidents, utilizing faulty parts, and fabrication of 
safety checks all surfaced in South Korea. As shown in Figure 4.5, the most significant shift of 
nuclear policy preference occurred in the realm of the social norms as the majority of the general 
public support shifted from the pro-nuclear energy camp to either reduce nuclear energy or to 
gradually phase out nuclear energy. Even though the shared goal of all members of the ANEC is 
zero-nuclear energy, the newly joined members of the ANEC prefer more moderate policy shift 
of either reducing or gradually phasing out nuclear energy over the immediate zero-nuclear 
energy policy. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, approximately 59% of the Korean 
public opposed nuclear energy; yet, four more nuclear reactors were constructed by the Korean 
government (Cha, 2011, p. 31). 
Furthermore, after long public debates over the construction of nuclear reactors, the 
PNEC was successful in convincing both the government and the public to continue to construct 
six new nuclear reactors. However, as of the end of 2017, 24 nuclear reactors were in operation 
and producing approximately 25.7% of South Korea‟s energy mix (KEPCO, 2018, p. 5). This 
has decreased from 31% in 2011 due to an increase in overall consumption of electricity in South 
Korea. Even though nuclear reactors are continuously constructed to maintain the increased 
usage of electricity, the Moon administration decided to reduce the total percentage of nuclear 
energy in their energy mix by increasing the output of fossil fuels and renewable energy. Unlike 
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previous administrations, the Moon administration took a big step toward zero-nuclear energy by 
declaring and introducing a policy in 2017 to gradually reduce nuclear energy dependency. For 
example, South Korea will stop renewing the operation license of old nuclear reactors. On the 
other hand, the Moon administration would like to follow the previous administrations in 
expanding their overseas export of nuclear reactors and technologies.  
The Korean nuclear community was exhilarated by the $40 billion nuclear deal with the 
UAE in 2009 to construct and operate four nuclear power plants. Former Vice President of the 
KEPCO Byun Jun-yeon stated that, as a person who worked in the field of nuclear energy since 
1977, “[he] feels the agony of the Fukushima incident, but on the other hand, [he] believe that 
this period could be an opportunistic moment for the Korean nuclear industry.” 88 In January 
2010, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) declared that it aimed to achieve 
exports of 80 nuclear power reactors worth $400 billion by 2030 (“Nuclear Power in South 
Korea  2018,” 2018). The number has decreased due to the Fukushima incident, but since 2011 
the KEPCO signed multiple agreements which set foundations for constructing nuclear reactors 
in Brazil, Kenya, and Ukraine. KEPCO is presently in negotiation with Turkey, Jordan, Ukraine, 
and Saudi Arabia for nuclear power plant deals. However, the Fukushima incident also created a 
new dimension in the overall nuclear debate in South Korea‟s discussion about nuclear safety. 
As nuclear safety issues became significant in both political and public spheres, political power 
quickly united around forming new political coalitions with anti-nuclear agendas.  
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 Author has conducted an interview with former Vice President Byun Jun-yeon of KEPCO on Sept 8, 2016, in 
Seoul.  
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Figure 4.5: Nuclear Policy Preference of Domestic Coalitions in Pre- and Post-Fukushima Era 
    
While nuclear energy has been furiously debated in both political and public spheres, the 
public support of nuclear weapons continued to decline in South Korea. Despite the escalated 
tension between South and North Korea in 2017, the public support of nuclear weapons was 53% 
according to the Realmeter survey (TBS, 2017). This is down from 68% in a survey taken by the 
Chosun Ilbo and Mediaresearch in 2011. In recent years, fearing the public backlash, there is less 
chatter about acquiring U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or developing indigenous nuclear weapons 
in the political sphere. In particular, conservative parties have shown reluctance to discuss the 
necessity of either acquiring U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or developing their own. If the pre-
Fukushima era was dominated by pro-nuclear energy coalitions with limited political 
competition within the nuclear policy arena, South Korea is experiencing intensified political 
competition between multiple coalitions within the nuclear policy arena in the post-Fukushima 
era.  
Despite a long-standing pro-nuclear energy policy, post-Fukushima South Korea is 
ambivalent towards its nuclear orientation, as the Korean public is evenly split between the pro-
nuclear and anti-nuclear energy camps in 2018. Given the shock of Fukushima and increasing 
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geopolitical tensions in the region, safety and security have begun to gain prominence within the 
nuclear policy arena. In short, while economic performance is still a major factor, it is not the 
only factor that should be considered by the decision-makers of South Korea. In the post-
Fukushima era, these political agendas on the economy, safety, and security have allowed new 
political coalitions with different nuclear agendas to emerge and compete within the nuclear 
policy arena of South Korea. The changing debates and political competition (interplay between 
political coalitions) within the nuclear policy arena will be examined and international and 
domestic conditions will be filtered through the lenses of these four coalitions (pro-nuclear 
energy, pro-nuclear weapons, anti-nuclear energy, and anti-nuclear weapons coalitions) in order 
to determine the nuclear orientation of Japan. From this point on, as shown in Figure 4.6, the 
next section will cover the changes from the perspectives of pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, 
which occurred on South Korea‟s nuclear spectrum in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. 
Figure 4.6: South Korea‟s Post-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
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A. Anti-Nuclear Energy Coalition (ANEC) 
Even though NGOs that deal with nuclear issues existed as early as 1986 in South Korea, 
their voices were suppressed in the name of economic prosperity.
89
 Support for nuclear energy 
was strongly aligned between the political leadership and its constituents. An internal debate 
regarding nuclear energy was almost non-existent in South Korea until the incident of 
Fukushima. The Fukushima disaster was a wake-up call for people living in South Korea. In the 
post-Fukushima era, the voice of the ANEC finally reached the political and public spheres in 
South Korea. The safety of nuclear energy became the most debated topic in Korean households 
and the media. Internal arguments regarding the safety of nuclear energy began to ignite 
throughout society. For the first time in South Korea, we saw a clear division between the 
proponents and opponents of nuclear energy.
90
 For the first time, the Korean public started to 
take notice of the anti-nuclear movements. Since the Fukushima disaster, the ANEC has been 
very active. Seventy-three NGOs allied with progressive political parties in 2011 to establish the 
movement known as the Joint Movement for Society without Nukes. In a joint communiqué in 
June 2011, they stated that they were starting a movement demanding a zero-nuclear policy on 
the Korean Peninsula. Even though the Democratic United Party (DUP, prior party name for the 
New Politics Alliance for Democracy party) did not join the movement officially, 2012 DUP 
Presidential Candidate Moon Jae-in and other top DUP politicians joined the movement. 
The ANEC was the largest benefactor of the Fukushima incident. Following the disaster, 
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the largest opposition party, the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party and other 
progressive parties switched from the pro-nuclear energy to the anti-nuclear energy camp. 
Former prime minister during the Roh administration and national assemblyman Lee Hae Chan 
stated that “the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party will never agree to build a 
reprocessing center or to enrich uranium. We are moving away from nuclear dependency.”91 
This totally revamped the dynamics of the nuclear policy arena in South Korea. This sudden 
defection on nuclear energy policy was surprising since the last two progressive administrations 
under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mooh-hyun advocated for a robust nuclear energy policy. 
Historically, progressive parties in Korea, including the newly-formed New Politics Alliance for 
Democracy party, have always been strong advocates for nuclear energy. This can be seen as an 
obvious political move by the opposition party to win over public opinion in the aftermath of 
Fukushima. On the other hand, this was a perfect representation of how the Korean public felt 
after the Fukushima incident. Recent nuclear reactor malfunctions and scandals over falsified test 
certificates for cable parts solidified the New Politics Alliance for Democracy party‟s position 
within the ANEC and public concerns about nuclear energy safety and transparency. 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the Korean media, both conservative and 
progressive newspapers, bombarded the public sphere with a massive number of articles on 
nuclear issues. Even though interest on nuclear issues had started to dwindle since late 2015, 
between 2011-2012, the South Korean public received over 1000 articles on nuclear matters 
from top five major newspapers: Chosun Ilbo, Dong A Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Hankyoreh and 
Kyunghyang Shinmun.
92
 The coverage on nuclear issues reached its peak in 2012, as the media 
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was reporting all sorts of nuclear issues. The same five major newspapers published 
approximately 38 columns during 2007 until the Fukushima incident. Yet, in the aftermath of 
Fukushima, Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Shinmun alone published more than 110 columns 
opposing nuclear energy from 2011 to 2014. As the progressive newspapers led the charge 
against nuclear energy by continuously reporting multiple corruption scandals within nuclear 
industry and community, the conservative newspapers had no choice but to be dragged along by 
the progressive newspapers to report on the nuclear issues including the corruptions. However, 
perspectives of conservative newspapers such as Chosun Ilbo, Dong A Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo 
did not change too much in the aftermath of Fukushima. The conservative newspapers focused 
on publishing articles dealing with how to strengthen the regulations on the nuclear industry and 
the importance that nuclear energy plays in the Korean economy. On the other hand, progressive 
newspapers such as Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Shinmun focused on reporting the zero-nuclear 
policy and the corruption scandals of the nuclear industry.  
B. Pro-Nuclear Energy Coalition (PNEC) 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, a question that quickly surfaced in both 
political and public spheres was the necessity of nuclear power in South Korea. The KHNP, in 
their monthly magazine, quickly responded to the Fukushima incident by emphasizing how the 
South Korean nuclear reactors were technically superior in terms of safety over Japanese ones. 
The KHNP also reiterated the necessity of nuclear energy for the Korean economy, energy 
security and environment. Even though progressive parties defected to the anti-nuclear camp, the 
PNEC had strong backings from the Lee administration and the GNP, a ruling party. During the 
first meeting of the KNEF since the Fukushima incident, the chairperson of KNEF 
acknowledged that public perception of nuclear energy was changing and the approval rating of 
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nuclear energy was also in decline. Thus, he claimed that KNEF would follow the directives 
from the Blue House and the Office of Prime Minister to utilize the media and education within 
the primary school to “regain public‟s confidence in nuclear energy” (Kim, 2015). This 
represents the perspective of and the extent to which the Lee administration was involved in 
promoting nuclear energy. The Lee administration showed a keen interest in nuclear energy due 
to the special relationship President Lee had with the nuclear industry. As president of Hyundai 
Construction in the late 1970s to 1990s, he led the bidding and the construction of over ten 
nuclear power plants in South Korea. The Lee administration and the PNEC quickly responded 
by recommending more stringent regulations for the nuclear industry. The South Korean 
leadership and the PNEC felt that it was the conflict of interests between regulation and 
operation that resulted in the manmade disaster of Fukushima. Thus, the Lee administration and 
the PNEC passed the Nuclear Promotion Act and the Nuclear Safety and Security Act, which 
separated the operation and regulation. These acts established the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), respectively in 2011. NSSC 
was an independent regulatory agency with more autonomy to solely focus on auditing nuclear 
regulations. The PNEC promoted that independent regulatory agency would strengthen the safety 
of nuclear reactors in South Korea. However, due to the organizational structure of NSSC, the 
decisions by NSSC were not truly independent from the government nuclear policy.  
Furthermore, as members of the nuclear mafia were placed in high ranks of NSSC, the PNEC 
was able to reinforce their position within the nuclear community by dominating the nuclear 
regulatory agency. This arrangement continued throughout the conservative administrations of 
President Lee and President Park.  
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The fate of nuclear energy was also furiously debated in both political and public spheres 
in 2012. It seemed that the PNEC was losing ground as multiple corruption scandals involving 
the KHNP erupted from 2011 to 2014. However, the bad fortune of the PNEC started to overturn 
as South Korea started to experience electricity shortage and the rise in electricity prices. 
Ironically, the malfunctions of nuclear reactors due to faulty parts in South Korea have increased 
awareness of safety concerns, but they also caused electricity shortages in the summer of 2013. 
This quickly shifted some of the public opinions back to supporting nuclear energy. As the 
electricity shortage continues, the Park administration released the 7
th
 Basic Plan for Long-term 
Electricity Supply and Demand in July 2015. This plan envisions 13 more nuclear reactors by 
2029. This was five more than outlined in the 6
th
 Basic Plan in 2013 (MOTIE, 2015). Even 
though they faced changing perception of the public on nuclear energy, the PNEC was strongly 
supported by the conservative administrations of President Lee and President Park. 
However, the PNEC was in trouble as the newly elected President Moon decided to 
gradually phase out nuclear energy. The PNEC challenged President Moon‟s policy to phase out 
nuclear energy. Over 400 professors in South Korea, including a large number from SNU and 
KAIST, called the Moon administration to “immediately halt the push to extinguish the nuclear 
energy industry that provides cheap electricity to the general public” (“Nuclear Power in South 
Korea  2018,” 2018). The PNEC was also successful in convincing local governments and local 
populations to continue the construction of new power plants. The PNEC is expected to receive 
government approval to start the operation of Shin Kori-4 and continue construction of two 
nuclear power plants Shin Hanul-1 and Shin Hanul-2. The PNEC also had a small victory over 
the Moon administration in October 2017, as nearly 60% of the vote within the government 
assembled committee agreed to continue the construction of Shin Kori-5 and Shin Kori-6 (Park, 
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2017). The PNEC continuously argue that the safety concerns could be managed by 
strengthening regulations and by truly making NSSC an independent regulatory agency. The 
PNEC also claims that constructing and operating nuclear power plants domestically is an 
indispensable sales pitch to foreign buyers. Furthermore, to be competitive with other major 
nuclear technology suppliers, the PNEC argues that South Korea needs to be able to offer full 
fuel cycle services. The U.S. and South Korea finally concluded the 123 agreement in April 2015 
which allows a little more freedom to manage nuclear fuel. South Korea was still denied the 
enrichment and reprocessing technology for fear of dual usage.
93
 As a result, the PNEC is 
seeking different routes other than indigenous enrichment and reprocessing to complete the 
nuclear fuel cycle within the boundaries of the U.S.-ROK 123 agreement and the NPT.  
C. Institutional Barriers: Legislative and Ratification Process 
The Atomic Energy Law, enacted in 1958 as the foundational law managing South 
Korea‟s extensive civilian nuclear energy program, can be conceptualized as a domestic legal 
constraint on the usage of atomic energy. Article 4 of the Atomic Energy Law establishes that 
the research, development, and utilization of atomic energy are independently managed by the 
nuclear committee directly under the Office of the Prime Minister
94
. As stated before, the Atomic 
Energy Law was divided into two acts in the aftermath of Fukushima to separate the operation 
and regulation sections into the Nuclear Promotion Act and the Nuclear Safety and Security Act. 
These acts created the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission, respectively.  
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There are three possible ways that the Nuclear Promotion Act and the Nuclear Safety and 
Security Act could constrain any nuclearization/denuclearization movement within South Korea. 
First, amendments to these acts must pass through a legislative procedure, which means that 
amendments or bills have to pass the national assembly to be enacted. In other words, the 
legislative process provides opposition within the national assembly with an opportunity to block 
proposed amendments or bills. Second, any movement to build nuclear related facilities has to 
receive approval from both commissions, since the authorization to construct or de-construct 
nuclear related facilities lies with the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, while the 
authorization of budgets for all nuclear development lies with the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Third, the Nuclear Safety and Security Act established the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission as a body composed of experts that are nominated by the National Assembly. This 
mechanism was intended to protect the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission from being 
influenced by the ruling party.  
Finally, all legislative bills have to pass the domestic ratification process to be enacted. In 
South Korea before 2012, the ratification process first went through a standing committee that 
required a simple majority, and then, if passed, advanced to the national assembly, which also 
required a simple majority. If this were still true, then party with a simple majority would not 
have had any problem ratifying the bill. However, the ratification process is not that simple, as 
the Korean national assembly passed an amendment known as the National Assembly 
Advancement Act (Sunjinhwa law) in 2012, which stops a highly contested bill or treaty from 
being presented to the national assembly.
95
 This amendment asserts that a highly contested bill or 
treaty requires the support from at least 3/5 of the national assemblymen to be put up for a vote. 
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However, at this time there is no clear definition of what makes a bill highly contested. Therefore, 
in practice, every bill is being considered as highly contested and requires the support of 177 
seats or more to be put up for a vote. In reality, it is almost impossible for one party to obtain 3/5 
of the national assembly. Because of this, cooperation with the opposition parties is essential to 
ratify any bills. In the aftermath of Fukushima, the national assembly has been evenly split 
among the pro- and the anti-nuclear energy camps. The legal basis of Nuclear Promotion Act and 
the Nuclear Safety and Security Act and the National Assembly Advancement Act make it 
difficult for any administration to make a policy shift that requires legislative approval. 
Policy Implication: Nuclear Weapons Debates 
In recent years, security conditions surrounding Northeast Asia have changed 
significantly from those of the Cold War. The rise of China‟s military, the arrival of North Korea 
as a self-recognized nuclear power, the remilitarization movement of Japan, and alliance 
abandonment concerns have increased tensions within South Korea as well as between South 
Korea and its neighboring states. Equally to the post-war era, South Korea leadership continues 
to show ambivalence towards nuclear weapons. By 2013, North Korea conducted its third 
underground nuclear test, which quickly renewed speculation, primarily inside South Korea, that 
South Korea might be pushing for nuclear sovereignty. The idea of nuclear sovereignty quickly 
mobilized behind the Saenuri party, a ruling party. In particular, right wing conservatives, led by 
the former chairman of the conservative party and national assemblyman Chung Mong-joon, 
have been vocal about nuclear sovereignty, showing their strong motivation to start a nuclear 
program in South Korea in the near future. At the nuclear policy conference hosted by the 
Carnegie Foundation in 2013, Chung Mong-joon explicitly discussed how South Korea should 
seriously consider exiting from the NPT in the near future for the sake of its nuclear sovereignty. 
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A survey conducted by Korea Gallup in 2013 reported that 64% of the public supported the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Even with public backing on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
conservative politicians never went beyond the talk.  
North Korea‟s nuclear test was quickly assuaged by the United States during the 
Security Consultative Meetings (SCM) in 2014. As recently as the 46
th
 SCM, the US reaffirmed 
its continued “commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the 
full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and 
missile defense capabilities.”96 However, unlike Japan, South Korea has shown confidence in its 
conventional military capability to deter North Korea. The 2008 relocation of U.S. Forces to 
south of the Han River made security scholars and policy makers fear that these priority shifts 
might signal the U.S.‟s abandonment of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, South Korea asked for the 
transfer of wartime operational control in 2008 in order to be more self-reliant on its defense. 
Furthermore, as the perceived threats of North Korea declined in South Korea, the question of 
the relevance of the U.S.-ROK alliance also peaked in South Korea. Moreover, as President 
Trump unilaterally escalated his rhetoric toward North Korea over the development of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs in 2017, South Korea is more concerned about possible 
entrapment caused by the United States than an abandonment by the United States. South Korea 
argues that the U.S. commitment in the Korean Peninsula is an important factor in deterring 
North Korea, yet it is also confident in its own military capability to deter North Korea. Thus, the 
U.S. and South Korea are working together to restructure the U.S.-ROK alliance to be more 
equal. This restructuring requires adapting to the changing regional and international 
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environment by increasing the flexibility of the USFK to respond to crises outside of Korea and 
by creating a more comprehensive regional security relationship between the U.S. and South 
Korea. 
However, South Korea start to see some shifts and organized movements by conservative 
politicians in the aftermath of the sixth nuclear test conducted by North Korea in 2017. National 
Assemblyman Won Yu-chul from the Liberty Korea Party (formerly Saenuri Party), representing 
the nuclear forum group within the Saenuri Party (include 22 members of national assembly), 
issued a resolution calling to exit the NPT and to acquire nuclear weapons (Kim, 2017). As 
tension escalated in the Korean Peninsula, even moderate scholars and security experts who once 
opposed to the nuclear option throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis switched their views 
and reluctantly supported the idea that South Korea needed to acquire nuclear weapons.
97
 South 
Korean government denied the possibility of reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons but 
strongly argued that South Korea needs to construct nuclear submarines to enhance the deterrent 
against North Korea‟s nuclear and missile provocations. The Washington Post reported that 
approximately 60% of the Korean public supported the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons in 
2017 (Lee, 2017). These multiple signals were a clear indication that South Korea could possibly 
go nuclear in the future if geopolitical situations and nuclear North Korea were to become 
unmanageable. A series of polling data ranging from the 1990s to 2017 also shows that the 
majority of the Korean public supports the idea of arming their country with nuclear weapons 
[see Figure 4.7]. However, this is not the end of the story.  
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Figure 4.7 South Korean public support for nuclear weapons 1996-2017 
       
Source: 1996 & 1999 data was from Research And Development Corporation (RAND) and  JoongAng Ilbo survey. 
2006 data was from JoongAng Ilbo.
98
 2004 was from CCFR and East Asia Institue Survey.
99
 2009 was from East 
Asia Institue Survey.
100
 2016, 2017, and 2018 data was from the Genron NPO and East Asia Institue survey.
101
 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 data was from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
102
 2013, 2016, and 
2017 data was from Korea Gallup survey.
103
 2016 data was from Chosunilbo & Mediaresearch.
104
 2017 data was 
from Realmeter.
105
 2018 data was from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs(CCGA).
106
 
The series of polling data also illustrates another side of the story. The percentage of 
public support of nuclear weapons in South Korea has further declined since the submarine 
infiltration incident, which resulted in skirmishes between South Korea and North Korea in 1996. 
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Although the public support for nuclear weapons tends to temporarily increase as a result of 
escalating tensions between South Korea and North Korea or in the region, the series of polling 
data has shown that, in the absence of significant tensions between the South and the North, the 
public support for nuclear weapons continues to show the pattern of decline since 1996[see 
Figure 4.7]. Furthermore, from the series of polling data, this study infers that support for nuclear 
weapons tends to be higher during the conservative government and lower during the progressive 
government in South Korea.  
During the progressive government under President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh 
Mooh-hyun, the animosity level toward North Korea significantly declined in South Korea. Thus, 
public support for nuclear weapons also declined to 50.7%. However, as North Korea conducted 
its first nuclear test in 2006, see Figure 4.7, support for nuclear weapons temporarily increased to 
65%. Then, even as North Korea conducted a second nuclear test in 2009, public support for 
nuclear weapons slightly declined to 62.7% in a survey conducted by EAI. The survey conducted 
by the Asan Institute for Policy studies in 2010 is even lower with 55.6%.  
However, due to South Korea‟s official report on the investigation of the sinking of the 
ROKS Cheonan in the late 2010 and the bombardment of Yeonpyongdo by North Korea on 
November 23, 2010, the support for nuclear weapons, as surveyed by Asan, temporarily 
increased to 62.6%. The public support for nuclear weapons peaked to 66.0% as the relationship 
between South and North continue to escalate in 2012. Yet, as Kim Jung-un called for an end to 
confrontation with South Korea and tension between the South and the North started to alleviate, 
the support for nuclear weapons in South Korea also started to decline. The survey by Asan and 
Gallup in 2013 was 62.9% and 64% of support, respectively. In 2016, even though the survey by 
Asan increased to 64.7%, the survey data from EAI portrays that support for nuclear weapons 
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has further declined to 59% and the survey conducted by the conservative news agency Chosun 
Ilbo has shown that the support for nuclear weapons declined to 52%.  
In 2017, public support for nuclear weapons once more increased in South Korea, as 
South Korea worried about both abandonment and entrapment dilemma caused by President 
Trump. In late 2016, Presidential candidate Trump caused abandonment concerns by repeatedly 
attacking the alliance with South Korea as a “bad deal,” while suggesting that he may allow 
Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, President Trump caused 
entrapment concerns as well, as he unilaterally escalated rhetoric toward North Korea over the 
development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, which intensified already 
heightened geopolitical tensions. Thus, even though the Moon administration, a progressive 
administration, took the helm of the Blue House, the survey conducted in 2017 varies from 54% 
by relameter to 67% by EAI. The downward trend becomes more apparent as the survey 
conducted by East Asai Institue found that only 43% of South Koreans would support nuclear 
weapons in 2018. However, another poll in 2018, conducted by the Council of Chicago on 
Global Affairs, found that 54% of South Koreans are still supportive of acquiring nuclear 
weapons [see Figure 4.7]. 
Despite the downward trend, unlike Japan and Taiwan, public support for nuclear 
weapons remains above 50% in South Korea. Kenneth Waltz (2003) argued this might be a cause 
for concern, as “no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they 
were determined to do so” (p. 38). As public support carries weight in decision-making in South 
Korea, the international community needs to keep a close eye on the public support for nuclear 
weapons in South Korea.  
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As public support for nuclear weapons continues to decline, it would become harder for 
the PNWC to pursue nuclear weapons. How can we explain the decline of public support for 
nuclear weapons? There is a negative correlation between intensifying geopolitical situations 
caused by North Korea‟s nuclear and missile tests and the South Korean public support for 
nuclear weapons. There are three explanations for this negative correlation. First, the perceived 
threat of North Korea continues to decline in South Korea. For example, there is no large 
fluctuation in the South Korean Stock Market other than the movement of foreign investment. 
Unlike the early 1990s, people did not run to the supermarket to stock emergency goods in fear 
of war. Nuclear and missile tests conducted by North Korea became part of the daily routine for 
South Koreans. Most of South Koreans do not believe that North Korea would invade South 
Korea or use nuclear weapons within the Korean Peninsula.
107
 According to the 2018 survey 
conducted by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, 54.6% 
of the Korean public considered North Korea as a state to cooperate with while only 10.3% of 
the Korean public considered North Korea as a hostile state to South Korea (Lim et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, the survey also reported that 54.7% of the Korean public expressed their trust 
toward the North Korean leadership as a rational actor to discuss the unification process of the 
Korean Peninsula (Lim et al., 2019). In short, we can infer from this data that the South Korean 
public supports nuclear weapons for purposes other than mitigating the threat of North Korea‟s 
nuclear weapons. 
Second, this is very ironic but South Korean public learned the impact of international 
sanctions vis-à-vis North Korea‟s nuclear crisis. South Korean public clearly understands the 
impact of sanctions could have on one‟s country. So far none of the surveys has asked a follow-
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up question regarding whether an individual would still support the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons knowing that international communities will heavily sanction his/her country. It is 
expected that the percentage that supports nuclear weapons would decline if this question were 
asked to the public.
108
  
Finally, the South Korean public is confident that its own military capability can deter 
North Korea. South Korea has been increasing its defense budget by 7.2% in 2017 and 8.2% in 
2018 to modernize and increase the military capability to effectively meet the North Korean and 
regional threats. Additionally, the Defense Ministry of South Korea released a mid-long term 
defense plan for 2019-2023, which increases the defense budget by 7.5% annually for the next 
five years to complete the three-axis defense system including the Kill Chain program, as well as 
Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation 
(KMPR) (Kim, 2019). As a result, the South Korean public shares similar views with the 
leadership that their conventional weapons capability can successfully deter any possible threats 
from North Korea. 
A. China’s Role in South Korea’s nuclear decision 
Another obvious, immense change that occurred in East Asia in the aftermath of the Cold 
War was the economic and military rise of China. Since early 2010, economic interdependence 
with China changes South Korean public perception and foreign policy behavior. It can be 
argued that the declining U.S. leverage over South Korea, due to the U.S. hegemonic decline in 
the region, could have provided an opportunity for South Korea to seek its own indigenous 
nuclear weapons. South Korea‟s strategy to deter nuclear threats while remaining a non-nuclear 
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weapons state has centered on its security treaty with the United States. However, since the U.S. 
hegemonic decline and the rise of China, South Korea‟s strategy also incorporated the idea of 
maintaining a favorable relationship with China. The Park Geun-hye administration has made 
clear that it will improve relations with China in 2013. President Park‟s commitment to this 
mission can be seen through her sending of her first team of special envoys to China and not to 
the United States. By the same token, her commitment can be perceived through the seating 
order arrangement of her meeting with the overseas Korean ambassadors in 2013. The seat to the 
right of the president is usually reserved for the Korean ambassador to the United States; 
however, at this first meeting of the year, this seat was given to the Korean ambassador to China. 
Likewise, a successful summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 quickly 
strengthened the relationship between the two countries. Since early 2013, China‟s favorability 
ratings in South Korea have been at an all-time high, and trade between the two countries 
continues to thrive. According to 2012 UN Comtrade data, China was Korea‟s number one trade 
partner and Korea was China‟s third highest trade partner. Their total trade volume in the early 
1990s was around $3 billion; however, trade volume increased 76 fold to $228 billion in 2012. In 
2012, South Korea‟s export volume to China reached $145 billion, which is more than two times 
its export volume to the U.S. ($62 billion). According to the Asan Public Opinion Report 2014, 
the percentage of the Korean public who believed that the relationship between South Korea and 
China has improved rose from 62% to 70.8% since President Park took office. Like it or not, by 
the beginning of the 21st century, South Korea was so intertwined with the Chinese economy 
that Korea was essentially, voluntarily and involuntarily, appeasing China at all level. 
Furthermore, the economic relationship between these two countries has been spilled over into 
non-economic relations, including military cooperation. Frequent high-level official dialogues in 
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recent years have enhanced mutual trust between these two countries. The leadership of both 
countries has actively interacted with one another through state visits and participation in 
international summits. Recently, Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan became the first 
Chinese defense minister to visit South Korea. China seeks to boost its bilateral ties with South 
Korea. Moreover, these two countries have agreed to set up a military hotline between their 
defense ministries.  
As the relationship between South Korea and China has strengthened in various areas 
such as politics, economics, the military, and person to person exchange, it will be tough to 
detach China‟s influence from South Korea‟s decision-making process, including around nuclear 
policy. For example, on a recent visit, the Chinese defense minister expressed concern over the 
possible Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment on the Korean Peninsula. 
In 2014, the Korean government made several reassurances to China that no agreement between 
Seoul and Washington existed on the issue. Furthermore, President Park assured President Xi 
Jinping during his visit in July 2014 that South Korea will not develop its own nuclear weapons 
or request U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the case that attempts to denuclearize North Korea 
fail. 
B. Remilitarization of Japan 
Unlike South Korea, Japan possesses enrichment and reprocessing facilities and weapon 
grade plutonium. Japan has amassed 47 tons of plutonium which could be used to make over 
6000 atomic bombs. Many of its neighbors are suspicious of Japan, and are certain that Prime 
Minister Abe is leading his nation down the path of nuclear armament. In August 2018, North 
Korea media accused Japan of stockpiling plutonium for the purpose of nuclear armament (Rich, 
2018). China and South Korea have also long objected to the Japanese stockpile of plutonium. 
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In South Korea, animosity and distrust toward Japan runs deep over historical and 
territorial issues. In a 2017 poll conducted by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 56.1% of 
South Koreans expressed an unfavorable view of Japan and 80.3% of South Koreans expressed 
an unfavorable view of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The poll represents the South Korean 
public‟s mistrust on the Abe administration‟s intention to remilitarize. Most South Koreans 
believe that the remilitarization of Japan is the first step toward nuclear armament, which would 
allow Japan to rearm itself with offensive weapons. They are convinced that Japan, with its 
weapon grade plutonium, is seeking the right moment to build nuclear weapons (Hayes and 
Moon, 2015).  
If Japan was to acquire nuclear weapons, most of South Koreans believe they need to 
acquire nuclear weapons as well. South Korea tends to be more concerned about the military 
capability of Japan than they are about North Korea‟s nuclear weapons development. In 2014 
South Korean senior official quoted that “South Korea wouldn‟t care how many nuclear weapons 
China acquires, or even if the North Koreans develop several more (nukes) … as long as Japan 
does not become nuclear!” (Lee, 2014). As animosity towards Japan runs deep within both the 
political and public spheres, Japan is considered as the primary regional competitor and rival of 
South Korea. South Korean security expert Scott Snyder (2010) also stated that, as long as Japan 
does not go nuclear, these animosities and mistrust toward Japan will not trigger South Korea to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
Many security experts and scholars argue that the next state to go nuclear in East Asia 
would most likely be South Korea (Moltz, 2006; C. Hughes, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 2016). This 
argument is based on the results of surveys and polls, which portray the majority of the Korean 
public supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, there is a trend of decline in the 
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public‟s support for nuclear weapons, even during times of security crisis. It is also important to 
note that the South Korean public understands the consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons. 
The Korean public realizes that the international community which has been pushing for 
nonproliferation and the U.S.-ROK alliance would not be easily compatible with indigenous 
nuclear weapons. Unlike Japan, South Korea does not possess enrichment or reprocessing 
facilities or weapon grade plutonium. Due to the formidable domestic and external barriers 
against nuclearization and declining support for nuclear weapons, it is highly unlikely that South 
Korea would emerge as a nuclear state in the foreseeable future.  
Policy Implication: Nuclear Energy Debates 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, a question that quickly surfaced in both 
political and public spheres was the necessity of nuclear power in South Korea. During the pre-
Fukushima era, nuclear energy was considered the ultimate energy source in South Korea 
because it was thought to be cheap, clean, and safe. Therefore, it was never seriously challenged 
or questioned within the nuclear policy arena of South Korea. Even the nuclear incidents at 
Three Mile Island in 1979, which ended the construction of new civilian nuclear reactors in the 
U.S., and Chernobyl in 1986, which limited the civilian nuclear programs in European states, 
hardly influenced the nuclear energy policies of South Korea. However, the Fukushima nuclear 
incident that almost happened in the backyard of South Korea was different from any other 
previous nuclear incidents. According to a public survey taken by Gallup by the request of the 
KNEF in 2012, only 34% of the Korean public considered nuclear power to be safe.
109
 This 
percentage was down from 61.1% in a 2009 survey (Kim, 2012). Furthermore, according to the 
KEEI survey of 2011, 70.5% of the Korean public opposed the new construction of power plants 
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near their neighborhood (Cha, 2012, p. 31). This is a significant increase from 45.8% in a 2009 
survey. As a consequence, in the post-Fukushima era, the public opinion and public trust of 
nuclear energy have dramatically shifted in South Korea. 
As the Lee administration tries to expand their overseas nuclear sales, the Fukushima 
incident was a hurdle but also an opportunity for the Lee administration to further penetrate the 
nuclear market overseas, especially replacing Japan as a new upcoming nuclear supplier in the 
world market. However, the Lee administration had to calm their domestic constituencies 
regarding the safety of nuclear power plants before they could focus on the overseas nuclear 
market. Thus, the most important change in South Korea‟s nuclear policy following the 
Fukushima nuclear incident was the establishment of the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission (NSSC) in 2011. Prior to the Fukushima nuclear incident, MEST was in charge of 
supervising both nuclear promotion and safety management. If MEST had authority over both 
regulation and utilization, which caused a conflict of interests between these two functions, 
NSSC was an independent agency with more autonomy to solely focus on auditing nuclear 
regulations. The South Korean leadership and the PNEC felt that it was the conflict of interests 
between regulation and utilization that resulted in the manmade disaster of Fukushima. Thus, the 
purpose of NSSC was to provide the necessary measures for the safety management of nuclear 
energy through an independent regulatory agency. The PNEC promoted that independent 
regulatory agency would strengthen the safety of nuclear reactors in South Korea.  
At the time of its establishment in 2011, the NSSC was reporting directly to President 
Lee Myung-bak, but the reporting line shifted to the office of the Prime Minister following the 
inauguration of President Park Geun-hye. NSSC consists of nine members including the 
chairperson. The chairperson is appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime 
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minister, while four members, including the secretary general, are appointed by the president on 
the recommendation of the chairperson. Out of the remaining four members of NSSC who are 
appointed by the president, two are recommended by the ruling party and the other two members 
are recommended by the opposition parties. In short, the seven members appointed to NSSC, 
including the chairperson and secretary general, most likely are aligned with the president‟s 
agenda. Thus, NSSC‟s decisions on important safety and regulatory issues related to nuclear 
facilities, such as the comprehensive safety plan for nuclear power plants, nuclear facilities, 
permits, approvals, and cancellations, follow the government‟s nuclear policy direction. In 
addition, the NSSC chairperson and committee members were chosen from those who graduated 
from KAIST and Seoul National University. The PNEC was able to strengthen its position 
within the nuclear policy arena by also dominating the nuclear regulatory agency.  
Even with a new independent regulatory agency in place, the corruption scandal of the 
KHNP started to rise within South Korea. A notable scandal was the Kori-1 power failure cover-
up incident in February 2012 that could have reproduced the manmade disaster of Fukushima. 
The twelve minute power outrage of Kori-1 during maintenance due to the old emergency diesel 
generator failing to kick in as a safeguard quickly increased the temperature of the coolant from 
36.9 degrees Celsius to 58.3 degrees Celsius (Yu, 2012). This could have led to a meltdown 
similar to the Fukushima incident. The KHNP concealed this incident to the public; however, the 
information was leaked to the public a month later. This scandal raises the transparency issue 
within the nuclear community.   
Since then multiple corruption scandals surfaced regarding the KHNP and the nuclear 
community. Rebates were often provided during the parts procurement process and the used 
parts were often sold again as new parts. However, the biggest corruption scandal was the cable 
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part procurement scandal in 2013. It was revealed that a cable manufacturer, authorities that 
verified the parts, and authorities that approved the parts were all involved in fabricating the test 
results of the cable that was supplied to the KHNP. These cables that were sold to and used by 
the KHNP were utilized to send power and control signals within the nuclear reactors, meaning 
that faulty cables could increase the possibility of disrupting power and control signals that could 
be detrimental during a crisis situation. As a result, 1,142km of cables in Shin Kori-3 and Shin 
Kori-4 were replaced. To prevent further corruptions in the nuclear industry, a Nuclear 
Regulation Act was established in December 2014 and put into effect in July 2015. This nuclear 
regulation act granted MOTIE similar regulatory power to monitor the nuclear industries as 
NSSC. Some nuclear experts argued that this weakened the regulatory power of NSSC and 
others have argued this was a waste of manpower and resources. Yet, the dominant argument in 
both political and public spheres is that this regulatory act has strengthened the regulatory 
functions and also increased transparency within the nuclear community.   
The fate of nuclear energy was furiously debated in the political sphere in 2012. The 19
th
 
National Assembly that was launched in early 2012 established two working research groups that 
dealt with the operation and regulation of nuclear energy. The possibility of phasing out nuclear 
energy was debated within the industry committee under the National Assembly. This led to 
presidential candidates making campaign promises on the nuclear issues during the 2012 
presidential debate. This was the first time that nuclear energy became a key platform for many 
presidential candidates. How to deal with aging nuclear power plants and the construction of new 
power plants became one of the focal points in the 2012 presidential election. The presidential 
candidate Moon Jae-in included a step-by-step process plan in his campaign platform which 
gradually decreases nuclear dependency to zero. The presidential candidate Park Geun-hye also 
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promised to put the safety of the nuclear reactor as her highest priority but was reluctant about 
reducing nuclear dependency (Kwon & Jun, 2015). The political debates and campaign promises 
eventually led to policy shifts regarding nuclear energy. 
Furthermore, if the majority of the public was in approval of either maintaining or 
expanding nuclear power prior to the Fukushima incident, in its aftermath, especially in 2015, 
according to the realmeter survey requested by the SBS, seven out of ten Koreans believed that 
there was no necessity for new construction of power plants and 65.7% of the respondents 
opposed any nuclear facility being built around their neighborhood. As nuclear safety and 
security issues became salient in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, political and public 
spheres rapidly coalesced around establishing new political coalitions with anti-nuclear agendas. 
With the backing of the public, the ANEC argued that nuclear power is not safe; therefore, South 
Korea must initiate an exit strategy for nuclear power. President Park Geun-hye did not provide 
an exit plan but took a step back, as promised during the presidential campaign, and readjusted 
and lowered the overall nuclear energy output to 29% from 41% the national energy plan that 
was set by the previous administration. In 2017, the Moon administration went a step further and 
reversed the policy which maximized nuclear energy outputs to a zero-nuclear policy. During the 
decommissioning ceremony of Kori-1, the first civilian nuclear reactor operated in South Korea, 
President Moon declared that “the permanent shut down of Kori No.1 is the first step on the path 
toward a nuclear-free country.” President Moon continued by saying that “[he] hope[s] we all 
will continue to build a new consensus on the national energy policy” (Remarks by President 
Moon Jae-in at a Ceremony Marking the Permanent Closure of the Kori No.1 Nuclear Reactor, 
2017).  
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In October 2017, President Moon promised to terminate all plans to build new nuclear 
power plants and not to extend the lifespan of existing nuclear power plants in a bid to phase out 
nuclear power by 2060. Even as the Moon administration tries to move away from nuclear 
energy, the PNEC is expected to receive government approval to start the operation of Shin Kori-
4, continue with the construction of two nuclear power plants Shin Hanul-1 and Shin Hanul-2, 
and expected to start the construction of Shin Kori-5 and Shin Kori-6 in 2023. The PNEC argued 
that the safety issue could be managed by improving regulations and by indeed making NSSC an 
independent regulatory agency. The PNEC continues to argue that constructing and operating 
nuclear power plants domestically is essential in promoting the sales of nuclear power plants 
overseas. Furthermore, the PNEC questions how they can make a sales pitch on nuclear energy 
when South Korea‟s domestic policy contradicts the promotion of nuclear energy. The PNEC 
also claims that all domestic companies that produce the parts for nuclear power plants would go 
bankrupt within three years, causing further problems for constructing nuclear power plants 
overseas.  
Unlike the domestic nuclear matter, the Moon administration highly promotes the sale of 
nuclear power plants overseas. As the Lee administration signed a $20 billion commercial 
nuclear reactor deal with the UAE in 2009, South Korea was ready to become a nuclear 
technology supplier and compete with other major players, such as the U.S., France, Japan, and 
Russia, on the nuclear energy market. Following in the footsteps of the previous administration, 
Park‟s administration has also strongly claimed that nuclear energy is the only viable option for 
energy independence. It has also contended that South Korea needs to be able to offer full fuel 
cycle services to be competitive with other major nuclear technology suppliers. Therefore, it is 
imperative that South Korea is able to proceed with uranium enrichment and reprocessing in the 
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near future. Even before taking her oaths to the office of the presidency, the president-elect in 
2013 requested the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell to ensure that uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel be added on as a provision to the U.S.-ROK civilian 
nuclear agreement known as agreement 123. After multiple rounds of negotiations, the U.S. and 
South Korea finally concluded the 123 agreement in April 2015. The new agreement does not 
allow the ROK to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, but also did not request South Korea to 
renounce its right to those technologies. 
Moreover, the agreement allowed ROK to reprocess spent fuel by a third-party in the 
future through consultation with the United States. Furthermore, U.S.-ROK agreed to conduct 
joint feasibility studies on pyroprocessing. Even though the government decided to phase out 
nuclear energy by 2060, the Moon administration continues to work on the pyroprocessing as it 
believes this technology is the future solution of nuclear waste management. As of 2018, there 
are 454 operable nuclear reactors and 54 nuclear power plants are under construction. Even 
though South Korea is gradually phasing out nuclear reactors domestically, the South Korean 
government believes that the nuclear renaissance will continue for many years to come. 
Therefore, South Korea expects the sales of nuclear power plants overseas will grow and will 
significantly contribute to economic prosperity in the coming years. 
Conclusion 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, the rise of China, and the decline of U.S. 
hegemony, the East Asian region has undergone significant military and economic power shifts. 
The arrival of North Korea as a nuclear power made an already volatile regional security 
environment even more volatile. However, the peaceful rise of China played a major role in 
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keeping South Korea from swaying from their export-oriented policies toward the global 
economy. The Fukushima incident was a huge hurdle for the South Korean nuclear industry 
domestically, but it was also an opportunity to further penetrate the nuclear market overseas. 
Domestically, the PNEC fought vigorously to maintain and expand the operation of nuclear 
power. The PNEC has faced a strong challenge from the ANEC over the utilization and 
construction of new power plants nationwide. At the end of 2018, the PNEC successfully 
convinced the government and public to continue with the construction of six new nuclear 
reactors, but failed to stop the government‟s policy to gradually phase out nuclear power by 2060.  
The South Korean nuclear orientation is maintaining the original position that it had prior 
to the Fukushima incident, but with different directives. In the post-Fukushima era, the 
interactions between the domestic coalitions within the nuclear policy arena resulted in five 
directives. The debate over safety and economy by the PNEC, the ANEC, and public opinion 
established three directives as follows: 1) Establish stricter nuclear regulations, 2) Minimize 
domestic nuclear energy output and gradually phase out nuclear energy, and 3) Maintain Nuclear 
Export Policy. The security debates and social norms for nuclear weapons established two 
directives as follows: 1) Maintaining the non-nuclear policy, and 2) Seeking other military 
options such as nuclear submarines.   
In the post-Fukushima era, nuclear policy changes occurred alongside policy preference 
shifts of domestic coalitions and social norms. The shift of social norms since the Fukushima 
incident reinforced the ideals of an anti-nuclear camp. Yet the geopolitical situation around the 
Korean Peninsula has escalated since 2006, as North Korea continued to conduct tests on nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems. Unlike previous scholarship that believed South Korea was the 
most likely state to go nuclear in East Asia, this study contends that the possibility of South 
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Korea going nuclear is very low as 1) South Korea, rather than pursuing their own indigenous 
ENR, is finding different ways to complete their fuel cycle and 2) the political leadership of 
South Korea since the 1990s has shown political inconsistency in regards to acquiring nuclear 
weapons or nuclear latency. Furthermore, support for nuclear weapons is declining in both the 
political and public spheres.  
Despite the downward trend, unlike Japan and Taiwan, public support for nuclear 
weapons remains above 50% in South Korea. In 2017, public support for nuclear weapons once 
more increased in South Korea, as South Korea worried about both abandonment and entrapment 
dilemma caused by President Trump. In late 2016, Presidential candidate Trump caused 
abandonment concerns by repeatedly attacking the alliance with South Korea as a “bad deal,” 
while suggesting that he may allow Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, President Trump caused entrapment concerns as well, as he unilaterally escalated 
rhetoric toward North Korea over the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
programs, which intensified already heightened geopolitical tensions. Thus, even though the 
Moon administration, a progressive administration, took the helm of the Blue House, the survey 
conducted in 2017 varies from 54% by relameter to 67% by EAI. Kenneth Waltz (2003) pointed 
out, this might be a cause for concern, as “no country has been able to prevent other countries 
from going nuclear if they were determined to do so” (p. 38). As public support carries weight in 
decision-making in South Korea, the international community needs to keep a close eye on the 
public support for nuclear weapons in South Korea.  
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Chapter 5 Taiwan 
Introduction 
Taiwan offers a compelling case for studies of nuclear proliferation. Unlike Japan and 
South Korea, Taiwan has not shown an ambition to become a top nuclear supplier or to build a 
robust civilian nuclear program. Furthermore, the nuclear weapons debate in both the political 
and public spheres has been almost non-existent since the abandonment of nuclear weapons in 
1988. This is quite remarkable since the Republic of China (known as Taiwan) faced constant 
political, economic, and military pressures from the People‟s Republic of China (PRC). In the 
aftermath of the presidential and legislative elections in 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen and the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) controlled both the Executive and Legislative Yuan. As 
President Tsai refused to embrace the „1992 consensus,‟ while promoting the independence of 
Taiwan, the tension began once again to escalate on the cross-strait relationship. Taiwanese 
Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan stated in the 2017 National Defense Report that increased 
military activity by the PRC near Taiwan posed an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan 
Strait” (“Chinese military drills pose „enormous threat‟ to Taiwan‟s security, warns Defense 
Minister,” 2017). Furthermore, China‟s rapid military modernization and buildup in recent years 
have raised the concern that the cross-strait military balance has shifted in China‟s favor (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense 2018, p. 10; Ministry of National Defense, 2018 p. 36). 
On the other hand, Taiwan experienced a period of high economic development known as 
the Taiwanese Miracle throughout the 1970s to the 1990s. According to the IMF 2016 Outlook, 
Taiwan‟s economy is the 22nd largest economy in the world. Rising demand for energy has 
accompanied this remarkable economic growth and structural transformation in Taiwan. Since 
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the establishment of ROC, the leadership of Taiwan pursued energy sovereignty; yet, according 
to the 2017 Energy Statistic Handbook, Taiwan still imported approximately 98% of its energy 
resources to either generate electricity or consume raw (Bureau of Energy, MOEA, 2018, p. 2). 
As Taiwan moves towards being free of nuclear power by 2025, the output of nuclear energy in 
the total energy mix has been declining. In 2017 the output of nuclear energy was 4.43% of the 
total energy mix of Taiwan (Bureau of Energy, MOEA, 2018, p. 2). Prior to the Fukushima 
incident, the political and public spheres of Taiwan were evenly split between the pro- and the 
anti-nuclear energy camps. This clearly represented the dilemma faced by Taiwan: energy 
sovereignty or a nuclear free Taiwan? However, the balance between the pro- and the anti-
nuclear energy camps was broken in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. In recent years, 
Taiwan has experienced a policy consensus on the subject of nuclear energy. The debate over 
nuclear power quickly came to an end in 2016 as President Tsai and the DPP proposed a 
substantive plan to make Taiwan “nuclear power free” by 2025. If Taiwan successfully 
decommissions all of its civilian nuclear reactors by 2025, it would reinforce a strong recent 
tendency in Taiwan to choose paths of future energy development that do not involve nuclear 
power and also remove any possibility for a revival of the nuclear weapons program in Taiwan. 
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially during the period of 
martial law, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) have dominated 
within the nuclear policy arena of Taiwan with limited political competition. The dominance of 
certain coalitions within the nuclear policy arena strongly influenced the decision making of 
Taiwan‟s nuclear policy. The Taiwan nuclear or atomic period can be categorized into three 
phases: 1) the period of martial law which was dominated by the military dictatorship (pro-
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons), 2) the post martial law era to the post-Fukushima era 
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which was dominated by the pro-nuclear energy coalition while seriously challenged by the anti-
nuclear energy coalition, and 3) the post-Fukushima era where anti-nuclear energy coalition has 
dominated within the nuclear policy arena of Taiwan [See Figure 5.1]. 
Figure 5.1: The Nuclear Decision-Making Process of Taiwan Based on Three Phases 
    
How have these changing international and domestic conditions affected the debate 
within the nuclear policy arena of Taiwan? How has this changing debate influenced the nuclear 
orientation of Taiwan toward nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? Furthermore, what is the 
likelihood that Taiwan will reverse its non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming years? In 
addressing these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, it will examine the nuclear 
debate and the resulting policy consensus that existed prior to the March 2011 Fukushima 
disaster. Second, this chapter will examine how the nuclear debate within the nuclear policy 
arena of Taiwan changed after the Fukushima incident. Finally, it will analyze how changing 
debates and political competitions within the nuclear policy arena have affected the nuclear 
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decision-making and nuclear orientation of Taiwan by focusing on key challenges in the 
economy, safety, security, and social norms. 
Period of Martial Law and Nuclear Program 
In 1949 Nationalist forces, led by General Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by Chinese 
communists, retreated to the Formosa and established the Republic of China (ROC or known as 
Taiwan). The ROC central government relocated to Taiwan in December 1949. Since the 
imposition of martial law in Taiwan in 1949, the formation of new political parties was 
prohibited except the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Youth Party (CYP) and the China 
Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP).
110
 The KMT was the sole ruling party of Taiwan from 1949 
to 2000. As Chiang Kai-shek resumed office as the President of the ROC in March 1950, the 
Chiang administration faced an overwhelming external military threat from China (Albright & 
Gay, 1998; Mitchell, 2004; Wang, 2007; Solingen, 2007; Bullard & Yuan, 2010).
111
 
Domestically, President Chiang faced challenges to develop Taiwan‟s economy and 
infrastructure necessary for regime survival, mainly to appease the native Taiwanese (Roy, 2003, 
p. 77; Solingen, 2007, p. 109). 
The Chiang administration addressed the internal challenge of ensuring economic growth 
via an export-oriented economy which highly depended on international trade and foreign direct 
investment. The Chiang administration and the KMT controlled all its bureaucracies including 
state-owned enterprises and oversaw the economic growth known as the Taiwanese Miracle. 
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 CYP and CDSP retreated to Taiwan with the KMT when the Nationalist force lost to the Chinese communists in 
1949. However, CYP and CDSP failed to gain elected representation after Taiwan's democratic transition in the 
1990s. 
111
 Taiwan was under the authoritarian rule under President Chiang Kai-shek until his death in 1975. 
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From 1952 to 1982, economic growth of Taiwan averaged nine percent annually (Hsiao, 2018). 
Growing demand for energy has accompanied this astonishing economic growth and structural 
transformation. The Chiang administration launched nuclear energy research to resolve the 
energy problem and serve as the cornerstone of Taiwan‟s economy; yet, silently, Taiwan also 
sought nuclear weapons programs as a long-term national objective. Taiwan‟s nuclear program 
began in 1955 as the ROC signed an agreement on cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy 
with the United States. In 1955, the Chiang administration also established an Atomic Energy 
Council (AEC) to domesticate and oversee basic research of nuclear technology. Taiwan opened 
its first nuclear reactor at National Tsinghua University in 1956. In the 1970s, the state-owned 
Taiwan Power Company (TaiPower) began to construct nuclear power plants as part of the “Ten 
Major Development Projects” to strengthen Taiwan economically in time of oil crisis (Ho, 2014, 
p. 968). 
The construction of the first nuclear power plant at Jinshan started in November 1970 and 
went into operation in 1978. The construction of the second nuclear power plant began in 
September 1974. The construction of the third nuclear power plant started in January 1978. All 
six reactors currently in operation were constructed in the 1970s. Similar to Japan and South 
Korea, the pro-nuclear energy coalitions quickly coalesced around the idea of energy 
independence. The Taiwan government, which was dominated by President Chiang Kai-shek and 
the KMT, formed a solid PNEC together with the Taiwan ministries in control of nuclear policy 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Atomic Energy Council), nationalized utility company 
(Taiwan Power Company or TaiPower), and the financial sector including the Bank of Taiwan 
and major businesses. Similar to Japan‟s nuclear village, the technocrats, a close-knit group of 
scientists that are linked by school ties and hometown, started to dictate both public and private 
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nuclear related institutions in Taiwan. The Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science at 
National Tsinghua University is the only place in Taiwan that trains nuclear engineers. Therefore, 
nuclear experts from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which regulates the industry, and the 
AEC, which is in charge of safety inspections, are mostly graduates of Tsinghua University (Kim 
& Chung, 2018). Since the 1970s, the AEC and Taipower officials, together with state-sponsored 
nuclear researchers, have been Taiwan‟s nuclear energy advocates, who continuously promoted 
the cheap, clean, and safe traits of nuclear power (Ho, 2014). 
Figure 5.2: Taiwan Pre-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
                   
On the other hand, Taiwan countered the military threat from China by increasing its 
military capability through buildup and modernization while seeking military protection from the 
United States. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of 
China was signed on December 2, 1954, and came into effect on March 3, 1955. During the 
1950s to the 1970s, military tensions between Taiwan and China were extremely high. The ROC 
and PRC had several skirmishes along the Taiwan Strait which ended in two crises in the 1950s 
(Hsiao, 2018). Tension across the Taiwan Strait reached its peak in the late 1970s as the United 
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States prepared to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China. The surprise Sino-
American rapprochement of 1971-1972 and the signing of the Shanghai communiqué in 1972 
without notifying Taiwan came as a shock to President Chiang. In response to growing security 
anxiety, Taiwan decided to develop nuclear weapons covertly. 
Taiwan did not launch a full-scale nuclear weapons program until China successfully 
conducted the first nuclear weapons test in 1964. The Chiang administration formally requested a 
bombardment of the PRC‟s nuclear installation to the United States. As the Johnson 
administration turned down the request, Taiwan began to operate a $140 million clandestine 
nuclear weapons program at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology in 1967 
(Mitchell, 2004, p. 296; Solingen, 2007). The nuclear weapons program was named the “Hsin 
Chu” project. As President Chiang decided to move on with the development of nuclear weapons 
in 1967, the pro-nuclear weapon coalition (PNWC) quickly coalesced around the idea of nuclear 
sovereignty. The PNWC was only comprised of President Chiang and small members of his 
cabinet, including his son Chiang Ching-kuo, as the entire program was maintained with utmost 
secrecy. Under martial law, the media and public and private intuitions were heavily censored by 
the Chiang administration and the KMT until the late 1980s (Roy, 2003). Under these conditions, 
the clandestine nuclear program was launched in the late 1960s. 
The Hsin Chu project involved procuring and operating a heavy water reactor, a heavy-
water production plant, a reprocessing research lab, and a plutonium separation plant (Mitchell, 
2004, p. 297). The procurement of nuclear facilities and materials were all carried out within the 
legal boundaries of international obligations. In 1973, a heavy water research reactor, which the 
Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) procured from Canada, went into operation 
(Bullard and Yuan, 2010). The program had procured heavy water from the United States and 
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uranium from South Africa. Since the development of nuclear weapons, Taiwan‟s clandestine 
nuclear weapons program seemed successful. Yet, the plan to develop nuclear weapons came to 
a sudden halt, as India conducted its peaceful nuclear explosive test of 1974. The Indian peaceful 
nuclear explosive test showed that civilian nuclear programs could be easily diverted into 
building nuclear weapons. In 1974 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that Taiwan 
was working toward a nuclear weapon capability and would be able to develop indigenous 
nuclear weapons within five years (Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 4-1-
74, ‟Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1974, p. 26-27). Thus, the United 
States tried to halt all sales related to nuclear energy to Taiwan because the United States felt that 
these nuclear technologies could be easily utilized by Taiwan to build nuclear weapons. 
Although Taiwan denied that the nuclear weapons program existed, new President Chiang 
Ching-kuo, in September 1976, promised to the United States that Taiwan would not acquire its 
own enrichment and reprocessing facilities (Mitchell, 2004, p. 299).   
President Chiang Ching-kuo‟s feeling of insecurity increased as the United States and 
China officially established diplomatic relations. The United States terminated diplomatic 
relations and a mutual defense treaty of 25 years with the ROC in 1979. However, the United 
States continued to protect the island of Taiwan via the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which was 
signed into law on April 10, 1979. In 1987 INER reinitiated nuclear weapons program by 
building multiple hot cell facilities.
112
 However, the nuclear weapons program in Taiwan only 
lasted a year, as Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, the deputy director of INER and a CIA asset, defected 
to the United States with top-secret documents regarding Taiwan‟s nuclear weapons program in 
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 Hot cell facility is used to chemically extract plutonium from spent fuel. 
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1988. At the time of Colonel Chang‟s defection, Taiwan is thought to have been just one or two 
years away from a bomb (Wiener, 1997).  
President Chiang Ching-kuo in the late 1970s slowly started the liberalization process in 
Taiwan. President Chiang allowed opposition parties to be created in 1986. In the following year, 
the Chiang administration finally lifted the martial law that was in place since 1949, paving the 
way for Taiwan‟s democratization (Schafferer, 2001; Roy, 2003). Under these liberalizing 
circumstances, unlike in the 1970s to the early 1980s, the risks of exposure of the covert nuclear 
weapons program seemed much higher. As martial law was lifted in 1987 and President Chiang 
Ching-kuo died in 1988, Taiwan finally renounced its nuclear weapons program. The only time 
since 1988 when a high ranking official of Taiwan discussed the possibility of nuclear weapons 
was when President Lee Teng-hui told the Legislative Yuan, in the aftermath of the PRC's 
missile exercise near Taiwan's water, that "[Taiwan] should restudy the question [of nuclear 
weapons] from a long term point of view" (Albright & Gay, 1998). Taiwan's Foreign Minister 
Fredrick Chien promptly issued a denial that Taiwan had any intention of developing nuclear 
weapons (Lin, 1995, p. 13). This position was reiterated by then Defense Minister Tang Fei on 
January 5, 2000, when he claimed that “[Taiwan] would never develop nuclear arms” (Lai, 2000). 
In 2016, the Ministry of National Defense released a statement, in response to the U.S. magazine 
article that revealed Taiwan‟s nuclear program in the 1970s, which stated that “Taiwan has 
clearly declared that its military will act in accordance with international conventions and 
government policies, and will not produce, develop, acquire, store or use nuclear weapons” (Lu 
& Chen, 2016). Since the abandonment of the nuclear weapons program in 1988, there has been 
a normative change in Taiwan‟s nuclear research. Taiwan‟s pursuit of nuclear technology has 
been limited to peaceful usage. 
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Post Martial Law and the Pre-Fukushima Era 
A. The pursuit of nuclear energy  
As Taiwan gave up its nuclear weapons program in 1988, there has been no indication 
that Taiwan is revisiting the decision to develop nuclear weapons. As President Chiang Kai-shek 
died in 1975, the power was transfer to his son President Chiang Ching-kuo who became the 
president from 1978 to 1988. President Chiang Ching-kuo in the late 1970s slowly started the 
liberalization process in Taiwan. President Chiang allowed opposition parties to be created in 
1986. In the following year, the Chiang administration finally lifted the martial law that was in 
place since 1949, paving the way for Taiwan‟s democratization. As the first direct presidential 
election occurred in 1996, Taiwan completed its transition to democracy. 
The PNEC enjoyed the protection of the KMT throughout the 1970s to the 1990s. The 
administration of the KMT ensured the continuation of pro-nuclear energy policy to prevail 
within the nuclear policy arena (Hsu, 1995; Hsiao, 1999; Ho, 2014; Kim & Chung, 2018). 
Throughout this period the business community heavily relied on the provision of stable energy; 
therefore, it was very supportive of the government‟s nuclear industry. Under the guidance of the 
KMT, major business leaders supported a pro-nuclear petition which was presented in the 
Legislative Yuan during the review of the fourth nuclear power plant in 1994 (Ho, 2014, p. 968). 
In the mid-1990s, Taiwan deregulated the electric power market and financial sector, ending 50 
years of a government monopoly. The deregulation allowed independent power providers and 
cogeneration plants to sell electricity to TaiPower (Hsu & Chen, 1997, p. 247; Ho, 2014, p. 968). 
The deregulation allowed major businesses in Taiwan to enter the electricity market as 
independent power providers, making them energy producers rather than energy consumers. The 
deregulation of the financial market in 1991 also allowed major businesses to enter the financial 
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market. Within the year of deregulation, 15 new private commercial banks entered the financial 
market (Shih, 1996, p. 127). The deregulation in both the financial and energy markets reduced 
private corporations‟ dependence on the state.  
Consequently, major businesses started to change their perspective toward nuclear energy. 
Throughout the late 1970s to the1990s, the controversial fourth nuclear power plant seemed 
crucial for major businesses. In the aftermath of the liberalization of the electricity market, the 
construction of the fourth nuclear power plant was an obstacle to their independent power 
businesses. As a result, the Formosa Plastic Group, the largest independent power provider in 
Taiwan, openly recommended that the government abandon the construction of the fourth 
nuclear power plant (Ho, 2014, p. 970). In the post martial law period, the fourth nuclear power 
plant at Lungmen, which was first proposed in 1978, became a hotly contested nuclear issue in 
both the political and public spheres. Despite the efforts to stop the construction in both the 
political and public spheres, the Lee administration and KMT were able to initiate the 
construction of two nuclear reactors at Lungmen, near Taipei in 1999 (Lassen, 2000; Ho, 2018). 
As the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established in 1986, an anti-nuclear 
clause was embedded in the DPP‟s charter (Ho, 2014). With the forming of the DPP, the anti-
nuclear movement also gained momentum within the political sphere. If the Anti-Nuclear Energy 
Coalition (ANEC) was comprised of local NGOs and academics during the martial law era, the 
ANEC quickly coalesced around the political backing of the DPP in the post martial law era. 
With the backing of the DPP, the anti-nuclear movement gained more traction and organized into 
a nationwide movement. The history of the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan goes back to the 
early 1980s when the public discovered that the construction of the third nuclear power plant at 
Maanshan would cost Taiwan more than double the approved budget. Furthermore, a series of 
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corruption scandals, 30 scandals in 1984 within the nuclear industry, also pushed the anti-nuclear 
energy movement in Taiwan in the 1980s (Lee, 2011, p. 166; Ho, 2014). The explosion of the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant provided further motivation to Taiwan‟s emerging anti-nuclear 
movement in 1986. During the 2000 presidential election, the DPP presidential candidate, Chen 
Shui-bian, promised to halt the construction of the two reactors at Lungmen. 
On October 27, 2000, Taiwan Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced that the Executive 
Yuan (Taiwan‟s cabinet) has decided to cancel the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant 
at Lungmen. One of the reasons for abandoning the project was safety concerns. It was noted that 
any nuclear accident would put entire Taiwan at high risk because of the island‟s small size. The 
opposition parties, led by the KMT, vigorously opposed the cancellation of the fourth nuclear 
power plant. The opposition parties stated that the announcement to halt the construction by 
Premier Chang was unconstitutional and illegal (Low, 2000). Furthermore, in January 2001, 
Taiwan‟s highest court, the Council of Grand Justice ruled that the Executive Yuan acted 
inappropriately when it halted the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant (Guyot, 2001). 
Under the increasing pressures from both political, Legislative and Judicial Yuan, and public 
spheres, the public and the business community, President Chen decided to take a step back. On 
February 14, 2001, the Chen administration, four months after Premier Chang made a 
cancellation announcement, had to rescind its order to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear 
power plant.  
On the other hand, the DPP claimed a small victory from taking a step back from halting 
the construction. From the negotiation with the KMT, the Chen administration obtained the 
KMT‟s endorsement of a nuclear free homeland as the eventual goal of Taiwan. A nuclear free 
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homeland was later written into the Basic Environment Act in 2002. The Chen administration 
also established the Nuclear-Free Homeland Communication Committee to raise public 
awareness of nuclear risk (Ho, 2005, 2014). The DPP also promised to legalize the referendum 
as a valid decision-making procedure so that the public can decide the future of the nuclear 
power plants.  
However, as the economic take a downturn in Taiwan, the DPP had to shift its attention 
from nuclear power plants to promoting economic growth. During the 2004 presidential election, 
the Chen administration stayed away from nuclear energy and focused their attention on the 
national defense and cross-strait relations to win the re-election bid. During the second term in 
office, President Chen decided not to make a similar mistake he made in his first term, as the 
Chen administration suffered political backlash and a setback when KMT-led opposition utilized 
parliamentary majority to boycott the government. Thus, the anti-nuclear movement was 
shunned by the DPP, as the Chen administration maintained the course of building the fourth 
nuclear power plant by approving an additional budget for the construction in 2004 and 2006. 
This exposed the limitation of the anti-nuclear movement without the political backing from the 
DPP. The ANEC was unable to make any progress when they have failed to obtain political 
backing from the DPP (Ho, 2003). Since then, the ANEC has become increasingly disenchanted 
with party politics (Shih, 2012). 
Post-Fukushima Era 
On the eve of March 11, 2011, there were six nuclear reactors in operation in Taiwan 
producing approximately 11% of the country‟s electric power (“New nuclear energy policy for 
Taiwan,” 2011). According to the survey conducted by the DPP in the aftermath of the 
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Fukushima incident, 57.2 percent of the Taiwan general public supported a halt to the 
development of nuclear energy in 2011(Wang, 2013a). The Fukushima incident is considered a 
turning point for Taiwan‟s policy consensus on the subject of nuclear energy, as it reignited the 
debate nationwide over the continued use of nuclear power in Taiwan. If the pre-Fukushima era 
was dominated by the PNEC, while seriously confronted by the ANEC, Taiwan‟s nuclear 
orientation is currently tilting toward a zero-nuclear policy as the ANEC has dominated within 
the nuclear policy arena in the post-Fukushima era. Several nuclear policy changes occurred 
alongside the policy preference shift by domestic coalitions and social norms in the post-
Fukushima era, as shown in Figure 5.3. As the myth about nuclear safety was shattered, shown in 
Figure 5.3, the most significant shift of nuclear policy preference occurred in the realm of the 
social norm. The general public support shifted from the pro-nuclear energy camp to the anti-
nuclear energy camp. Even though the shared goal of all members of the ANEC is zero-nuclear 
energy, the newly joined members of the ANEC prefer the more moderate policy shift of 
gradually phasing out nuclear energy over the immediate zero-nuclear energy policy. 
Figure 5.3: Nuclear Policy Preference of Domestic Coalitions in Pre- and Post-Fukushima Era 
    
 
 
210 
 
The most noteworthy policy change in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident was not 
to extend the life of three nuclear power plants in Taiwan. The Ma administration decided not to 
operate Jinshan, Kuosheng and Maanshan nuclear power plants beyond their planned 40-year 
lives. This new policy was in line with Article 23 of the Basic Environment Act that would 
eventually see Taiwan become nuclear free (“New nuclear energy policy for Taiwan,” 2011). 
However, despite public concerns over the safety of power plants, President Ma stated that there 
is no need to shut down the three nuclear power plants (Li & Wu, 2011). The Ma administration 
argued that the safety issue could be managed by improving the regulation. President Ma also 
promised that the fourth nuclear power plant being built at Lungmen would not begin its 
operation until all safety requirements are met.  
Given the shock of Fukushima, safety has gained more prominence within the nuclear 
policy arena. In short, while economic performance is still a major factor, it is not the only factor 
that should be considered by the decision-makers of Taiwan. In the post-Fukushima era, political 
coalitions such as PNEC and ANEC tried to solidify their agendas on the economy and safety to 
compete within the nuclear policy arena of Taiwan. The changing debates and political 
competition (interplay between political coalitions) within the nuclear policy arena will be 
examined and international and domestic conditions will be filtered through the lenses of two 
coalitions (pro-nuclear energy, and anti-nuclear energy) in order to determine the nuclear 
orientation of Taiwan. From this point on, as shown in Figure 5.6, the next section will cover the 
changes from the perspectives of pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, which occurred on Taiwan‟s 
nuclear spectrum in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. 
 
 
 
211 
 
Figure 5.4: Taiwan‟s Post-Fukushima Nuclear Energy and Weapons Spectrum 
                                   
A. Anti-Nuclear Energy Coalition (ANEC) 
In the post-Fukushima era, the voice of the ANEC was reinforced within the nuclear 
policy arena of Taiwan. The ANEC quickly gained momentum in the nuclear policy arena and 
became the dominant power in the nuclear policy decision-making process. Over the years, the 
ANEC has been emphasizing the catastrophic risks of nuclear energy, which was overlooked by 
the PNEC and pro-nuclear government, especially under the KMT. The Fukushima incident 
allowed the ANEC to solidify nationwide legitimacy beyond the core members of the anti-
nuclear movement in Taiwan. In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the World Nuclear 
Association listed all of Taiwan‟s nuclear reactors as among the most vulnerable in the world. 
The ANEC‟s conviction was fortified that nuclear power plants are vulnerable to natural 
disasters and safety cannot be guaranteed through stricter regulations (Chan & Chen, 2011, p. 
404). Thus, the ANEC advocates a path towards a zero nuclear energy policy; therefore, they 
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would like to either phase out nuclear power gradually or totally decommission all nuclear 
reactors in Taiwan. 
The ANEC was the largest benefactor of the Fukushima incident. Following the disaster, 
the largest opposition party, the DPP once again went on the offensive to stop the construction of 
the fourth nuclear power plant at Lungmen. The Fukushima incident reinvigorated strong 
political backings of the DPP against the fourth nuclear power plant and for the nuclear free 
Taiwan initiative. The ANEC has attracted more attention from the general public across the 
country than ever before. The Fukushima incident resulted in a broadening of its support base. 
Citizen organizations such as the Mothers‟ Alliance for Monitoring Nuclear Power Plants, led by 
professional women, and the Five Six Movement, led by a group of writers, film directors, and 
entertainers, were established in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster (Ho, 2018). 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, the KMT was also partially 
divided on the issue of nuclear energy policy. As the Ma administration gave in to overwhelming 
protest in 2014 and reversed the government policy to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear 
power plant, a group of politicians within the KMT defected to the anti-nuclear energy camp. By 
the 2016 presidential election, the KMT joined the DPP on the anti-nuclear energy agenda as its 
presidential candidate Eric Chu promised on his campaign platform to phase out nuclear energy. 
As a result, both the DPP, a ruling party, and the KMT, an opposition party, in Taiwan supported 
the agenda of the ANEC to free Taiwan from nuclear energy by 2025. 
B. Pro Nuclear Energy Coalition (PNEC) 
If the competition within the nuclear policy arena were a zero-sum game, then the PNEC 
would have been the biggest loser in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. In particular, the 
KMT, the ruling party, defected to join the DPP to phase out nuclear energy by 2025. The 
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general public also quickly turned away from the pro-nuclear energy to support the anti-nuclear 
energy movement. Even after the KMT candidate Eric Chu promised to phase out nuclear energy, 
the KMT lost the 2016 presidential and legislative election to the DPP. As a result, both the 
Office of the President and the Legislative Yuan fell under the control of the DPP. For the first 
time, the PNEC lost all of the political and public backings it had enjoyed since the 1970s. In 
2017 the existence of the PNEC was threatened when Taiwan‟s Legislative Yuan passed an 
amendment to the Electricity Act, which stipulated a policy of a nuclear free homeland by 2025. 
This plan allows all operating nuclear reactors to be decommissioned by 2025 and permanently 
suspended the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant at Lungmen. Furthermore, the 
PNEC had difficulty in mobilizing support from the business community. More and more major 
businesses, such as Eva Air and the Fubon Financial Group, voiced their opposition to the fourth 
nuclear power plant (Ho, 2014).  
However, the bad fortune of the PNEC started to overturn as Taiwan started to 
experience an electricity shortage and a rise in electricity prices. As the summer of 2018 
approached, Taiwan suffered a nationwide power outage. On August 15, 2018, Taiwan suffered 
its worst power outage as 6.68 million households were left in the dark (Liao & Ko, 2018). This 
quickly shifted some of the public opinions back to supporting nuclear e nergy. The political 
sphere also experienced a shift as the majority of the KMT moved back to the pro-nuclear energy 
camp. Former President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT called on the public to support the pro-
nuclear referendum proposals which would repeal the government‟s policy of halting the fourth 
nuclear power plant and making Taiwan a nuclear-free homeland by 2025 (Shih, 2018). In the 
aftermath of the electricity shortage, the PNEC called for a referendum to repeal the first 
paragraph of Article 95 of the Electricity Act. On November 24, 2018, Taiwan received the 
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unexpected result, as the majority of voters cast their votes in favor of abolishing the provision 
that all “nuclear-energy-based power-generating facilities shall wholly stop running by 2025.” 
This was a small victory for the PNEC against the DPP and the ANEC. In the aftermath of the 
referendum, the president aspirant Eric Chu of the KMT also claimed that “[he] would be willing 
to restart the fourth nuclear power plant” (Yeh, Wang, Yu, & Hsu, 2019). As Taiwan is getting 
ready for the 2020 presidential election, the nuclear debate over the fourth power plant at 
Lungmen is about to start all over again. 
Policy Implication: Nuclear Energy Debates 
The Fukushima incident in 2011 quickly reinitiated the nationwide debate over the 
continued utilization of nuclear power in Taiwan and the construction of the fourth power plant. 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, both the political and public spheres have been 
discussing whether a nuclear disaster similar to Fukushima could occur in Taiwan. The day after 
the Fukushima incident, the AEC deputy director stated, “Taiwan‟s nuclear power plants are like 
the Sea Goddess sitting on unshakable rocks” (Chan & Chen, 2011, 404-405). President Ma 
stated during his visit to the AEC a few days later that there was no need to halt operations at 
Taiwan‟s three nuclear power plants despite public concerns over the growing nuclear crisis in 
Japan. Furthermore, President Ma stated that “to suspend the operations of the second and the 
third plants, it would have to be because of serious risks” (Li & Wu, 2011). However, the AEC‟s 
and President Ma‟s position on the safety of nuclear power plant was quickly overturned as the 
World Nuclear Association published a report which outlined the vulnerability of nuclear power 
plants in Taiwan. The nuclear power plants in Jinshan and Kuosheng had been ranked as the 
most dangerous nuclear power plants in the world (Butler, 2011). The news on the vulnerability 
 
 
215 
 
of power plants in Taiwan was headlined in the two most widely circulated newspapers in 
Taiwan, Liberty Times and Apple Daily, and was reported 24/7 by several news channels.   
In the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, there have been multiple studies on what 
could happen to Taiwan if a similar incident as that of the Fukushima incident occurs in Taiwan. 
(Butler, 2011; Chan & Chen, 2011; Tang, Tsuang, & Kuo, 2016). Nuclear safety issues were 
raised quickly in Taiwan, as approximately 10 million people are living within a 30-kilometer 
radius of Jinshan and Kuosheng power plants in northern Taiwan (Chao, 2011).
113
 It would be a 
disaster to relocate about half of the country‟s population. Furthermore, if a nuclear incident 
occurs between May and September, when the wind is blowing toward the southwest, there is no 
place to hide within Taiwan from the nuclear fallout. This is because most of the population lives 
on the coastal plain along the western part of the island. Political competition between domestic 
coalitions within the nuclear policy arena and public interests on the subject of nuclear energy 
has reached an all-time high. The Ma administration quickly responded by making promises to 
improve the safety of power plants. The Ma administration also decided not to operate Jinshan, 
Kuosheng and Maanshan nuclear power plants beyond their planned 40-year lives. This new 
policy was in line with Article 23 of the Basic Environment Act that would eventually see 
Taiwan become nuclear free (“New nuclear energy policy for Taiwan,” 2011). Following the 
disaster, the AEC initiated a comprehensive nuclear safety review. Since Taiwan is vulnerable to 
seismic activities, the AEC also strengthened its radiation protection capacity and contingency 
mechanisms. After one year of review, the AEC reported that inspections found no safety 
concerns with the six operating nuclear reactors.  
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 During the 2011 Fukushima incident, the residents living within the 30 kilometer radius of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant were forced to leave the area.  
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 However, in August 2011, the vice-chairperson of the AEC resigned over his 
disapproval concerning the safety of the fourth nuclear power plant. Furthermore, Lin Tsung-yao, 
another AEC expert, who headed an official commission to evaluate the fourth nuclear power 
plant, also resigned in 2013 as the Ma administration ignored his concerns regarding the safety of 
the fourth power plant. The defection of technocrats, who were in charge of the safety and 
regulation of nuclear power in Taiwan, lent legitimacy to the ANEC (Ho, 2014). 
In the aftermath of Fukushima, the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant became one of 
the most debated issues in both the public and political spheres. According to the survey 
conducted by Taiwan Thinktank in 2013, more than 80% of the public showed concern that a 
nuclear disaster could happen in Taiwan. Furthermore, the survey also reported that 71.6% of the 
public opposed the construction of the Lungmen power plant, even if electricity prices could 
increase by 10% (Wang, 2013b). The nuclear debate over the fourth nuclear power plant 
intensified within the Legislative Yuan as nuclear power became more controversial in both the 
political and public spheres. In February 2013, Premier Jiang Yi-huah announced that a national 
referendum would be initiated to decide whether to scrap the fourth nuclear power plant. This 
was an unorthodox move by Premier Jiang and the KMT, as the KMT did not typically favor 
referendums. The referendum was considered as a political tool that was commonly utilized by 
the DPP to confront the KMT (Ho, 2014). In response to the KMT‟s referendum proposal, over 
200,000 people turned up for the anti-nuclear demonstration in the street of Taipei, Kaohsiung, 
Taichung, and Taitung. This was the most massive protests since President Ma took office in 
2008. In regards to the protest, Lin Hung-chih, deputy secretary-general of the KMT stated that 
“Taiwan cannot afford to hold back on nuclear power, especially for industrial use, as long as the 
island lacks other energy sources” (Jennings, 2013). However, as anti-nuclear demonstrations 
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continued to attract a large number of participants throughout the second term of President Ma of 
the KMT, he was forced to reverse the government‟s policy and stop the construction of the 
fourth nuclear power plant in 2014.  
As President Ma decided to stall the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in 
2014, Taiwan was already in a preparation mode for the 2016 general and presidential election. 
The presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP campaigned for a nuclear free homeland by 
2025. By 2015, the KMT joined the DPP on the anti-nuclear energy agenda as its presidential 
candidate Eric Chu promised on his campaign platform to phase out nuclear energy. However, 
the KMT suffered a landslide defeat in both the general and presidential elections in January 
2016. For the first time, the DPP captured both the presidency and the Legislative Yuan. On 
March 11, 2016, the DPP reiterated its commitment to the nuclear free homeland by 2025 when 
it becomes the ruling party in May. As a result, in 2017 both the DPP, a ruling party, and the 
KMT, an opposition party, in Taiwan supported an end to the nuclear energy by 2025. The Tsai 
administration proposed a plan which would involve decommissioning all nuclear power plants 
by 2025, exploring alternative renewable energy sources, and liberalizing the electricity industry. 
In January 2017, Taiwan‟s Legislative Yuan passed an amendment to the Electricity Act, which 
stipulated a policy of a “nuclear free homeland by 2025” in Article 95 of the Electricity Act. The 
first paragraph of Article 95 claims that “the nuclear-energy-based power-generating facilities 
shall wholly stop running by 2025.”114 Furthermore, the plan suspended the construction of the 
fourth nuclear power plant in Lungmen and discontinued the renewal license to operate Taiwan‟s 
active nuclear power plants. By mid-2017, everything was in place to gradually phase out 
nuclear power from Taiwan‟s energy mix. Starting with the decommissioning of the power plant 
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at Jinshan in December 2018, Kuosheng and Maanshan power plants would eventually 
decommission by 2025 when their license to operate expires. 
However, the good fortune of the ANEC was challenged by the PNEC as Taiwan started 
to experience an electricity shortage and a rise in electricity prices. In the summer of 2017, 
Taiwan suffered multiple nationwide power outages. On August 15, 2017, Taiwan suffered its 
worst power outage as 6.68 million households were left in the dark (Liao & Ko, 2018). This 
quickly shifted some of the public opinions back to supporting nuclear energy. As Power outage 
continued throughout 2017-2018, the political sphere also experienced a shift with the majority 
of the KMT returning to the pro-nuclear energy camp. Former President Ma Ying-jeou of the 
KMT called on the public to support the pro-nuclear referendum to restart the fourth nuclear 
power plant (Shih, 2018). On May 30, 2018, power outage occurred at Miaoli County and 
Taichung leaving more than 70,000 households without electricity. In the aftermath of the 
electricity shortage, the PNEC successfully called for a referendum to repeal the first paragraph 
of Article 95 of the Electricity Act. The two referendum proposals were initiated by Huang Shih-
hsiu, a founder of Nuclear MythBusters, to overturn the government's policy of scrapping the 
fourth nuclear power plant and making Taiwan a nuclear-free homeland by 2025 (Chen & Chi, 
2019). On November 24, 2018, Taiwan received the unexpected result, as the majority of voters 
cast their votes in favor of abolishing the provision that all “nuclear-energy-based power-
generating facilities shall wholly stop running by 2025” (Wu, Ku, & Kao, 2018). This was a 
small victory for the PNEC against the DPP and the ANEC. In the aftermath of the referendum, 
the president aspirant Eric Chu of the KMT also claimed that “[he] would be willing to restart 
the fourth nuclear power plant” (Yeh, Wang, Yu, & Hsu, 2019). Yet, President Tsai claimed that 
despite the passage of a referendum against the 2025 deadline, the initial goal of making Taiwan 
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a nuclear-free homeland remains unchanged. The Tsai administration also noted that the 
decommissioning process of all three power plants is already underway, and it might be too late 
to postpone the phase out of these power plants.
115
 As Taiwan is getting ready for the 2020 
presidential election, the nuclear debate over the fourth power plant at Lungmen is about to start 
all over again. 
Policy Implication: Nuclear Weapons Debates 
A. Nuclear Weapons Chatter: China’s Role in Taiwan’s nuclear decision 
Despite the “One China” dispute, the economic ties between the island and the mainland 
have thrived in recent decades. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan‟s export 
volume to China in 2017 was approximately $89 billion, engrossing nearly 28% of Taiwan‟s 
exports by value (“Bureau of Trade - Trade statistics,” 2018). Furthermore, Taiwan‟s total export 
volume to Hong Kong was $41.2 billion in 2017. The total export volume across the strait was 
over $130.2 billion in 2017, constituting more than 40% of Taiwan‟s total export volume (“TW‟s 
Top 10 export destinations,” 2018). Over the past two decades, Taiwan‟s economy has become 
deeply intertwined with mainland China. Ironically, the trade between Taiwan and China started 
to grow exponentially from 2000 to 2008, during the Chen administration who advocated 
independence from China. Some of the security experts argued that the DPP, especially the 
independence-minded right wing of the DPP, might be tempted to proceed with a nuclear 
weapons program.  
Yet, since its establishment in 1986, the DPP strongly opposed nuclear energy and 
nuclear weapons. The DPP, who is committed to Taiwan‟s independence from China, is pushing 
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Taiwan in the direction of dismantling the civilian nuclear program which goes against any 
possible revival of the nuclear weapons program in the future. Former President Chen Sui-bian 
of the DPP ran successfully on the non-nuclear energy and weapons policies platform during the 
2000 presidential election (Mitchell, 2004). Former President Chen Sui-bian expressed a 
willingness to undertake a “journey of peace” to China during his presidency to maintain the 
cordial trade relationship with China and Hong Kong (Lijun, 2001). Despite the cross-strait 
conflict between Taiwan and China, by the end of the Chen administration, China was already 
the number one trading partner of Taiwan.  
The trade between China and Taiwan continued to grow at a moderate rate during the Ma 
administration. As President Ma and the KMT accepted the „1992 consensus‟, the KMT opposed 
nuclear weapons acquisition and pursued closer political and economic ties with mainland China. 
In June 2010, President Ma signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
with China which removed tariffs on 539 Taiwanese products to China and 267 Chinese products 
to Taiwan (Hornby, 2010). The Legislative Yuan ratified the ECFA in August 2010 without a 
single dissenting vote from the opposition party (“Historic Taiwan-China trade deal takes effect,” 
2010). Furthermore, Taiwan set up its first government office in Beijing, as Taipei and Beijing 
agreed to open tourism between Taiwan and mainland China. As the relationship between 
Taiwan and China has strengthened in various areas such as politics, economics, and person to 
person exchange, it would be tough to detach China‟s influence from Taiwan‟s decision-making 
process.  
According to the Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences‟ Institute 
of Taiwan Studies, Zhou Zhihuai, President Ma successfully ended a cross-strait crisis by 
accepting the „1992 consensus‟ during his presidency; however, he noted that this could be all 
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ruined if the DPP returned to power in 2016. The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party Xi Jinping warned Taiwan in 2016 that, “if the „1992 consensus‟ is denied, negotiations 
across the strait cannot continue and all the agreements made in the past cannot be fulfilled. 
Cross-strait relations will return to the volatile situation of the past” (“Xi warns Taiwan on „1992 
consensus,‟” n.d.). Unfortunately for Zhou and Beijing, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP outbid Eric 
Chu of the KMT to become the president of Taiwan in January 2016.  
As the Tsai administration and the DPP did not embrace the „1992 consensus,‟ tension 
has been once again escalating on Taiwan Strait since 2016. Once more, security experts argued 
that the DPP, especially the independence-minded right wing of the DPP, might be tempted to 
proceed with a nuclear weapons program if push becomes shove. However, following her 
predecessor Chen Sui-bian, President Tsai also ran successfully on the non-nuclear policy 
platform during the 2016 presidential election. The debate over Taiwan‟s nuclear capabilities in 
international politics is mixed. Some nuclear experts claim that if Taiwan reverses its non-
nuclear weapons policy and decides to develop nuclear weapons, it could build nuclear weapons 
within a year or two, while other experts argue that Taiwan has dismantled its weapons facilities 
irreversibly. It seems the Tsai administration has lifted the hands of those who argued that 
Taiwan would maintain non-nuclear weapons policy by vigorously promoting nuclear free 
Taiwan by 2025. If Taiwan successfully decommissions all of its civilian nuclear reactors by 
2025, it would reinforce a strong recent tendency in Taiwan to choose paths of future energy 
development that does not involve nuclear power and also remove any possible revival for the 
nuclear weapons program in Taiwan.  
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Conclusion 
The plan to phase out nuclear power in Taiwan felt like smooth sailing until Taiwan 
voters unexpectedly decided to repeal the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Electricity Act via 
referendum on November 24, 2018.
116
 In the aftermath of the referendum, the cabinet 
spokeswoman Kolas Yotaka stated, “the government's goal of making Taiwan a nuclear-free 
homeland by 2025 remains unchanged,” even after the 1st paragraph of Article 95 is removed 
from the Electricity Act (Wu, Ku, & Kao, 2018). However, the significant electricity outage and 
an unexpected result from the referendum reinitiated the nuclear debate over the fourth power 
plant at Lungmen for the upcoming 2020 presidential election. In recent years, Taiwan‟s pursuit 
of nuclear technology has been limited to peaceful usage. Unlike Japan and South Korea, the 
nuclear weapons debates or hedging statements, within both the political and public spheres were 
practically non-existent. Furthermore, since the 1995 nuclear weapons comment by President 
Lee Tang-hui, politicians from the KMT or the DPP did not utilize nuclear weapons as a political 
tool to rouse their political base or to bring their political bases together before the general and 
presidential elections. There are still some vocal proponents of nuclear weapons, who stress 
Taiwan‟s need to acquire nuclear weapons to deter China. However, unlike Japan and South 
Korea, the PNWC is either almost non-existent in Taiwan or is indeed dormant for the time 
being.    
Taiwan‟s nuclear orientation has shifted from the original position that it had prior to the 
Fukushima incident. In the post-Fukushima era, the interactions between the domestic coalitions 
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 Under the Referendum Act, for a referendum to pass, the number of voters in favor of a proposition must exceed 
the number who vote against it and reach one quarter of the voters eligible to cast votes in referendums. Out of 54% 
eligible voters who cast their votes, 5,895,560 votes were casted in favor of abolishing the provision that all 
“nuclear-energy-based power-generating facilities shall wholly stop running by 2025,” whereas 4,014,215 voted 
against the initiative. 
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within the nuclear policy arena resulted in three directives. The debate over safety and economy 
by the PNEC, the ANEC, and public opinion established two directives as follows: 1) Gradually 
phase out nuclear energy, and 2) explore alternative renewable energy sources. The security 
debates for the nuclear weapons established one directive as follows: 1) Maintain the non-
nuclear policy.  
Out of the three states under discussion, Taiwan is the one that is most likely to undergo a 
drastic and far-reaching change in their nuclear policy decision-making. In the post-Fukushima 
era, nuclear policy changes occurred alongside the policy preference shift of domestic coalitions 
and social norms. The shift of public opinions since the Fukushima incident reinforced the ideals 
of an anti-nuclear camp. The nuclear orientation of Taiwan is moving toward zero-nuclear 
energy. Yet the recent electricity shortage and downturn of the economy are putting the KMT 
and the PNEC back on the offensive against the ANEC. Taiwan‟s debate over nuclear energy 
will continue into the 2020 presidential election. This will, at least for now, push back the 
timeline for removing any possibility of reviving the nuclear weapons program in Taiwan.  
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Chapter 6 Findings and Prospects 
In Japan, the economic agenda is still taking precedence over safety and security. 
However, the importance of the security agenda has increased with the rise of nuclear North 
Korea, the military rise of China and the surge of Japanese nationalism. As a result, Japan‟s 
nuclear orientation is circling back to its original position prior to the Fukushima incident and 
taken one step beyond nuclear latency. In South Korea, the economic and safety agenda has 
taken priority over security concerns in the nuclear policy arena. Despite a long-standing pro-
nuclear energy policy, post-Fukushima South Korea is ambivalent towards its nuclear orientation, 
as the Korean public is evenly split between the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear energy camps in 
2018. South Korea decided to gradually phase out nuclear power by 2060 and to not pursue ENR 
technologies or facilities. At least for now, South Korea‟s nuclear orientation is moving toward 
denuclearization by 2060. Yet, the international community needs to keep a close eye as South 
Korea intentionally or unintentionally violated the IAEA regulations several times since the mid-
1980s to its ratification of the IAEA additional protocol in 2004. Moreover, even though public 
support for nuclear weapons is showing a downward trend since 1999, support for nuclear 
weapons remains over 50% in South Korea. 
In contrast to Japan and South Korea, the safety agenda has taken priority over both the 
economic and security agendas in Taiwan‟s nuclear policy arena. Taiwan‟s landmass is small in 
size; therefore, a nuclear incident similar to the Fukushima disaster would put the entirety of 
Taiwan at high risk. Although Taiwan faces constant political, economic, and military pressures 
from mainland China, Taiwan is aiming to decommission all of its nuclear power plants by 2025, 
removing any possibility of reviving the nuclear weapons program in Taiwan. Political 
segmentation and competition in these states‟ nuclear policy arenas allow us to test which 
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conditions are essential for decision-makers and examine how these domestic coalitions pressure 
the decision-makers to enact policies that advance the substantive agendas or ideological 
perspectives of narrower constituencies. These new political agendas have allowed new political 
coalitions with different nuclear agendas to emerge and gain power in the nuclear policy arenas 
of these states.  
Comprising case studies of JST, the preceding chapters represent a controlled comparison 
of these three states‟ nuclear decisions in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. The objective 
of this research has been primarily analytical, aiming at a better understanding of why JST are 
experiencing different outcomes in their nuclear decisions in the post-Fukushima era and how 
these deviating outcomes will influence these states‟ non-nuclear weapons policies in the coming 
years. In an effort to shed light on this question, the evolution of nuclear debates, policy 
consensus, and competition within the nuclear policy arena of these three states are examined. 
Furthermore, each case study chapter analyzed how these changing nuclear debates, policy 
consensus, and competition within the nuclear policy arena affected the politics and nuclear 
orientation of these three states.  
The post-Fukushima environment, with multiple political coalitions, makes the nuclear 
policy arena the perfect testbed to examine how international and domestic conditions, such as 
the economy, security, safety, and social norms, interact and compete for political influence, and 
how these conditions are filtered through domestic politics during decision-making processes. 
The nuclear policy arenas provide spaces where these filtered conditions can interact and 
compete for political power which can influence the final decision. These debates and 
interactions can serve as measures of how much influential power each condition or coalition has 
within the nuclear policy arena. However, it would be difficult to quantify which condition(s) 
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and coalition(s) have the most influential power within the nuclear policy arena of each state. 
Nonetheless, examining the events and nuclear debates chronologically and matching them to the 
current nuclear orientation of a state can, at least qualitatively, help us understand which 
coalition is leading each nuclear debate and how each coalition interacts with the others within 
the nuclear policy arena. 
Since the second nuclear age, JST, as allies of the United States in Northeast Asia, have 
been walking a similar path regarding their nuclear decisions. These states faced similar external 
and internal threats throughout the Cold War. South Korea constantly faced provocations from 
North Korea, whereas Taiwan faced similar provocation from China. Japan, albeit to a lesser 
extent, also faced similar provocation from North Korea and China. South Korea and Taiwan, 
were under authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War. Both authoritarian leadership in 
South Korea and Taiwan justified themselves by claiming that a dictatorship was necessary to 
remove all non-democratic elements within their states and to fast track their economies. Japan 
was overwhelmingly dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for nearly five decades. 
All three states enjoyed successful modernization with high economic growth. Authoritarian 
regimes in South Korea and Taiwan, as well as the LDP throughout the Cold War, strongly 
favored the nuclear policy of maximizing nuclear energy because they were constrained by 
energy security and economic challenges. These states decided to abandon their clandestine 
nuclear weapons programs in favor of robust civilian nuclear energy programs. 
By the 1990s, these three states ended their longtime one-party dominated political 
systems. South Korea and Taiwan started the democratization and liberalization processes in the 
late 1980s and became consolidated democracies by the mid-1990s with multi-party political 
systems. In the 1990s, the LDP was still the dominant party in the Japanese Diet, but it lost the 
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one-party dominance it had maintained from the 1950s to the 1980s. Even after the one-party 
dominated political system, the PNECs were the only domestic coalitions from these states 
which enjoyed the full backing of both the political and public spheres prior to the Fukushima 
incident. In the case of Japan, the ANWC was also backed by both the political and public 
spheres, but their influence within the political sphere has weakened as the power of the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) declined within the National Diet. 
Prior to the Fukushima incident, the nuclear policy preference of domestic coalitions in 
JST was very similar. The PNECs of these states aimed to maximize their nuclear energy and 
sought enrichment and reprocessing technologies and facilities to achieve a complete nuclear 
fuel cycle for the purpose of energy security and economy. The PNECs of these states do not 
deny possible unintended consequences. Nevertheless, the PNECs have been promoting the 
importance of enrichment and reprocessing technologies for completing the nuclear fuel cycle. It 
has been argued by South Korean and Japanese nuclear experts that it is cost-effective and 
economically viable for a state to acquire both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
facilities when a state owns more than 20 nuclear reactors. The complete nuclear fuel cycle is 
essential for maintaining stable nuclear fuel supplies and for the growth of their nuclear 
industries in the world market. Unlike the PNECs, given the constraints on nuclear weapons 
domestically and internationally, the PNWCs of these states have sought a more realistic goal, 
latent nuclear capability, and have done so throughout the pre-Fukushima era. Nevertheless, a 
problem with these two nuclear technologies is that they provide two pathways for acquiring 
nuclear weapons. For the PNWCs, the cost-effective and economically viable argument was a 
way to obtain enrichment and reprocessing technologies and facilities while playing safely 
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within the boundaries of the NPT and international expectations. This allows the PNWCs to 
obtain dual-usage technologies while concealing their true intentions. 
Unlike Japan where the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were the embedded norm, the 
ANWCs of South Korea and Taiwan were almost non-existent. The concept of nonproliferation 
did not exist in South Korea and Taiwan prior to the Fukushima incident. Furthermore, nuclear 
weapons were positively portrayed in South Korea as symbols of independence. In the aftermath 
of the Fukushima incident, the ANWCs were incorporated into the ANECs of these states under 
the broader theme of the zero nuclear policy. However, the ANECs of these three states had a 
hard time gaining consistent political support from both the political and public spheres prior to 
the Fukushima incident. The majority of these states‟ populations supported maximizing nuclear 
energy for the sake of economic growth; however, the public opinions of these states differed 
concerning nuclear weapons.  
Figure 6.1: Nuclear Policy Preference by Domestic Coalitions Post-Fukushima Incident 
 
Solingen (2007) predicted that “different dynamics could be at work, triggering 
conditions under which internationalizing [or other domestic] models may no longer provide 
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sufficient conditions for continued denuclearization” (p. 286). Too many international and 
domestic conditions have changed in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident since these states 
abandoned their nuclear weapons programs. The Fukushima incident opened the floodgates to 
closed information that was once regulated by the government. It also introduced more 
transparency to all nuclear discussions in JST. 
In the post-Fukushima era, there have been significant nuclear policy preference shifts in 
the realm of social norms [See Figure 6.1]. The majority of the public opinion of Japan and 
Taiwan are in favor of zero-nuclear energy policy. In the case of South Korea, public opinion has 
been evenly split in the debates of both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Another significant 
preference shift was by the PNWCs of these states. As the civilian nuclear program was 
threatened to be shut down permanently, the PNWCs of these states moved beyond nuclear 
latency and were becoming more vocal about acquiring indigenous nuclear weapons or U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons.  
As a result of multiple coalitions fighting for their own agendas within the nuclear policy 
arena, Taiwan has decided to decommission its six nuclear reactors by 2025. In 2017, Taiwan‟s 
decision-makers stipulated a policy of a „nuclear free homeland by 2025‟ in Article 95 of the 
Electricity Act (Lin, 2018). South Korea is in an awkward position, as it would like to gradually 
phase out domestic nuclear energy and replace it with alternative energy sources while also 
expanding its nuclear industry in international markets. In September 2012, the ruling 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) initiated the process of decommissioning nuclear reactors by 
2039. However, this initiative was quickly terminated as the conservative LDP under Shinzo Abe 
reclaimed the Japanese Diet in early 2013. Seven years after Fukushima, Japan is gradually 
circling back to nuclear power and remains in the zone of nuclear latency. In contrast, South 
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Korea and Taiwan have moved away from fence-sitting and are once more moving toward 
denuclearization. However, unlike Taiwan, the direction of nuclear orientation of South Korea 
does not seem likely to be a permanent move. If the conservative party reclaims the Blue House 
in the coming years, the nuclear orientation of South Korea can reverse its direction just as Japan 
did under the Abe administration. 
Policy Implications for Nuclear Debates  
A. Nuclear energy debates  
As these states lack natural energy resources, they all have persistently worked toward 
maximizing nuclear energy for the purposes of their economies and energy security. Prior to the 
Fukushima incident, Japan was already one of the world‟s leading nuclear suppliers. South 
Korea was just entering their own nuclear renaissance as they had just won their first overseas 
bid to build four nuclear reactors at UAE in 2009. Taiwan was constructing its fifth and sixth 
nuclear reactors at Lungmen, near Taipei, to increase its nuclear output to cover 20% of its total 
energy mix. A month before the Fukushima incident, 62 nuclear reactors were under 
construction and 156 more reactors were either already signed to be built or in the process of 
negotiation worldwide. The world was entering the nuclear renaissance. South Korean presidents 
and Japanese prime ministers visited and made executive promises to win bids against old 
members of NSG, especially France, as this was a window of opportunity for these states to gain 
market shares of nuclear power plants. Yet, this nuclear renaissance was short lived in these 
states, as the tsunami engulfed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants in 2011.  
In Japan, as seen in chapter 3, the PNEC‟s and the PNWC‟s interest in energy security 
and nuclear latency were the main drivers of Japan‟s nuclear energy ambition in the pre-
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Fukushima era. However, in the post-Fukushima era, there is a vigorous debate over the safety of 
nuclear power between the PNEC and the ANEC which is threatening the PNEC‟s and the 
PNWC‟s interest in energy security and nuclear latency. In the aftermath of the Fukushima 
incident, the ANEC has been pushing for a zero-nuclear policy with the full support from both 
the political and public spheres. However, even with the majority of the public opinion diverging 
from the Japanese government on the matter of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, the gap 
between the public and leadership did not impact the general elections because safety concerns 
did not translate into a vote. This indicated that economy and security still took precedence over 
safety in Japan. Thus, as the LDP took control of both the upper and lower house of the National 
Diet, the Abe administration was able to slowly restart Japan‟s nuclear reactors while turning a 
blind eye to the public opinion in the name of economic prosperity and national security.  
As for South Korea, explored in chapter 4, the Fukushima incident provided a hurdle 
domestically but provided an opportunity for South Korea to further penetrate the nuclear market 
overseas, especially replacing Japan as one of the top nuclear suppliers in the world market. 
Despite a long-standing pro-nuclear energy policy, post-Fukushima South Korea is ambivalent 
towards its nuclear orientation, as the Korean public is evenly split between the pro-nuclear 
energy and the anti-nuclear energy camps in 2018. In the post-Fukushima era, the safety of 
nuclear power has been furiously debated in both the political and public spheres. Similar to 
Japan, the ANEC gained momentum within the nuclear policy arena as progressive parties 
defected to the anti-nuclear energy camp. However, unlike Japan, this momentum did translate 
into votes in the 2017 presidential election. Furthermore, the ANEC‟s agenda to phase out 
nuclear power became the national agenda, as the Moon administration proposed a substantive 
plan to phase out nuclear power by 2060. However, as South Korea started to experience an 
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electricity shortage and a rise in electricity prices, the South Korean public opinion shifted back 
to supporting nuclear energy. Furthermore, it is difficult to give up on the construction of nuclear 
power plants overseas and nuclear technologies because they are becoming one of the hottest 
export commodities for South Korea. Thus, the debate over nuclear power between the PNEC 
and the ANEC will be ongoing in South Korea for the foreseeable future.  
The Fukushima incident, as explored in chapter 5, reinitiated the debate nationwide over 
the continued use of nuclear power in Taiwan. As nuclear power plants in Jinshan and Kuosheng 
had been ranked as the most dangerous nuclear power plants in the world, nuclear safety issues 
were raised quickly in Taiwan in the post-Fukushima era. The ANEC quickly gained momentum 
in the nuclear policy arena and became the dominant power in the nuclear policy decision-
making process. By the 2016 presidential election, the Kuomintang (KMT) also defected to the 
anti-nuclear energy camp, removing all of the political hurdles to phase out nuclear power. As a 
result, both the DPP, a ruling party, and the KMT, an opposition party, supported the agenda of 
the ANEC to free Taiwan from nuclear energy by 2025.  
In the post-Fukushima era, all three states experienced a massive defection from both the 
political and public spheres from the PNECs to the ANECs. The majority of the populations 
from these states were concerned about the safety of nuclear power and were all in favor of 
phasing out nuclear power. Yet, this concern over the safety of nuclear power did translate into 
votes in South Korea and Taiwan but did not translate into votes in Japan. This indicates that in 
the case of Japan, economic issues still prevail over safety concerns, while safety issues 
dominate the economic concerns in the case of Taiwan. For South Korea, safety and economic 
concerns are evenly split in both the political and public spheres.  
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B. Nuclear weapons debates 
On the other hand, the rise of China‟s military, the arrival of North Korea as a self-
recognized nuclear power, the Japanese movement to normalize (remilitarize), and alliance 
abandonment concerns have increased tensions within JST, between neighboring states, and in 
the region. As allies of the United States in the region, these states face similar security 
environments and concerns. As examined in the preceding chapters, these states‟ civilian nuclear 
programs were initially launched with the nuclear weapons program as their long-term objective. 
Despite the fact that these states discontinued their nuclear weapons programs and maintained a 
solid record of adhering to their policies of peaceful usage of nuclear energy, the United States 
and the international community were always, and still are, suspicious about these states‟ 
intentions to pursue dual-usage nuclear technologies.  
In the post-Fukushima era, as examined in chapter 3, the ANEC and the ANWC, with the 
backing of the Japanese Peace Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, supported a 
zero-nuclear policy while the PNEC tried to disassociate with the PNWC by getting out of the 
back-end (reprocessing) process of the nuclear fuel cycle debate. The ANEC and the ANWC 
understand that shutting down all nuclear reactors was a first step to remove all fissile materials 
from Japan, which could eventually block the pathways leading to the development of nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, Japan decided to shut down the Monju fast breeder reactor in 2016. This 
was a major problem for the PNWC as the Monju fast breeder was the rationale for the 
reprocessing program in Japan. Consequently, Japan lost the legitimacy of maintaining its large 
amounts of plutonium stockpile. The unfavorable situation forced the PNWC‟s hand to take a 
step beyond nuclear latency by establishing a further legal basis for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
The PNWC has amended the Atomic Basic Energy Law of 1955 and is pushing for the revision 
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of the Japanese Peace Constitution to establish a legal basis for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
These actions are significant because whatever is stated within the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 
1955 is officially recognized as law, whereas the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which stops the 
manufacturing, possessing, and permitting of nuclear weapons, is merely a norm. Furthermore, 
Prime Minister Abe is utilizing the nuclear option to rouse nationalistic sentiments and to gain 
political backing from conservative constituencies and right-wing organizations. The movement 
to amend the Japanese Peaceful Constitution and the movement to set the foundation for nuclear 
latency and to acquire nuclear weapons could all be part of one nationalistic movement to make 
Japan great again.  
Most experts argue that the strong public support against acquiring nuclear weapons 
based on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and formidable domestic institutional barriers against 
nuclearization make it highly unlikely that Japan would emerge as a nuclear state in the 
foreseeable future. The PNWC does not expect to develop nuclear weapons any time soon. Yet, 
throughout the years, Japanese leadership, especially the LDP leadership, has shown political 
consistency in making nuclear hedging statements. These hedging statements should not be taken 
lightly. The surprising and sudden revision of the Atomic Basic Energy Law of 1955 in 2012, 
while the LDP was the largest opposing party, exposed the weakness of the Japanese domestic 
institutional barrier to stop the PNWC‟s nuclear ambition. This also indicates that political 
consistency, if needed, can and could take action necessary to achieve or maintain its objective. 
Thus, Japan needs to be closely monitored as nationalism continues to surge and leadership 
continues to make nuclear hedging statements. Moreover, domestic institutional barriers, at least 
within the legality of nuclear weapons, have been broken. The Atomic Basic Energy Law, which 
was amended in 2012, could now provide the legal basis necessary for acquiring nuclear 
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weapons for the purpose of national security. Finally, Japanese leadership, especially the LDP, 
have shown a tendency to disregard public opinion for the sake of economy and security.   
Unlike Japan, South Korea, as explained in chapter 4, does not possess enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities or weapon grade plutonium. South Korea continuously seeks enrichment 
and reprocessing technologies within the boundaries of nonproliferation. The PNEC gave up on 
enrichment technology and is pursuing different paths to accomplish the front-end of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. South Korea also received a conditional agreement with the United States to jointly 
research pyroprocessing, which could be the future of nuclear reprocessing without proliferation 
concerns.  
Unlike Japan, the political leadership of South Korea since the 1990s has shown political 
inconsistency in regards to acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear latency. As explained in 
chapter 4, the nuclear weapons debates in the political sphere were used by the conservative 
politicians to rouse the public before the general or presidential elections. However, the nuclear 
weapons debates were ignored by the conservative politicians and conservative political parties 
when the conservative party was in control of the Blue House and the National Assembly. 
Furthermore, the percentage of public support for nuclear weapons in South Korea has steadily 
declined since the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea in 2006. Thus, fearing a public 
backlash, there has been less chatter about acquiring U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or developing 
indigenous nuclear weapons by the PNWC in the political sphere.  
This study also contends that, at the international level, economic interdependence with 
China changed South Korean public perception and foreign policy behavior. South Korea‟s 
strategy to deter nuclear threats while remaining a non-nuclear weapons state has centered on its 
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security treaty with the United States. However, since the U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of 
China, South Korea‟s strategy has also incorporated the idea of maintaining a favorable 
relationship with China. By the beginning of the 21st century, South Korea was so intertwined 
with the Chinese economy that South Korea was essentially, voluntarily and involuntarily, 
appeasing China on all levels. Furthermore, President Park personally assured President Xi 
Jinping during his visit in July 2014 that South Korea will not develop its own nuclear weapons 
or request U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. 
 Due to the formidable domestic and external barriers against nuclearization and 
declining public support for nuclear weapons even in time of a security crisis, it is highly 
unlikely that South Korea would emerge as a nuclear state in the foreseeable future. However, 
unlike Japan and Taiwan, public support for nuclear weapons remains above 50% in South 
Korea. Kenneth Waltz (2003) pointed out, this might be a cause for concern, as “no country has 
been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to do so” (p. 38). 
As public support carries weight in decision-making in South Korea, the international 
community needs to keep a close eye on the public support for nuclear weapons in South Korea.  
Unlike Japan or South Korea, Taiwan, as examined in chapter 5, is not a nuclear supplier; 
therefore, it has not chased after enrichment and reprocessing technologies since the 
abandonment of its nuclear weapons program in 1988. The leadership of both the KMT and the 
DPP has shown political consistency in regards to nuclear weapons since the 1990s. Nuclear 
weapons debates, or hedging statements, within both the political and public spheres were almost 
non-existent. Politicians from the KMT or the DPP did not utilize nuclear weapons as a political 
tool to rouse their political base or to bring their political bases together. Based on their 
environment and electricity acts, Taiwan is at the verge of decommissioning all of its civilian 
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nuclear reactors. Even though some tacit knowledge will continue to exist, dismantling the 
civilian nuclear program removes any possibility of a nuclear weapons program revival in 
Taiwan.  
In the pre-Fukushima era, these states all remained, to some degree, within the zone of 
nuclear latency. However, in the post-Fukushima era, changing international and domestic 
conditions filtered through the lenses of domestic coalitions affected their nuclear weapons 
debates differently and resulted in various decision outcomes. Taiwan is moving toward 
complete denuclearization by removing its civilian nuclear programs. South Korea is gradually 
moving toward complete denuclearization via a gradual phase out of its nuclear power and 
finding different paths to complete its nuclear fuel cycle. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Japan 
has utilized a surge of nationalism and external threats from China and North Korea to move one 
step beyond nuclear latency by setting up the legal basis necessary for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Yet, these states‟ movements toward maintaining non-nuclear weapons policies have resulted in 
very pragmatic policy decisions to meet the conditions of both the international and domestic 
environments. Thus, this dissertation concludes that increased transparency over the nuclear 
debates and domestic institutional barriers created by the interactions between domestic 
coalitions make the emergences of nuclear-armed JST highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
Prospects 
It is highly unlikely that JST will reverse their non-nuclear weapons policies in the 
coming years. Even though geopolitical tensions started to escalate as China increased and 
modernized its military capability and North Korea started to conduct multiple nuclear and 
ballistic missile tests, these states continuously conveyed their intentions to uphold their non-
proliferation obligations stated in the NPT. Furthermore, these states have been very adamant 
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about their non-nuclear weapons policies while heavily condemning North Korea. As North 
Korea continued to conduct their nuclear tests, a domino effect or “reactive proliferation,” as 
many experts predicted did not occur in Northeast Asia.
117
  
However, there are still some possibilities that reactive proliferation could occur in 
Northeast Asia and spill over to other regions if either Japan or South Korea decides to go 
nuclear in the future. According to the findings of the case study chapters, this dissertation 
cautiously envisions that, for different domestic political reasons, Japan and South Korea are 
more prone to go nuclear than Taiwan if the U.S. nuclear umbrella fails to work properly in the 
coming years. Although Taiwan faced constant political, economic, and military pressures from 
the People‟s Republic of China (PRC), the nuclear weapons debate in both the political and 
public spheres has been almost non-existent since the abandonment of nuclear weapons in 1988. 
Furthermore, unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan has not shown an ambition to become a top 
nuclear supplier or to build a robust civilian nuclear program capable of hiding true intentions of 
nuclear latency. 
Japan has an ambition to become the power house of Asia once more. Thus, nuclear 
weapons might not be an end goal but a necessary step on its way to becoming a great power. 
This study contends that Japan is more prone to go nuclear due to its political motivations and 
the consistency shown by its leadership on the matter of nuclear hedging throughout the years. 
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, the Japanese leadership continuously used external threats, 
such as China and North Korea, to rouse nationalistic sentiment within the general population 
and to justify its remilitarization process. In particular, the surge of nationalism in Japan should 
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will lead other states to seek nuclear weapons as well to balance the power between two states.  
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be carefully monitored because this will not influence its short-term, but will influence its long-
term national strategy.
118
The surge of nationalism and the remilitarization of Japan could be a 
dangerous mix of traits which could force Japan to make a radical decision in regards to its non-
nuclear weapons policy. Furthermore, the Japanese leadership decided to move one-step beyond 
nuclear latency by setting up the legal basis necessary for acquiring nuclear weapons.  
In contrast, this study contends that South Korea is prone to go nuclear due to high 
public support for nuclear weapons. Even though public support for nuclear weapons is showing 
a pattern of downward trend since 1999, the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons is still popular 
among many South Koreans. The recent polls vary from 54% to 67%. As explained many times 
in the South Korean case study chapter, nuclear policy decisions by leadership were made or 
reversed in South Korea due to strong public opinions.  
However, this study contends that, if South Korea goes nuclear, it will be after Japan 
decides to go nuclear. Unlike Japan, who would like to become one of the global leaders in both 
economy and security, South Korea has taken the position of a middle power in international 
politics. Thus, South Korea tends to be more cautious about their actions within the realm of 
international politics. This has been more so in the field of nuclear technology. South Korea has 
been closely following the footsteps of Japan. Even so, South Korea has been denied in its 
attempt to challenge the United States to receive an approval for ENR technology. South Korea 
has utilized the fairness argument where it accuses the United States of differential treatment of 
its allies, as Japan did in the1970s and 1980s but without any success.  
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 The Japanese government is pursuing a policy to boost nationalism within the younger generations through the 
national curriculum within its education system. 
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Thus, if Japan decides to acquire nuclear weapons, this will likely trigger South Korea to 
follow its footsteps. South Korea tends to be more concerned about the military capability of 
Japan than they are about North Korea‟s nuclear weapons development. This is because Japan is 
the primary regional competitor for South Korea. Thus, even though there are no immediate 
concerns for these states to abandon their non-nuclear weapons policies, the international 
community needs to keep close eyes on the public support for the nuclear weapons in South 
Korea and the surge of nationalism and the remilitarization process that is currently in progress 
in Japan.  
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